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c>^/ra/^H<:>ovis/ 



THE BATTLES 



OF THE 



War for the Union 



BEING THE STORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR FROM 

THE ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO 

THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATOX. 

BY ^ 

PRESCOTX HOLME^S 



With Eighty Illustrations. 



PHILADELPHIA '\^'L\'^ - (L "^ 



Henry altemus 



N ^ 



A-x 






Copyrighted by Henry Altcmus, of I'hilaJelphia, in the State of Pennsyl- 
vania, on June 4, i8qt, in the One Hundred and Twentieth Year 0/ 
the Independence o/the United States 0/ America. 



Henry Altemus, Manufacturer, 
philadelphia. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. THE SECESSION MOVEMENT ... 9 
Lincoln Inaugurated — "Confederate States" Government 
Formed — Jefferson Davis Declared President of the Southern 
Confederacy — Fort Sumter Bombarded — Its Surrender — The 
Rush to Arms — Richmond Made the Capital of the Con- 
federacy — Harpers' Ferry Evacuated by the Union Forces — 
The Norfolk Navy Yard Evacuated and Burned — Robert E. 
Lee Placed in Command of the Confederate Forces in Vir- 
ginia — Massachusetts Troops Fired Upon in Baltimore — 
General Irwin McDowell in Virginia. — Battle of Big Bethel — 
The First Union Defeat — The Shenandoah Valley — General 
George B. McClellan's Campaign in Western Virginia — Rich 
Mountain — McClellan Commands the Army of the Potomac — 
English Government Confers Belligerent Rights on the Con- 
federates — Confederate Privateers — "On to Richmond" — 
General Beauregard — Battle of Bull Run — Joseph E. John- 
ston and " Stonewall " Jackson — The Union Forces Defeated 
— Stampede to Washington — Battle of Ball's Bluff — Another 
Defeat for the Union Troops. 

CHAPTER II. THE CAMPAIGNS IN THE WEST (1862) . 47 
McClellan Made Commander of the Union Forces — Formu- 
lates Plans of Campaigns — General Halleck in the West — 
Fort Henry Attacked by General Grant and Commodore 
Foote, and the Ironclads — " Unconditional Surrender " of Fort 
Henry — Operations Against Fort Donelson — Generals Floyd, 

(5) 



6 CONTENTS. 

Pillow, and Buckner — Donelson Taken — Johnston Abandons 
Nashville, and Retreats to Murfreesboro — Grant and Buell 
Advance — Island No. lo Attacked — The Position Surrenders 
to Commodore Foote — Battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shi- 
loh — Albert Sidney Johnston Killed — Success Crowns the 
Union Arms — Fort Pulaski, Near Savannah, Bombarded and 
Captured — Fall of New Orleans — The Submission of Natchez 
— Butler Superseded by Banks — The First Attack on Vicksburg 
— The Siege Abandoned — Bragg Succeeds Beauregard — 
Guerilla Warfare — Movements in Kentucky — Union Troops 
Surprised and Defeated by Kirby Smith — Bragg Defeats 
Buell — Rosencrans Assumes Command of Buell's Army — 
Battle of Corinth — Confederates Defeated — Joseph E. John- 
ston Commands the Confederates in the West — Attacks 
Rosencrans — Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesboro — Confed- 
erates Repulsed — Morgan and Forrest's Guerilla Depreda- 
tions — Sherman Attacks Vicksburg — Haines' Bluff. 

CHAPTER III. THE " MONITOR ' ' AND THE " MERRIMAC " I 1 6 
The Naval Engagement in Hampton Roads — Shot-proof 
Vessels — The Merrimac — Her First Successes — Destruction 
of the Cumberland, and Others of the Wooden Fleet — Des- 
cription of the Monitor — The Great Combat Between the 
Mailed Vessels — The Merrimac Disabled — The Blockading 
Fleet Saved. 

CHAPTER IV. THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, FROM 

YORKTOWN TO GETTYSBURG . . . . . I28 

The Union Army Crosses into Virginia — McClellan in Com- 
mand — Forward Movement — Winchester — Yorktown Cap- 
tured — Williamsburg Occupied — Norfolk Evacuated, and 
Burned by the Confederates — McClellan's Reverses — "Stone- 
wall " Jackson in the Valley — Banks Surprised — Fremont 
and Shields Attacked — Jackson Escapes — Battle of Seven 
Pines, or Fair Oaks — Confederates Defeated — Jackson Re- 



CONTENTS. 7 

inforces Lee — The Seven Days' Battles — General Pope Super- 
sedes McClellan — Cedar Mountain — Second Battle at Bull 
Run, or Manassas — Union Forces Retreat to Washington — 
McClellan Reinstated — Lee Enters Maryland — Harper's 
Ferry Surrenders — Battle of Antietam — Lee Repulsed and 
Retreats to Virginia — McClellan Removed and the Com- 
mand Conferred on General Burnside — Battle at Fredericks- 
burg — Burnside Defeated — General Joseph Hooker in Com- 
mand — Battle of Chancellorsville — Hooker Defeated — 
George G. Meade Commands the Union Forces — Lee Plans 
to Conquer a Peace Upon the Soil of the Loyal States, and 
Invades Pennsylvania — Battle of Gettysburg — Confederate 
Successes the First Day — Generals Hancock and Longstreet — 
Confederates Repulsed — Pickett's Famous Charge — Lee 
Defeated — Northern Invasion Abandoned. 

CHAPTER V. vicKSBURG, and the operations in 

THE WEST (1863) ...... 192 

The Reduction of Vicksburg Determined Upon by Grant — 
Porter, and His Iron Clads — Haines' Bluff Abandoned by 
the Confederates — General Pemberton Shut Up in Vicksburg 
— Vicksburg Bombarded — Its Siege and Surrender — Sherman 
and Johnston — Port Hudson Taken — The Conquest of the 
Mississippi — Operations in Tennessee — Rosencrans and Bragg 
— Battle of Chickamauga — Union Forces Retreat to Chatta- 
nooga — Grant's Arrival — Battle of Chattanooga — Bragg Re- 
moved from Command — Longstreet Before Knoxville — 
Sherman Relieves Knoxville. 

CHAPTER VI. CHARLESTON AND FORT SUMTER. . 235 

Expedition Against Charleston — The Ironclads Seriously In- 
jured — The Attack Abandoned — A Third Attack Begun by 
Lincoln's Orders — Forts Wagner and Sumter Bombarded 
— Sumter in Ruins — Charleston Bombarded — The Attack 
Abandoned. 



i*^ 



8 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VII. Sherman's march to the sea . 250 

Sherman Against Johnston — Generals Ilardee, Hood and 
Polk — Operations of McPherson — Thomas and Scliofield — 
The Siege of Atlanta — Sherman Captures Atlanta — Jefferson 
Davis Visits Hood, who Assumes the Defensive — Con- 
federates Repulsed — Beauregard Assumes Command — The 
March to the Sea — Atlanta Burned — Savannah Occupied — 
Hood in Sherman's Rear — Hood Surprises and Defeats Scho- 
field — Hood and Thomas — Battle of Nashville — Hood De- 
feated — Sherman in the Carolinas — Columbia (S. C.) Cap- 
tured and Burned — Charleston Evacuated by Hardee — The 
City Burned by the Confederates — Wilmington (N. C.) 
Taken — Schofield Moves to Goldsboro — Battle of Benton- 
ville — Sherman Reaches Grant's Headquarters. 

CHAPTER VIII. THE CLOSING battles in VIRGINIA 297 
Grant Commands all the Union Armies — Battles in the 
Wilderness — Meade and Hancock — Longstreet Wounded — 
Confederates Repulsed — Battle of Spottsylvania — General 
Sedgwick Killed — " I propose to fight it out on this line" — 
Battle of Cold Harbor— Attack on Petersburg — General Early 
Advances into Maryland — Washington Narrowly Escapes 
Capture — Early's Retreat — Burning of Chambersburg, in 
Pennsylvania — Sheridan Against Early — Battle of Cedar 
Creek— Sheridan "thirty miles away" — Early Defeated— 
Hancock Attacks Lee's Forces — Siege of Richmond — Fort 
Fisher Assaulted — Butler Superseded— A Second Assault — 
Fall of Fort Fisher — Peace Negotiations Opened by the Con- 
federates — Lincoln Insists on Absolute Submission — Lee 
Strikes at Grant with the View to Unite with Johnston's 
Forces — Attack on Fort Steadman — Battle of Five Forks — 
Confederates Retreat to Petersburg — Petersburg and Rich- 
mond Taken — Lee's Army Surrenders — President Lincoln 
Assassinated — Surrender of Johnston and Others — Jefferson 
Davis Captured — The Cost of the War in Blood and Money. 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



CHAPTER I. 
The Secession Movement.* 

On March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inaugu- 
rated President of the United States, surrounded by 
soldiers under the command of General Scott. During 
the campaign preceding the election, the Southern 
leaders had threatened to secede from the Union if 
Lincoln were elected. Charles A. Dana puts the case 
in the following succinct way: 

" The election of Abraham Lincoln was brought about 
by a dissension in the Democratic party. It was divided 
and the Republican party was united, and the conse- 
quence was his election. The great question at issue in 
that election was this : Shall the owners of slaves enjoy 
the right of taking their slaves into the Territories of 
the United States that are now free, and keeping them 
there ? The slave-owners claimed that right. Slaves 
were property. They were like other property, and why 
should their owners be denied the right of taking their 
property into the Territories, when a Northern man 
could take his property, his horses, his oxen, whatever 
he possessed ? The slaves were their oxen ; they were 
their chattels, and they insisted that they ought to have 
the right of taking them into the Territories and keep- 

*The history of the events leading up to the Civil War will be found 
in the " Lives of the Presidents," in Altemtis' Young People's Series. 

(9) 



IQ THE BATTLES FOR THE UNIOM. 

ing them there as slaves. That was the fundamental 
question of the election. And when Mr. Lincoln was 
elected, the South said : ' Now we are denied this 
right, we will break up the Government; we will secede; 
we will withdraw.' That right, too, they claimed as a 
constitutional principle. No Northerner had claimed it, 
though some ardent partisans had threatened it ; but 
several of the Southern States now set it up as an 
original, inalienable right. They claimed that the re- 
fusal to them of the right to take their property with 
them when they went to live in one of the new Terri- 
tories, was sufficient occasion for the withdrawal from 
the Union of the slave-holding States, and for the break- 
ing up of the Government." 

The South had been contemplating rebellion for 
years, and had only refrained from attempting it because 
hitherto she had pretty generally had her own way. 
The choice of Lincoln immediately determined their 
resolution. John B. Floyd, of Virginia, the Secretary 
of War under Buchanan, had quietly contrived that the 
arsenals of all the Northern States should be stripped 
of their arms and ammunition, and those warlike mate- 
rials concentrated in the Southern section of the Union. 

South Carolina naturally led off in the Secession 
movement, her Ordinance of Secession being adopted 
on November 17, i860; Georgia came next, and the 
remainder of the border (or planting) States quickly 
followed. Virginia joined two days after the fall of 
Sumter. 

On February 9, 1861, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, 
was declared President, and Alexander II. Stephens, of 
Georgia, Vice-President of the Confederate States 
OF America. On March 4, 1861, the Confederate flag 
was unfurled from the State House at Montgomery, 
Alabama, and the Confederacy was inaugurated. 

Of moral justification for the disruption of the Union 




JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
{^President of the Southern Confederacy.) 



12 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



there was absolutely nothing. The South separated 
themselves from the Union from motives of transparent 
and avowed selfishness. Stephens declared that " the 
corner-stone of the new Confederacy was slavery." In 




MAJOR ROKERr ANDERSON. 



,^oi>^"'-" 



a few years that corner-stone was pulled out, and the 
whole fabric came toppling down in irremediable ruin. 

War between the new Slave Power and the Old 
Union was so certain to ensue that the South made in- 
stant preparations for the worst. The Southern Con- 
gress authorized Davis to accept 100,000 volunteers for 



,4 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

twelve months, and to borrow fifteen millions of dollars. 
And so great was the faith of most foreign nations in 
the permanence of the Confederacy that the bonds were 
circulated in Europe, and principally in England. This 
was one reason why English opinion, among the 
wealthy classes, was so largely enlisted in favor of Se- 
cession. The bondholders felt they had an interest in 
securing the triumph of the Southern aristocracy, and 
they brought every possible pressure to bear on their 
Government to force a recognition of the Confederacy, 
and the raising of the blockade. When the rebellion 
collapsed, great was the regret of these investors that 
they had relied upon the ability of a Slave Empire to 
stand up against the might of freedom. 

When the Lincoln Administration came into power 
sixteen forts were in possession of the Secessionists, who 
had thus acquired 1226 heavy guns to turn against the 
Federal authority. It should be remembered that the 
North was left, at the very commencement of the 
struggle with comparatively few educated officers. The 
greater number of those who graduated at the Military 
Academy at West Point, and continued in actual ser- 
vice, were Southern men ; and these, with comparatively 
few exceptions, although trained at the expense of the 
nation, and bound to loyalty by the most solemn oaths, 
at once joined the Southern forces. 

Fort Sumter (April 12, 1861). — The first gun was 
fired by the South on Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor. 
The fort was commanded by Major Anderson, with but 
70 men. It was bombarded by the forts and batteries 
under command of Peter G. T. Beauregard ; and for 
34 hours this little garrison of 70 men contested with 
7000 rebels, no one being hurt on cither side. The 
shells set fire to the barracks, and the garrison, worn 
out, suffocated and half-blinded, were forced to sur- 



FORT SUMTER. 



15 



render on April 13. The effect of this event was electri- 
cal. It unified both the South and the North ; the Amer- 
ican flag, the symbol of Revolutionary glory and of na- 
tional unity being unfurled thoroughout the North. 

If there had previously been any doubt as to the 
necessity of taking serious steps against the rising re- 
bellion, it was now evident that pacific measures were 
no longer possible. Until then, the shrinking from civil 
war had been so great that men were willing to compro- 




THE CONFEDERATE FLAG. 



mise matters with the South, even at the cost of not in- 
considerable sacrifices. But now a spirit of determined 
resistance to Southern aggression was aroused in every 
one of the Northern States. It was seen that a bloody 
struggle was inevitable, and men nerved themselves to 
meet the terrible demands that would be made upon 
their patriotism. A national fort had been seized ; a 
body of Federal troops had been defeated ; the flag of 
the Union had been lowered at the demand of traitors. 
The time for hesitation had gone by, and the Govern- 



l6 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

merit understood its duty. Lincoln issued a proclama- 
tion on April 15, declaring that the laws of the Republic 
had been for some time, and were then, opposed in the 
States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, " by combinations 
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course 
of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the 
marshals by law." The President accordingly called 
forth the militia of the other States of the Union, to the 
aggregate number of 75,000 men. He appealed to all 
loyal citizens " to favor, facilitate, and aid his efforts 
to maintain the honor, integrity, and existence of the 
National Union, and the perpetuity of popular govern- 
ment." This was responded to by 300,000 volunteers. 
The resolution of the North to fight for the existence of 
the Union has never been surpassed by any popular 
movement in any account of the world's history. 

The Secessionists audaciously thrust their capital into 
their northernmost State, and on April 20, made Rich- 
mond the Capital of the Confederacy. 

Troops were pushed into Virginia, and threatened 
Washington. The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, hur- 
rying to the defence of the National Capital, were 
attacked in Baltimore, and several men were killed. 
Thus, the first blood shed in the Civil War was on 
April 19, the eighty-sixth anniversary of Lexington and 
Concord. 

Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, was attacked on April 18. 
The commander, whose force was small, observed 
symptoms of dissatisfaction all around, and fearing that 
he could not withstand the attack that he knew was to 
be made, blew up the fort, crossed the river with his 
men, and retreated towards Pennsylvania. 

It was resolved by the Secessionists to seize the Navy 
Yard at Norfolk, Virginia, to prevent which it was 
determined to set fire to all the ships, together with all 



THE CALL FOR TROOPS. 



17 



the public buildings, and national property. The loss 
to the Government was estimated at seven millions of 
dollars. Eleven vessels were thus destroyed. The 
Merrimac was sufficiently uninjured, to be afterwards 
repaired by the Confederates, and to render service to 
their cause. 

Pennsylvania and Massachusetts were among the first 
to answer President Lincoln's call for troops. Fortress 
Monroe, situated on the point of land between the James 
and York Rivers, at the junction with the Potomac, was 
the only place now held by the Federal Government 
in Virginia. Those rivers were blockaded by what 
remained of the fleet, and the vessels were concentrated 
at Hampton Roads, near the fortress. 

Baltimore refused to allow foreign State troops to 
pass through her soil on the way to Washington. Lin- 
coln, feelipg his weakness, suggested that the troops pass 
round Baltimore instead of through it. He finally 
declared that troops must be had for the defence of 
Washington, and as they could come by no other route 
but Maryland, the people of Maryland must be content 
to let them pass. 

On April 20, Robert E. Lee, a Virginian, and an 
engineer officer of much distinction, connected by mar- 
riage with the family of Washington, separated himself 
from the Federal service, considering the claims of his 
State paramount, and went over to the Confederacy, and 
was made Commander of all the military and naval 
forces in Virginia. 

Maryland was reduced to submission before the end 
of April by an expedition of Massachusetts troops 
under Benjamin F. Butler, and New York's famous 
Seventh Regiment, under Colonel Lefferts. Butler was 
a lawyer, not trained to military life, but possessed of 
spirit, resolution, and audacity. He was placed in com- 
mand of the Department of Annapolis, which embraced 



1 8 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

the countr)' 20 miles on each side of the railway from 
Baltimore to Washington. Lefferts went on to Wash- 
ington to guard the capital. 

General Scott, the Commander-in-Chief, said the occu- 
pation of Baltimore was made without his knowledge 
or approbation, and required the Government to recall 
Butler from his post; and this was done. The President, 
however, was satisfied with the operations of this active 
leader, and immediately commissioned him as a Major- 
General of Volunteers, and the command of a large 
military district, including Eastern Virginia and the 
two Carolinas, with his headquarters at Fortress 
Monroe. 

Ever}- day the movement in the South was becoming 
more formidable; every day the s}'mpathizers with 
Secession in the border States were growing more 
dangerous and irreconcilable. It was now seen that the 
President's call for militia would not be sufficient to 
meet the attack which was evidently meditated by the 
South. Lincoln accordingly, in a proclamation issued 
on May 3, called into the service of the United States 
42,000 volunteers for three years ; ordered an increase 
of the regular army to the extent of 22,714 officers and 
enlisted men, for not less than one year, nor more than 
three years; and directed the enlistment of 18,000 sea- 
men for the naval service. The response to these 
demands showed how thoroughly in earnest were the 
people of the loyal States in their resistance to Secession. 
The number of volunteers exceeded the demands of the 
Government, and money, amounting to more than forty 
millions of dollars, was subscribed for the various pur- 
poses of the war. 

The Capitol at W^ashington was by this time changed 
into a great citadel. Troops occupied the legislative 
halls, the rotunda, and other chambers ; the basement 
galleries were converted into storerooms for the army ; 



THE CALL FOR TROOPS. 



19 



and the vaults under the terrace on the western front of 
the edifice were used as ovens, where 16,000 loaves were 
baked every day. Before the summer had fairly set in, 




BENJAMIN F. BUTI.ER. 



the Federal capital had been protected by a line of forti- 
fications and entrenchments, distributed along the 
ncitjhborinc: heights on the Viriiinian side of the Poto- 



20 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

mac, and presenting a formidable front to any hostile 
force coming from that direction, Major-General Mc- 
Dowell, an officer of the regular army, was placed in 
command of the troops on the south side of the river, 
and the greater portion of the district recently under 
the orders of General Butler was transferred to him. 
The Northern forces had now reached a total of about 
95,000 men, divided into eight distinct bodies, which 
were stationed in various parts of the country. Several 
of the men, however, were not yet armed, and but few 
of the regiments had acquired anything like efficient 
discipline. The chief rallying-place of the Confederate 
Army was at Manassas Junction, situated on the Orange 
and Alexandria Railway, about 25 miles west from the 
city of Alexandria, and thirty in a direct line from 
Washington, The position was important, as com- 
manding the great Southern railway route which con- 
nects Washington and Richmond, and also another line 
leading to the valley of the Shenandoah, beyond the 
Blue Ridge. Butler had at an early period recom- 
mended the occupation of that locality ; but Scott, whose 
measures at this time were marked by the extreme cau- 
tion of old age, took a different view, and the result 
was that the Confederates, acting with greater enterprise, 
seized the position, which they found of service as a 
menace against the Federal capital. 

Big Bethel (June 10, 1861). After fortifying New- 
port News — a point of land at the junction of the James 
River and Hampton Roads — Butler formed a design 
of attacking a Confederate force which had been sta- 
tioned at Big Bethel, about 15 miles off, on the road to 
Yorktown. This force was the advanced post of a 
rather considerable array of Southern troops under the 
command of Colonel Magruder, formerly an artillery 
officer in the U. S. Army. The main body was at York- 
town, whence expeditions were frequently sent out, 



BIG BETHEL. 21 

with the object of harassing the Union Army in the 
vicinity of Fortress Monroe. From observations, it 
became evident that Magruder was preparing to seize 
Newport News and Hampton, so that he might confine 
Butler to the fortress which he had made his headquar- 
ters. It was therefore resolved to take the initiative. 
The Confederate detachment at Big Bethel consisted of 
800 North Carolina Volunteers, and 360 Virginians, 
with a battery of five howitzers and one Parrott rifle- 
gun. Some field-works had been erected, and the posi- 
tion was naturally strong, owing to the surrounding 
forest and the presence of some swampy ground which 
protected the Confederate flanks. In front, at a place 
called Little Bethel, was a small picket of cavalry; and 
the whole detachment was under the command of 
Colonel D. H. Hill. The attacking force sent forward 
by Butler was composed of four regiments, under the 
direction of General Peirce. These started on the night 
of June 9, and their plan of operations was to send two 
regiments directly to the front, along the Fortress Mon- 
roe and Yorktown roads, while the other two were to 
endeavor to outflank the enemy. An unfortunate 
blunder deranged the execution of the scheme. The 
supporting regiments coming within sight of each other 
in the obscurity of the early morning, mutually mistook 
their forces for those of the enemy, and at once opened 
fire. The advanced guard, hearing the firing, and sup- 
posing that the enemy had got into their rear, fell back 
upon their supports ; and by the time the mistake was 
discovered, and the forward march resumed, all hope 
of surprising the enemy was at an end. The cavalry at 
Little Bethel had pressed on to Big Bethel, and nothing 
remained but to make a direct attack upon the latter 
position, in the hope of carrying the works at the point 
of the bayonet. Big Bethel was reached by ten o'clock. 
To take an entrenched position is a trying task even for 



22 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

well-seasoned troops: for raw and undisciplined volun- 
teers it is almost an impossibility. The men were led 
up to the charge, but failed to make any way. Though 
supported by the artillery, the Union regiments flinched 
before the Confederate batteries. What was wanting 
on their part was not courage — for they remained in the 
field nearly three hours, making scattered and desultory 
attacks — but coolness, knowledge, and concentration. 
Their losses were severe, and during the engagement two 
additional regiments from Fortress Monroe arrived on the 
spot, while four others were held in readiness to march 
to the front. On the right of the attacking force the 
Vermont companies distinguished themselves by great 
perseverance, gaining a position in the rear of the enemy, 
and silencing one of his batteries. About noon the 
Union troops were withdrawn. The retreat has been 
described as a rout. Doubtless it was somewhat pre- 
cipitate. The Confederates boasted much of their own 
valor at Big Bethel, and were unsparing in their de- 
nunciations of the cowardice, as they described it, ex- 
hibited by the Union troops. It must always be recol- 
lected, however, that it is one thing to hold a fortified 
position, and quite a different thing to attack it. 

The Shenandoah Valley. — The Federal authorities 
determined to send a body of troops up the valley of the 
Shenandoah, in conjunction with a movement of McClel- 
lan from the neighborhood of Grafton. It was necessary 
to the protection of Washington that the Confederates 
should be driven from Harper's Ferry, their possession 
of which would at anytime enable them to execute a flank 
attack on the capital. To effect this purpose, an army of 
20,000 men, under the command of General Patterson, 
was pushed forward from its camp in the neighborhood 
of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to Greencastle and Get- 
tysburg ; and at the same time troops were marched up 
the north bank of the Potomac to Rockville. These 




: ^MQ^>M'i 



11 1'l iiii 'I 






1^' 'ill hi 



i,aii ' 



ii'^JKi 



24 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



movements rendered it prudent for General Joseph E. 
Johnston to withdraw to some safer locality. His force 
was about 7000 in number, and he feared being over- 
whelmed by the gathering hosts. He therefore began 
his retreat on June 16, but, before doing so, he blocked 
up the railway and canal near the ferry by blasting 
the overhanging rocks. He destroyed the great bridge 
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway by blowing it up. 
Whatever guns he could not take with him he spiked; 
and, having burned another bridge a few miles higher 
up the Potomac, he marched along the valley, and en- 
camped for a time near Charleston. Patterson imme- 
diately afterwards crossed from Maryland into Virginia ; 
and was met with a demand from Scott to send him all 
the troops he could spare for the defence of Washington. 
In consequence Patterson was left with so small a force 
that he found it necessary to withdraw them at once 
across the Potomac. The explanation of this untoward 
event is, that there had been a panic at the capital. 
Immense Confederate forces were believed to be at 
Manassas. And as they had been placed under the 
vigorous control of Beauregard, it was feared an attempt 
would be made on Washington before Congress could 
meet on July 4. The danger was probably exagge- 
rated, but it was not imaginary, Washington swarmed 
with Secessionist sympathizers, who were ready to abet 
any treason that might be plotted from without. Still, 
Patterson's forward movement had had the effect of 
driving Johnston to a more remote position, and he 
made no attempt to reoccupy Harper's Ferry. He 
established his headquarters at Winchester, and entrusted 
the task of watching the Potomac to Colonel Jackson 
(the officer afterwards known as "Stonewall" Jackson, 
one of the most heroic of the Southerners), in combina- 
tion with the cavalry under the conmiand of Colonel 
Stewart. On July 2, Patterson's force again crossed the 



RICH MOUNTAIN. 



25 



Potomac, and occupied Harper's Ferry. Shortly after- 
wards, Johnston moved his army to the rehef of Beau- 
regard at Manassas, and nothing of importance took 
place between himself and Patterson. 

Attention was now directed to McClellan's opera- 
tions. He had been in command of the military district 
which included Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Western 
Virginia. He was a soldier by education, and, was 
joint-commissioner with Lee to report on the warlike 
operations in the Crimea. Retiring from the service 
after that date, he became manager of the Illinois Central 
Railway, but resumed his original profession on the 
outbreak of the Civil War. Having by midsummer or- 
ganized a force of 15,000 soldiers, principally recruited 
in the Western States, he advanced against the Con- 
federate troops in Western Virginia. These did not 
count more than 6000 men, with a small proportion of 
cavalry and artiller)- ; the whole under the command of 
General Garnett. The country occupied by the Southern 
commander was well adapted to defensive operations, 
being traversed by the main body of the Allegha- 
nies and by several minor ridges running in the 
same direction, which is from the north-east to the 
south-west. 

Rich Mountain (July 11, 1861). — General Garnett — 
an officer of experience and talent — took up his position 
on an eminence called Laurel Hill, situated west of the 
chief line of the Alleghanies, and covering the high- 
road leading from Philippi to Beverley. He threw for- 
ward a detachment under Colonel Pegram, which was 
to station itself upon an isolated and forest-clad hill 
named Rich Mountain, a few miles south of Laurel Hill, 
from which it is separated by woody country and a 
creek. The force numbered about 2000, and his duty 
was to obtain a command over the road leading in a 
north-westerly direction from Beverly to Weston. 



26 'i'^^E BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

Agaiii-st these positions McClellan advanced from the 
north, and on July ii halted at a short distance from 
Rich Mountain. Fighting began on the following day, 
when four regiments, commanded by Colonel Rosecrans, 
were sent forward by a circuitous path through the 
woods, to turn the left of Colonel Pegram's position. 
Under a drenching rain, they climbed the steep side of 
the mountain, and, undeterred by a heavy fire which 
was opened on them as they neared the summit, com- 
pletely routed the defenders, and drove them down the 
opposite side of the acclivity. All this while McClellan 
himself, with the main body, was in front of the position ; 
but no occasion arose for his immediate services. Push- 
ing on towards the east, Rosecrans, arrived within three 
miles of Beverly, in which direction Garnett, who 
abandoned Laurel Hill on finding his position turned, 
had himself proceeded, until, discovering the perilous 
proximity of the enemy, he struck northward through 
the mountains, in hope of gaining St. George, on the 
Cheat River. Pegram had by this time surrendered, 
with 600 of his men; the remainder joined their com- 
rades under Garnett, who was actively pursued by 
General Morris. The line of retreat was rendered diffi- 
cult by rocks, thickly intertangled woods, and streams 
swollen by the summer rains. Here and there, in nar- 
row gorges, the fugitives had cut down large trees, and 
turned over great boulders of stone, with a view to 
baffling their pursuers ; but the forces of General Morris 
dashed on through every obstruction, occasionally en- 
gaged with the rear-guard of the enemy, and at other 
times tracking their foes by the knapsacks, camp- 
equipage, and abandoned wagons which they had left 
behind them in their headlong flight. McClellan had 
given orders for intercepting the retreating columns; 
but Morris, on July 13, overtook the Confederate gen- 
eral at Carrick's Ford, on the Cheat, and indicted on 




WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 
[The War Secretary of State.) 



27 



28 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION, 

him a severe reverse. While exposing himself with great 
courage, Garnctt was shot dead, and the shattered rem- 
nants of the army were conducted by Colonel Taliaferro 
to Monterey, on the eastern side of the Alleghanies, 
where they arrived in a state of the utmost destitution 
and fatigue. 

The campaign had been a great success. With the 
loss of only fifty men, McClellan had routed and dis- 
persed the forces of his opponent, had taken nearly looo 
troops, and had captured seven guns, 1500 stand of 
arms, twelve colors, and the greater part of the equip- 
ments and baggage of the Confederate camp. McClellan 
was disposed to take a very sanguine view of the exist- 
ing situation; and gave it as his opinion that Secession 
was killed in that part of the country. The Confederates 
rallied after awhile, and, on General Lee being appointed 
to the post lately occupied by Garnett, a series of vigor- 
ous operations took place on the western side of the 
mountains. Yet the results obtained by the Unionists 
were really important. The army of General Garnett 
was for the time disorganized, broken up, and crest- 
fallen. The Union forces had certainly made a fortunate 
commencement of the war, and a fortunate conclusion 
lay before it; but between those two extremes many 
signal disasters were to be endured and overcome. 

On July 22, General George B. McClellan was called 
to the command of the Army of the Potomac. 

Lincoln called an extra session of Congress to con- 
vene on July 4. He recommended that Congress 
should grant legal means to make the existing contest a 
sliort and decisive one, by placing at the disposal of the 
Government 400,000 men, and ;$400,ooo,ooo. The 
number of men, he remarked, was about one-tenth of 
those of proper ages within the regions where all 
seemed willing to engage ; and the sum was less than 



BELLIGERENT RIGHTS ACCORDED. 



29 



one-tvventy-third part of the money value owned by 
men who appeared ready to devote the whole. 

The total force in the field was computed at 230,000 
men, after abstracting 80,000 who had only enlisted for 
three months, then on the eve of expiring. 

The Secretary of the Navy reported that the total 
naval force of the United States was 42 vessels, nearly 
all of them on foreign stations; while the lioinc squad- 
ron consisted of but 12 vessels, carrying 187 guns, and 
about 2000 men. 

On May 13, 1 861, the English Government issued a 
Proclamation of Neutrality, by which belligerent rights 
were conferred on the Confederates. To confer this po- 
sition of a belligerent was in some degree to recognize 
their existence as an independent Power ; and this was an 
immense gain to the cause of Jefferson Davis. It took 
the Confederacy out of the category of rebels, and 
placed it in that of acknowledged nations. The privi- 
lege was one which the Federal Government never con- 
ceded, for to do so would have been to annihilate the 
justification for the war. If the Confederacy was a be- 
ligerent in the technical sense of the word, it was an in- 
dependent nation ; and as an independent nation there 
was no reason for attacking it. Only as a rebel could it 
fairly be made amenable to the law force. This view 
was sustained throughout the long struggle by William 
H. Seward, one of the ablest of our Secretaries of State. 

The Confederate privateers (numbering about twenty) 
were by this time very active, and although their opera- 
tions did not commence until the early part of May, 
they had by the end of July captured vessels and prop- 
erty valued at several millions of dollars. 

The military position in the early part of July was such 
as to create great confidence in the minds of the North- 
ern people. The cry " On to Richmond ! " was raised 
in many quarters, and it was believed that means had 



^o THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

been obtained for making the war as sharp, short, and 
decisive as the President desired it to be. The hne of 
the Potomac was held by the Union troops from its 
mouth to the Cumberland, in Maryland. The adjacent 
seacoast was patrolled by armed vessels, and the Vir- 
ginia bank of the river was carefully watched, though 
the troops had not been able to prevent the erection 
of Confederate batteries. The Union cause was repre- 
sented in Virginia itself by McDowell's army (45,000 
strong), and by the large force under Patterson. Be- 
tween the latter force and McClellan's army was a gap 
in the line, indicating, of course, a weakness in that 
particular direction. But the Union position, on the 
whole, was good. 

The main Confederate Army was under the orders of 
Beauregard, and was probably somewhat less numerous 
than McDowell's. It was stationed at and near Manas- 
sas Junction, a strong and important military position 
between Washington and Richmond, with which it was 
connected by rail. All around were wooded hills and 
frequent streams, and, in addition to the natural defences 
of the position, which were great, Beauregard had 
thrown up several artificial fortifications. A second Con- 
federate Army was stationed in the Shenandoah Valley 
under Joseph E. Johnston, whose headquarters were 
at Winchester. This position also was strongly en- 
trenched, and the duty of Johnston was to check the ad- 
vance of Patterson, and prevent his junction with Mc- 
Clellan. The question now to be determined was 
whether the Unionists were strong enough to advance 
on Richmond, or the Confederates strong enough 
to take Washington, or whether neither was strong 
enough to affect its manifest intention, and could only 
nullify the operations of the other. General Scott, the 
Commander-in-Chief, was suffering from the accumulated 
infirmities of age. He was not the man who, 14 years 



"ON TO RICHMOND!'' 



31 



earlier, had led his forces to victory in Mexico. For 
three years he had been unable to mount a horse ; and 
dropsy and vertigo rendered it difficult for him to transact 
the ordinary business of his office. It was impossible 
that he should take the field in person ; and accordingly 
the active direction of the troops was confided to 
Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Irwin Mc- 
Dowell, a native 
of Ohio, who 
had graduated 
at the Military 
Academy a t 
West Point, and 
had served un- 
der General 
Wool in the 
Mexican War. 
Since May 27 
he commanded 
the Depart- 
ment of Vir- 
ginia, with his 
headquarters 
at Arlington 
Court House, 
andhadworked 
hard at the or- 
ganization of 

the army. He had done much, but had not had 
time to do sufficient. Popular clamor, however, de- 
manded a headlong rush against the Confederates ; 
and in this mood of uninstructed confidence, of pas- 
sionate enthusiasm, and of ill-grounded hope, the nation 
laid itself open to the serious reverse which was about 
to happen. 




GENERAL IRWIN MCDOWELL. 



32 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Bull Run (July 21, 1861). — All things being sup- 
posedly in readiness for the assault upon the Confederate 
lines, the forward movement of the Union troops began 
on the afternoon of July 16. The enterprise would have 
been one of grave difficulty, even had the attendant cir- 
cumstances been more favorable than they really were. 
But there were particular facts which added largely to 
the perils of the campaign. Not only were the troops 
unacquainted with the actual operations of war, but the 
Union plans were seriously disturbed by the conduct of 
the army under Patterson. His forces were relied upon 
for holding Johnston in check, and preventing his junc- 
tion with Beauregard, whose division was about 50 miles 
off, but with the advantage of railway and telegraphic 
lines between. Patterson, however, was unable to carry 
out his part of the programme, owing to the determina- 
tion of his men, who had been enlisted for three months, 
to disband at the very earliest opportunity. They were 
implored to re-engage, if only for ten days ; but, with 
the exception of four regiments, they refused. Their 
conduct was precisely that of large numbers of troops 
engaged in the revolutionary war; and the embarrass- 
ment from which Washington so frequently suffered 
was now once more experienced. Patterson had ad- 
vanced towards Winchester, where Johnston was posted; 
but, on the very day when the rest of the troops moved 
against the enemy, he was compelled to recede towards 
the Potomac, owing to the unpatriotic spirit of his regi- 
ments. The force under Patterson was originally in- 
ferior in numbers to that of his adversary, besides being 
ill-provided with artillery ; it would now, in the course 
of a very few days, be reduced to the most slender pro- 
portions. It therefore seemed prudent to withdraw in 
the direction of Maryland, where he could still assist in 
blocking Johnston's advance on Washington, although 
he was unable to fight a regular action. 



BULL RUN. ^2 

Massed into five divisions, the Army of the Potomac, 
to the number of about 53,000, sought the Hnes of the 
enemy in the middle of July. Only 3000 of the entire 
number were regulars ; the rest were raw and inex- 
perienced soldiers, and in many instances the officers 
were not much better instructed than the troops they 
commanded. 16,000 men, under General Mansfield, 
remained at Washington, to guard the city against sur- 
prise; and the others moved forward along four roads, 
all converging in the vicinity of Centreville. The right 
column, under the orders of General Tyler, began its 
march at two p. m. on the i6th, and was followed, at 
eight A. M. on the following morning, by the remaining 
divisions. The Confederate force was posted along 
Bull Run — a small stream rising in a chain of hills to 
the west of Alexandria, and falling into the river Occo- 
quan, about twelve miles from the Potomac. The line 
extended some eight miles, from Union Mill, where the 
Orange and Alexandria Railway crosses the stream, to 
the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton turnpike-road. The 
banks of the little river are steep and rocky; thick 
woods offered admirable covert for soldiers; and the sur- 
rounding country, from its irregularity and abundance 
of foliage, presents favorable opportunities for defence. 
Confederate reserves were held in readiness near 
Manassas Junction; and not far off, Beauregard had his 
headquarters. An outpost with fortifications, at Centre- 
ville, protected that part of the line, and strong pickets 
were thrown forward to Fairfax Court House, a village 
ten miles from the main army, in the direction of Wash- 
ington. The division under Johnston, to the left of the 
other Confederates, gave additional strength to the 
Southern line of battle, and Patterson's unavoidable 
retreat contributed in a serious degree to the disaster 
which ensued. 

Some obstructions on the road, in the shape of felled 
3 



■^A THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

trees thrown across the path, delayed the progress of 
the Union forces, but did not prevent the van from 
reaching Fairfax Court House by noon on the 17th. 
Here there was a shght skirmish with the Confederate 
pickets ; but the place was occupied by the Union Second 
Division, while the other divisions, with the exception 
of the Fourth, which was kept behind to guard the 
communications with Washington, were stationed be- 
tween Germantown and Centreville, at two points on 
the Alexandria and Richmond Railway, and on the 
approaches to Centreville from the south-east. On the 
morning of the i8th, it was found that the Confederates 
had evacuated Centreville, which they had roughly 
fortified only eight hours previously. They were seen 
to be posted on the right or southern bank of Bull Run, 
and Tyler, who had command of the First Union Divi- 
sion, resolved on making an immediate attack. The 
country was thickly covered with wood, and the Con- 
federate brigades of Generals Longstreet and Bonham 
took advantage of the fact. The Union point of attack 
was at Blackburn's Ford, situated between the Warren- 
ton Road and the Richmond and Alexandria Railway. 
Tyler, however, did not attempt to cross the stream, but 
opened fire with his heavy guns at a distance of a mile 
and a half, and afterwards somewhat nearer. His ad- 
versary replied with spirit, and a brisk duel went on for 
some time. At length, several of the New York troops 
broke and fled, throwing away their arms; the other 
regiments retired in fairly good order. A small force 
of Confederates then crossed the stream at Mitchell's 
Ford, and, taking up a position on high ground to the 
east of the road to Centreville, poured a heavy fire into 
the retreating ranks. The object of Tyler in making 
his movement was to carry out a reconnoissance; and 
this having been accomplished, he did not consider it 
advisable or necessary to risk any further conflict. 



BULL RUN. 



35 



It being now evident that the Confederate position 
was too strong to be attacked in front, it was resolved 
to approach the enemy on his left flank. No fresh 
movement, however, could be made for a couple of 
days, owing to the difficulty of moving inexperienced 
troops, with their accompanying supplies and baggage ; 
and those two days were of the greatest value to the 
Con federates, 
Johnston, n o 
longer having 
the dread of 
Patterson be- 
fore his eyes, 
quitted his po- 
sition in the 
S he n a n doah 
Valley, and on 
July 20, arrived 
by rail at the 
headquarters of 
Beauregard 
with 6000 men 
and twenty 
guns, to be fol- 
lowed by the 
rest of his force. 
Other regi- 
ments were 
moved up from 

Richmond, and the Confederates now believed them- 
selves equal to any attack likely to be made. Their left 
was on the Centreville and Warrenton Road, a little 
above the bridge over which that iiighway crosses Bull 
Run ; their right was at Union Mills Ford, about nine 
miles farther down the little river, near the railway con- 
necting Alexandria and Richmond. In front was the 




GENERAL PETER H. T. BEAUREGARD. 



36 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Stream, with its high and precipitous banks; at the rear 
were dense woods, capable of conceahng large numbers 
of marksmen. The general character of the country- 
was undulatory, and in parts extremely rugged. High 
hills alternated with lower elevations, and the gorges 
between were often so narrow that a small force could 
easily stand against one much larger. With no little 
confidence, therefore, did Beauregard and Johnston 
draw up their legions on Sunday morning, July 21. 
The Confederates were disposed in three lines, watch- 
ing the eight fords over the stream. Beauregard stated 
that his entire army amounted to 27,833 men, with 49 
guns for the defence of the Confederate position. 

The plan of attack formed by McDowell was one 
unusually sensible and soldierly for that early day, and 
perfectly worthy of commendation at the present. It was 
to turn tlie Confederate left, and, if possible, to destroy 
the railway leading from Manassas Junction to the 
Shenandoah Valley, so as to cut off the remainder of 
Johnston's army. With this view, the men were served 
with three days' rations, and furnished with instructions 
as to how they were to proceed. The army was late 
in starting, owing to some delay on the part of the 
First Division ; and it was ten o'clock on the morning 
of the 2 1st when the advance crossed the river at 
Sudley Springs. Colonel Evans, the Confederate 
officer on the opposite bank, disputed the ground, 
but the Union forces made wa}', and were gradually 
reinforced by other divisions of the army. McDowell 
was commanding in person, and he hurried up addi- 
tional regiments, with a view to crushing his adversary. 
Matters began to look grave for the Confederates, and 
Beauregard and Johnston rode towards the scene of 
contest, to give immediate direction to the movements 
of their troops. Some hard fighting took place on an 
elevated plateau, partly covered with pine-woods, and 



BULL RUN. 



37 



intersected by water-courses. The Unionists repeatedly 
drove their adversaries down the eastern slope of this 
eminence ; and at noon the Confederates, though reply- 
ing with firmness to the opposing fire, and doing con- 
siderable execution with their field-pieces, had undoubt- 
edly lost ground. During one of these charges, the 
Confederate officer, General Bee, observed rather 
excitedly to General Jackson, " They are beating us 
back!" "Well, sir," replied Jackson, "we will give 
them the bayonet." Bee turned to his men, and en- 
deavored to rally them. " Form ! form ! " he exclaimed. 
" There stands Jackson like a stone wall." In this way 
did the gallant Confederate leader obtain the designa- 
tion which clung to him till his death. The courage 
and self-possession of Jackson did wonders, but the day 
was still going in favor of the Union men. Towards 
the centre, the brigade under Colonel Richardson 
opened fire against Jones and Longstreet at Blackburn's 
Ford, to prevent their reinforcing the Confederate left; 
and, by order of Beauregard, Longstreet crossed the 
stream, and detained some of them from the more 
important field of conflict. The Confederate right and 
the Union left were hardly engaged at all 

So unpromising did the aspect of affairs seem to 
Beauregard and Johnston that, shortly after twelve 
o'clock, the latter hastened to Lewis House, in the rear 
of the Confederate line, to see whether he could hurry 
forward the troops which were expected to arrive by rail 
from the Shenandoah Valley. During his absence, the 
Confederates made an approach towards retrieving 
their position ; but they were still very hard pressed. 
Jackson executed a movement by which he was enabled 
to seize one of the Union batteries — a success due 
to the mistake of the officer in command, who, not feel- 
ing sure that the advancing troops were those of the 
enemy, abstained from firing. About this time Mc- 



38 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Dovvell ordered Colonel Sherman, who occupied the 
centre of the Union line, to charge the opposing bat- 
teries with his entire brigade. The movement was be- 
gun with a good deal of dash and energy ; but the 
brigade ultimately fell back. Again and again the des- 
perate attempt was renewed, and the regiments were 
terribly cut up ; but the Confederate batteries were ad- 
mirably handled, and Sherman was unable to carry out 
his orders. Still, the Union troops were having the 
best of the encounter. The Confederates were driven 
down the wooded slopes, and the ground was thickly 
strewn with the dead and wounded. Many of the Con- 
federate officers had by this time fallen ; Jackson was 
struck, but refused to quit the field ; and Beauregard, 
placing himself at the head of his troops, led the 
charge. Shortly afterwards he was slightly wounded, 
but, like Jackson, remained with his regiments, and was 
in time rewarded by a complete change in the fortunes 
of the day. 

Meanwhile, Johnston was at Lewis House, commonly 
called " the Portico," from which he could scan the 
country all round. He felt extremely anxious as to the 
issue of the struggle, for up to that time fortune seemed 
lilcely to declare itself on the side of the Union forces. 
It was now three o'clock and the looked-for reinforce- 
ments had not yet arrived. "Oh, for four regiments!* 
he is reported to have exclaimed to one of his officers ; 
and not long afterwards a cloud of dust was seen rising 
into the air from the direction of the Manassas Gap 
Railway, to the south of where he was standing. For 
the moment, Johnston was under the impression that 
this indicated the advance of Union reinforcements. 
He soon discovered his error. The strangers proved to 
be a body of Confederates, numbering 4000 and com- 
manded by General E. Kirby Smith. They had come 
by rail from the Shenandoah Valley, and Smith, on hear- 



40 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



ing the sound of cannon on his left, had stopped the 
train, and marched his men across the country in tlie 
direction of the battle which was going on. At the 
Portico they received the commands of Johnston, who 
ordered them to attack the rigiit flank of McDowell's 
line. He also directed Colonel Cook's brigade to 
join in the action. Other bodies of Southern troops 
likewise dashed forward to the plateau where Beaure- 
gard was desperately contending against the Union ad- 
vance ; and he found himself so heavily reinforced that 
the relative position of the two armies was entirely re- 
versed. The Confederate ranks were now far more 
numerous than those of their opponents, and the new 
arrivals were fresh and vigorous. Beauregard, who had 
ordered an advance of the whole line shortly before, felt 
victory almost within his grasp. The reinforcements 
took position to the left of the onward-sweeping hosts, 
and the whole accumulated mass fell like a thunder- 
bolt upon the fatigued Union troops. Very soon 
they were outflanked, and driven headlong down the 
opposite side of the plateau. Sharpshooters appeared 
in the woods at their back ; from three sides a storm 
of shot poured into their staggering ranks ; and the 
perils of the time were aggravated by panic. A portion 
of General Stewart's cavalry joined in the Confederate 
charge, and in a moment the battle was ended, and the 
Union troops gave way in hopeless and miserable flight. 
The victorious regiments, however, suffered severely in 
the final assault. Kirby Smith fell badly wounded 
shortly after he had placed his troops to the left of the 
main body, and Generals Bee and Barton were killed a 
little later. But the day, after a long and sanguinary 
fight, had been won, and Jefferson Davis, who had 
left Richmond in the morning, arrived in time to see the 
rout of the Union forces. 

The flight of the Union troops was marked by every 



BULL RUN. 41 

sign of disorganization and military incompetence. 
Flinging away their arms, ammunition, knapsacks, and 
other incumbrances, like the Confederates after the bat- 
tle of Rich Mountain, the discomfited soldiers dashed 
pell-mell from the scene of their crushing reverse, scat- 
tering dismay far and wide by their cries of terror. All 
pretence of order and method was at an end. Each 
man thought only of himself, and the honor of the 
army was entirely lost in the overwhelming consideration 
of personal safety. A panic once begun cannot readily 
be stopped. The unreasoning apprehension passes 
from rank to rank, and from regiment to regiment, like 
wild-fire ; and the contagion of fear is as mysterious in 
its agencies and as rapid in its effects as any other 
epidemic. Where veterans have lost all sense of mili- 
tary subordination and mutual reliance, it is not surpris- 
ing if inexperienced and half-disciplined troops should 
become totally disorganized, and even for the time un- 
manned. The rush from Bull Run, with all its dis- 
graceful incidents, was in no respect surprising; it was 
nevertheless painful in the highest degree. 

McDowell, on perceiving that his men were utterly 
defeated, rode off to Centreville, ordered General 
Blcnker's German brigade to support and rally the flying 
troops, and directed Colonels Davies and Richardson to 
take up a position to cover Centreville. Johnston had 
ordered Ewell to cross Bull Run in force, and attack 
that village; but, in attempting to execute the move- 
ment, his subordinate w^as so warmly received that he 
found it necessary to retreat, his men being thrown into 
disorder by the heavy guns of the enemy. By sunset, 
most of the Union troops reached the farther side of 
the Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether 
an attempt should there be made to reorganize the shat- 
tered army. The panic had not spread to all of the 
regiments. Blenker's brigade, the regulars, and a por- 



42 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

tion of the reserves at Centreville, retained their military 
form, though nearly exhausted by thirty hours' march- 
ing and fighting. These battalions were of immense ser- 
vice in covering the confused retreat, and in checking 
the pursuit. But they could not infuse any better spirit 
into their demoralized comrades, and it was agreed by 
all the commanders that there was no choice but to fall 
back. The men had been fighting for hours under a 
blazing sun; they were tired, hungry, and disheartened; 
their rations, issued the day before, had been recklessly 
thrown away ; and a large number of guns and small 
arms, together with stores of ammunition, had been 
lost. It appeared, moreover, that Blackburn's Ford was 
by that time in possession of the enemy, and that he 
was endeavoring to turn the Union left. Orders were 
given to continue the retreat ; but the troops had 
taken the matter into their own hands, and, as night 
came on, were hurrying along the road to Washington. 
In the fields and ways from the battle-ground to 
Centreville, the wounded lay in hundreds. Many 
dropped with fatigue, and were crushed by the artillery, 
or ridden over by the horses. A dull, deep roar, made 
up of many cries of rage, agony, and terror, surged 
along the paths by which the troops were retreating, 
and clouds of dust, illuminated by the western sun, 
revealed the several lines of flight. It was not until the 
early morning of the 22d that the fugitives reached 
Washington; and even then their fears did not desert 
them. During the eventful Sunday, crowds assembled 
round the telegraph and newspaper offices, reading with 
eager satisfaction the despatches that came from the 
field of battle throughout the morning and the early 
part of the afternoon. Everything, it was then reported, 
was going well. The Union soldiers were successful at 
all points. A complete and overwhelming victory was 
certain. But, as the afternoon wore on, the telegrams 



BULL RUN. 



43 



ceased to arrive. An ominous silence supervened, and 
men began to ask one another what it meant. Then 
came placards announcing, "Utter rout of the troops!" 
" Stampede to Washington ! " "All our batteries cap- 
tured ! " and so on. From a city of joy, the Federal 
capital passed into a city of mourning. 

The losses of the Union army were stated by McDo- 
well at 19 officers, and 462 non-commissioned officers and 
privates, killed; 64 officers, and 947 non-commissioned 
officers and privates, wounded. The "missing" were very 
numerous ; many went off altogether, and never returned 
to the colors. The Confederate loss was estimated by 
Beauregard at 378 killed, and 1483 wounded. Of 
prisoners, including wounded, he had no fewer than 
1600 men, and among the captured were officers and 
men of forty-seven regiments of volunteers, and of nine 
different regiments of regular troops, detachments of 
which were engaged. The gains of the Confederates in 
artillery, small arms, ammunition, accoutrements, flags, 
military appliances, hospital stores, wagons, horses, etc., 
were very large, and Johnston and Beauregard were in 
a better position for pushing a vigorous campaign after 
the battle than before. It was subsequently made a 
ground of complaint against Jefferson Davis and his 
colleagues that an advance on Washington was not 
immediately ordered. But, to use Davis' own words, 
" It was a hard-fought field, and the victors were in no 
condition to pursue." So Washington was not attacked, 
and the North had time to rally. 

In his report on the battle, General McDowell was 
compelled to make many complaints of his men, and to 
point out many defects in the military system. But it 
should always be recollected, in considering the events 
of thi.s unhappy day, tliat the Union soldiers, for the 
most part, fought well for long hours, drove their ad- 
versaries before them again and again, and at one time 



44 THE BATTLES FOR THE UAVON. 

came very near obtaining a decisive victory. It was 
only when they were outnumbered and outflanked 
that they fled in uncontrollable dismay. Many well- 
trained armies have done the same. Discreditable as 
their flight was, it was no worse than that of Braddock's 
regiments from the ambushed French and Indians, or 
that of Gage's men from Concord. Such panics are 
known to every service, and should not be alleged as a 
special reproach against any one in particular. The 
Sadowas of history are few. 

Swinton, in his Decisive Battles of the War, thus sum- 
marizes the effect of this eventful action : " The victory 
of Bull Run gained more than a field; it won a campaign. 
Midsummer passed, autumn came and went, winter at 
last found the Union and Confederate troops in Virginia 
in their peaceful log-camps. The year 1861 slipped 
entirely away without another forward movement in 
Virginia ; the next year opened silently there ; spring 
came again before the spell which Bull Run had thrown 
was broken up. Nor was this true of Virginia alone, 
but of the whole West; incessant skirmishes and desul- 
tory engagements by detached forces occupied the time 
and strength which had been designed for grand opera- 
tions ; for these latter were repressed at their beginning, 
and the military year of 1 861, from which so much had 
been hoped, came to its end at the battle of Bull Run." 

Ball's Bluff (October 21, 1861). — Near the end 
of October, McClellan made preparations for send- 
ing out a strong reconnoissance towards Leesburg, 
to ascertain the movements and intentions of the 
enemy. About 2000 Union troops had crossed the 
Potomac and in the course of the 21st a collision took 
place in the woods covering the banks of the river. 
Being devoid of artillery, the Confederates charged 
with fixed bayonets, and the opposing line gave way. 
Colonel Baker, the U. S. Senator from Oregon, who 



46 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



commanded one of the Union brigades, rallied his 
men. A hot musketry engagement ensued, in which 
they were much galled by the raking fire which came 
from out the forest. Baker was at length mortally 
wounded, and fell ; and his men then rushed towards 
the steep banks of the Potomac without the slightest 
restraint, pursued by their adversaries, who slaughtered 
as many as they could reach by bayonet or musket-shot. 
The discreditable incidents of the 2ist of July were 
thus repeated three months later, and it became distress- 
ingly manifest that a quarter of a year had made little 
difference in the military character of the Union army. 
Some of the fugitives swam across the river; others 
attempted to get away in boats, which were swamped 
by the numbers who crowded into them. Several were 
drowned; still more perished at the hands of the foe; 
many were captured in their efforts to escape. Of the 
whole force, half were killed, wounded, or taken ; there 
was an admitted loss of nearly iioo men. Telegrams 
were despatched during the action to General Banks, 
who sent forward fresh troops ; but the day was by that 
time irretrievably ruined. The disastrous result of the 
movement appears to have been attributable partly to 
the misapprehension of orders, by which McClellan's 
design of a reconnoissance was changed into a general 
action without proper means for supporting it ; and 
partly to want of firmness in the men. The Confed- 
erates were superior in number to the Union forces, and 
were undoubtedly better disciplined and better handled. 
An upholder of the Confederate cause has remarked 
that the victory at Ball's Bluff, like that at Bull Run, 
" bore no fruits but those of a confidence on the part of 
the South, which was pernicious, because it was over- 
weening and inactive, and a contempt for its enemy, which 
was injurious in proportion as it exceeded the limits of 
truth and justice and reflected the self-conceits of fortune." 



CHAPTER II. 

The Campaigns at the West (1862), 

At the commencement of 1862, the Union forces 
were upwards of 640,000 volunteers, and more than 
20,000 regular troops. The quality of these soldiers 
was in many instances very indifferent ; but every day 
helped their education in their new trade. When 
McClellan was made Commander-in-Chief of the 
armies, he prepared at Lincoln's request a memoran- 
dum in which he drew out a scheme of operations, and 
set forth the means by which his conceptions were to 
be carried into effect. The most important strategical 
point, he said, was in Eastern Virginia, and the struggle 
must be fought out there. Campaigns in other direc- 
tions, however, were necessary in support of the princi- 
pal movement. An advance must be made on the 
Mississippi, and the Confederates must be driven out 
of Missouri. Operations should likewise be con- 
ducted in Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assist- 
ing the Union men in that locality, and of seizing the 
railroads leading from Memphis to the east. Efforts 
should be made to organize and equip regiments in 
Western Virginia ; and the importance insisted on of 
occupying Baltimore and Fortress Monroe, and at 
the same time of concentrating a large army in the 
vicinity of Washington. For the carrying out of these 
various projects, McClellan demanded 250 regiments of 

(47) 



48 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



infantry; lOO field-batteries of six guns each; 28 regi- 
ments of cavalry ; and 5 regiments of engineers : giv- 
ing altogether a total 273,000 men. This was for the 
active oi)crations alone. Another large body would be 
needed for holdincf VVashincrton and the line of the 
Potomac, for furnishing garrisons to various towns, and 
for performing the routine military duties required by a 
state of war. A strong naval force, it was suggested, 
should act in conjunction with a fleet of transports; 
and the railway service of the country was to be turned 
to advantage by every available means. *' We must 
endeavor," said McClellan, " to seize places on the rail- 
ways in the rear of the enemy's points of concentra- 
tion ; and we must threaten their seaboard cities, in 
order that each State may be forced, by the necessity 
of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the 
Confederate Army." To him it appeared possible that 
by a combination of vigorous movements the war 
might be terminated in one more campaign. He hoped 
to occupy Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mont- 
gomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans, and in 
this was to " crush out the rebellion in its very heart." 
Some of the earliest encounters of 1862 took place 
in Kentucky. The Western Military District was at 
that time commanded by General Hallcck, who had his 
headquarters at St. Louis. Under his orders were 
Generals Grant and Buell ; the first in Western 
Kentucky, the second in Eastern. The army under 
Buell occupied Somerset and Columbia, near the upper 
part of the Cumberland River, and was opposed by 
General Zollicoffer, whose camp was at Mill Springs, 
on the southern bank of the same river. Crossing 
to the northern bank, he was joined by General Critten- 
den, his superior in rank; at midnight on January 18, 
the troops began their march with the design of 
surprising, ere it was yet light, the Union army who 



CAMPAIGNS AT THE WEST 



49 



were stationed about ten miles north of the Confederate 
entrenched camp. 

The Confederate approach was discovered at 6 o'clock 
on the morning of the 19th, and the action commenced 




GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT. 



shortly afterwards. At first the Union forces were 
repulsed ; but after awhile they regained the ground 
they had lost, and at 8 o'clock, a furious encounter was 
taking place between the forces, which appear to have 
been pretty evenly matched. It was at this time that 
4 



50 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Zollicoffcr, riding forward in front of his men, was shot 
dead ; and his men were so much disheartened by this 
unexpected event that they began to lose form, and to 
fall back confusedly, and finally gave way in disorderly 
flight. General Thomas ordered a pursuit of the 
Southerners, who were accordingly followed as far as 
their entrenchments. During the ensuing night, shells 
were thrown into the Confederate camp, and the dis- 
comfited troops, fearing they might be cut off, and being 
very ill-provided with food in the situation they had 
taken up, determined to retreat across the Cumberland. 
The men succeeded in effecting their passage, but it 
was found impossible to carry with them the wagons, 
horses, artillery, and camp equipments, which fell into 
the Union hands. General Crittenden's regiments 
retreated first to Monticello, and afterwards to Gains- 
borough, in Tennessee. Their sufferings on the route 
were extreme, for they had been obliged to leave behind 
them all their stores, and were compelled to make their 
way through a tract of country so thinly populated 
that it could afford no adequate support for a large 
army. 

Fort Henry (February 6, 1862). — Crittenden's re- 
treat placed Eastern Kentucky entirely in the liands 
of the Union forces ; but the western division of 
the State still remained to the Confederates. General 
Sidney Johnston, the Southern commander, held a 
line of defence which extended from Bowling Green, 
on the right, to Columbus, on the left — a position 
rendered unusually strong by the neighborhood of the 
Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, and by a railway 
system connecting the ends of the line, and giving a 
command over the adjacent country. Johnston had 
protected himself by the erection of two forts, one, 
called Fort Henry, was situated on the right bank of 
the Tennessee, in the State of Kentucky, while the 



FORT HENRY. 



51 



other, Fort Donelson, was planted on the left bank of 
the Cumberland, 15 miles to the south-east of the 
other, and within the borders of Tennessee. The 
defences of Fort Henry were formidable, and the posi- 
tion was strengthened by the creeks and swamps 
among which the works had been constructed. Never- 
theless, Grant determined to attack the fortifications, in 
combination with the fleet under Commodore Foote. 
The expedition embarked at Cairo, on February i, and 
the troops were landed about five miles below Fort 
Henry on the 5th. The fort was to be assaulted on the 
land side by the soldiers, and from the river by the fleet. 
All being prepared, the march of the land forces began 
on the morning of the 6th. The first division, under 
General McClernand, proceeded along the right bank 
of the river, with orders to take up a position on the 
road from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson. Two brigades 
of the second division under General Smith proceeded 
at the same hour along the left bank, so as to occupy 
the heights commanding Fort Henry ; and to the third 
brigade of the second division was assigned the duty of 
moving directly against the fort, and assaulting the 
works when the proper moment should have arrived. 
Unfortunately the roads were heavy with mud, owing to 
a great fall of rain a few days previously, so that the 
army was not in a position to co-operate with the fleet 
when the latter opened fire. The first naval line was 
composed of four gunboats, partially protected with iron 
armor, but hastily adapted to their present purpose out 
of river-steamers or ferry-boats ; the second line con- 
sisted of three wooden vessels. A vigorous cannonade 
was interchanged between the ships and the fort, and 
the gunboats, getting nearer in shore, directed an effec- 
tive fire against the works ; but, before the action had 
lasted quite an hour, an unlucky casualty occurred in 
the fleet. A shot struck the gunboat Essex, entering 



52 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



the starboard boiler and filling the boat with steam. 
Many of the crew were badly scalded, and the Essex, 
unable to do anything more, was forced to drop astern. 
The other gunboats, however, continued to advance ; 
and when they had got within 600 yards of the fort, the 
Confederate flag was lowered, and signal was made that 
General Tilghman, the commandant of Fort Henry, was 
prepared to surrender. On his asking what terms would 
be accorded him, the commodore formulated the terms 
in two words, " Unconditional surrender." The action 
had lasted an hour and a quarter, and the Union success 
was due entirely to the naval force, as, owing to the 
obstructions to which allusion has been made, the land 
forces were unable to reach the positions to which they 
had been assigned. The defenders of the fort were 
made prisoners of war ; but the derangement of the 
Union plans enabled the main body of the Confeder- 
ates to escape behind the bulwarks of Fort Donelson. 
Grant's cavalry pursued for some distance, and a por- 
tion of the field-artillery was abandoned ; yet the men 
got safely to their place of refuge. By possessing 
Fort Henry, the Union forces were able to take up a 
position in the rear of Columbus, on the Mississippi, 
and within ten miles of a bridge crossing the railway 
which connects that town with Bowling Green. The 
Tennessee River was now open to the Union gunboats, 
and the three wooden vessels were sent up the channel, 
with orders to destroy the railway bridge, and to cap- 
ture or sink such of the enemy's vessels as they might 
encounter. These directions were completely carried 
out. Lieutenant Phelps, who commanded, penetrated 
as far as Florence, in Alabama, and succeeded in cap- 
turing three steamers and an unfinished gunboat. Six 
other river-steamers were burned by the Confederates 
themselves, to save them from the adversary, and 
scarcely any opposition was offered to the lieutenant, 



FORT DO NELSON. 



53 



who possessed himself of a large amount of camp 
equipage and other stores, with which he returned to 
Fort Henry on February lO. 

Fort Donelson (February 19, 1862). — The success 
of the Union forces in reducing that work en- 
couraged Grant to prosecute operations against Fort 
Donelson. On February 12, he set out with the divi- 
sions of McClernand and Smith, consisting of 15,000 
men. Six regiments were at the same time detached, 
with orders to proceed by water, and under convoy of 
a gunboat, to the Cumberland River. Preparations for 
the investment of Fort Donelson were at once begun, 
and the operations were conducted with so much vigor 
as to promise a speedy success. The garrison was 
strong in numbers ; but the troops who had fled from 
Fort Henry were in a mood of depression which augured 
ill for their steadiness. The works in themselves were 
not contemptible. Heavy batteries commanded the 
river, while, on the land side, rifle-pits and entrench- 
ments offered resistance to the Union advance. The 
entrenchments, however, formed the weakest part of 
the defences, for on the morning of the 1 2th they were 
still unfinished. The hilly nature of the country, 
covered with dense oak woods, and intersected by a 
broad, deep valley, which almost divided the Confederate 
position into two distinct parts, presented opportunities 
of which both sides could equally avail themselves. 
The army within the fort, and in the external works 
connected with it, was augmented, on the 13th, by the 
troops under General Floj^d, who had marched from 
the city of Cumberland. The Confederate force now 
amounted to about 14,000 men, who were under the 
general direction of Floyd, as the senior officer. The 
right wing was conmianded by General Buckner, and 
the left by General Pillow. Among the three com- 
manders, and in the several divisions of the army, 



54 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

there was but little unity of feeling or design, and a 
disaster was insured by the inefficient character of the 
troops, and the ignorant blundering of the officers. At 
three o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th, Commodore 
Foote began the attack with four ironclad gunboats 
and two wooden vessels. These advanced in a crescent 
shape, and opened fire at a distance of a mile from the 
batteries. The Confederates, however, did not reply 
until the boats had got within a distance of 400 yards. 
A hot encounter then ensued, and continued for nearly 
five hours, when the ironclad gunboats were so much 
injured as to be obliged to withdraw, with a loss of 54 
men. Foote hereupon retired to Cairo, determining to 
wait until a competent force should be brought up from 
that place to attack the fort. The land forces under 
Grant had previously taken their positions in front of 
the works, and the whole of the Confederate left, with 
the exception of a strip of swampy ground near the 
river, was by this time invested. Some skirmishing 
had occurred, but to no very serious extent, and the 
Union troops were now suffering ratiier from the 
severity of the cold than from the guns of their enemies. 
The weather had for some time been unusually warm 
for the season ; and the troops had recklessly thrown 
away their coats and blankets. When a change came, 
and they were surprised by frost and snow, an im- 
mense amount of suffering, which might have been 
avoided, was experienced by the troops in the open 
field. 

The Confederates were not much better off, and their 
position in all respects was so critical that, at a council 
of war held on the night of the 14th, it was re- 
solved to reopen, if possible, the communication with 
Nashville by Charlotte, and to save the greater por- 
tion of the army by abandoning the position at Fort 
Donelson. The plan proposed was to attack the Union 



FORT DO NELSON. 



55 



riy;ht next day, in order that while the action was pro- 
ceeding the rest of the army should cut their way 
out by the most available of two roads leading to Nash- 
ville. The operations of the 15th were embarrassed by 




COMMODORE A. H. FOOTE. 

delays consequent on the icy condition of the roads, 
and a want of sufficient preparation on the part of the 
men. Nevertheless, an animated encounter was pro- 
ceeding by nine a. m.. when General Pillow attacked the 
Union troops in front, and General Buckner, who was 



5 6 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

to conduct the rear-guard of the retreating army, opened 
fire on their left with artillery. The Union troops soon 
found their aniniunition exhausted, and gave way with 
some precipitation. Pillow now pushed forward with 
rapidity and vigor, supported by Buckner on his right, 
and by the cavalry under Colonel Forrest. For a 
moment, the Confederates seemed to be prevailing, but 
their enthusiasm was short-lived, and their commanders 
were totally inadequate to the demands of the situation. 
Pillow and Buckner misunderstood one another; Gen- 
eral Floyd appears to have done nothing; the inferior 
officers were left without instructions ; confusion speed- 
ily supervened, and Buckner, who had full possession 
of the road by which he proposed to escape, was per- 
plexed and bewildered as to the proceedings of his col- 
leagues. In the course of the day, he received a mes- 
sage from Pillow, bidding him return to his entrench- 
ment, and while in full retreat was met by Floyd, who 
expressed surprise at what he was doing, but afterwards 
confirmed the directions of Pillow. Buckner accord- 
ingly struggled back to the Confederate lines ; but be- 
fore the whole of his force could get within them. 
Smith's division attacked his right, and in a little while 
burst into the entrenchments. After two hours' fight- 
ing, the Confederates were completely defeated, and 
Smith's division retained possession of the works. 
Grant had lost upwards of looo men, of whom nearly 
300 had been captured by the Confederates, placed on 
board steamers, and sent up the river ; but he had 
achieved a great success, and the Southerners were now 
in so serious a position that it was a question whether 
they would not be entirely overwhelmed. The attempt to 
break through the lines liad been an utter failure. Com- 
munication with Nashville was cut off. The troops 
were suffering much from the inclemency of the 
weather; and they had now on their hands a large 



58 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



number of wounded, for whose necessity no adequate 
provision could be made. Another council of war 
was held on the night of the 15th, when several of the 
officers met at the headquarters of General Floyd, in 
the little town of Dover. Floyd having requested the 
views of Buckner and Pillow as to what should be done 
under existing circumstances, Buckner spoke very em- 
phatically to the effect that another sortie would result 
in nothing but a massacre; and it was understood that 
Pillow was of the same opinion. After some further 
discussion, from which it appeared that General Sidney 
Johnston had effected his removal from Bowling Green 
to Nashville, and that consequently there was no longer 
any necessity for covering his operations, it was agreed 
that negotiations should be opened for the surrender of 
the army, together with the fort. 

Floyd, speaking on personal grounds, observed that 
he " would rather die than surrender." * Hereupon 
Pillow remarked that there were no two persons 
in the world whom the Unionists would be better 
pleased to capture than himself and Floyd ; and he 
proposed that they should endeavor to escape. Buck- 
ner undertaking to remain and conduct the negotia- 
tions, it was resolved that that officer should assume 
the chief command. As daylight was by this time near 
at hand, and the Union attack would certainly recom- 
mence in a little while, Buckner drew up his missive to 
Grant and sent it off. Arrangements, however, were at 
the same time made for the escape of Floyd and Pillow 
and Colonel Forrest, with a certain proportion of the 
army. In the early dawn, these got away from their 
perilous position — the infantry in boats, and the cavalry 
on the lower road to Nashville. The letter from Buck- 

* Floyd was Buchanan's Secret.-iry of War, who had dismantled all 
the Northern arsenals before the " unpleasantness." It would probably 
have gone hard with him if he had been captured. 



FORT DO nelson: 



59 



ner to Grant proposed an armistice until twelve o'clock 
that day (the i6th), in order to arrange terms of capitu- 
lation. Grant replied by insisting on " unconditional 
and immediate surrender," and added that " he proposed 
to move at once upon the Confederate works." In re- 
sponding to this communication, Buckner observed that 
the existing distribution of his forces (incident to an un- 
expected change of conmianders), and the overwhelm- 
ing strength of his opponent, compelled him, notwith- 
standing the brilliant success of the Confederate arms, 
to accept the "ungenerous and unchivalrous terms" 
which were proposed. The capitulation was then 
effected. Nine thousand men laid down their arms, and 
the stars and stripes floated over the stronghold of the 
Cumberland. Fort Donelson was now occupied by the 
Union troops, and the river by the gunboats. The 
Confederates had lost, during the four days' fighting, 
nearly 1200 men, and the blow thus inflicted on their 
cause in that part of the country was of the most dis- 
heartening nature. On the same day. Bowling Green, 
from which Sidney Johnston had just withdrawn, was 
occupied by the Union officer. General Mitchell, at the 
head of a division from Buell's army. 

Floyd was at once deprived of his command. Pillow 
was not again employed ; but Buckner, who had cer- 
tainly acted in a creditable spirit of self-abnegation, was 
once more placed at the head of a Confederate army, as 
soon as he had been exchanged. The position of the 
Confederates was at this time far from hopeful. The 
Union gunboats having advanced up the Columbia 
River to Clarksville, General Johnston considered it ad- 
visable to abandon Nashville, and take up a position 
farther south. The people of Nashville were wild with 
rage and apprehension at Johnston's departure. Many 
of them took flight by any conveyance they could ob- 
tain, and crowded the roads leading southward with 



6o THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

disorderly mobs. Two unfinished steamers on the 
wharf were burned ; and nothing but rapacity, fear, and 
outrage prevailed for some days. Order was not re- 
stored until the arrival of the first brigade of the Union 
army on February 25. The mayor then surrendered 
the place into the hands ot General Bucll, who took 
measures to calm the popular excitement and re-estab- 
lish the forms of government. 

In the meanwhile Johnston pursued the line of his 
retreat without being followed, and took up a posi- 
tionin the vicinity of Murfreesboro'. The whole of 
Northern Tennessee, with the entire line of the Cum- 
berland River, was now abandoned by the Confeder- 
ates. Columbus, on the Mississippi, was evacuated by 
General Polk, who removed his army, guns, and stores 
to a line of defence situated forty miles to the south, near 
the small town of New Madrid, on the western bank of 
the great river. On March 3, the day following the de- 
parture of the Confederates — the Union cavalry from 
Paducah, followed by the gunboats under Foote, arrived 
at Columbus and took possession of it. General Beau- 
regard was now established at Jackson, Tennessee. His 
army formed the center of the Confederate line of de- 
fence for the Western States. Polk was to the left, at 
New Madrid, and Johnston to the right, at Murfrees- 
boro'. The Confederates had been compelled, by the 
recent course of events, to make a great retrogression 
towards the south, to give up the whole of Kentucky, 
and to leave the northern part of Tennessee open to 
attack. They had lost the command of important 
rivers and railway communications; had beheld their 
ranks thinned by fatigue and want, as well as by the 
operations of war; and were now dispirited, not merely 
by the calamities which had occurred, but by the pros- 
pect of others which seemed imminent. The Union re- 
verses in the East had been amply compensated by 



ISLAND NO. 10. 6 1 

their successes in the West, and the development of 
events placed the fortunes of Washington far above 
those of Richmond. 

Generals Grant and Buell continued their advance, 
and prepared for fresh attacks upon the Confederate 
armies. The line of defence taken up by tiie Southern- 
ers, after their retrogressive movement, was one of ex- 
treme length, extending from New Madrid, in Missouri, 
and Island No. lo, on the Mississippi, in the north- 
western part of the State named after that river, to 
Murfreesboro' and Cumberland Gap, in the north- 
east, with the center at Jackson, to the south of both 
extremities. The left, at Island No. lO, was supported 
by an outpost at New Madrid ; and the defence of the 
island depended to a great extent on the possession by 
the Confederates of that small town. General Pope, 
therefore, led an expedition against the latter place, 
while Commodore Foote, with his gunboats, made a 
demonstration in front of the insular position. These 
proceedings began on February 28 ; batteries were after- 
wards erected, which were used principally against the 
gunboats and shipping in the river; and on the night 
of March 13, in the midst of a violent storm of rain, 
thunder, and lightning, the Confederate garrison of 
New Madrid retired to Island No. 10, and to the works 
on the left or eastern bank of the Mississippi, within 
the State of Kentucky. The town was at once occu- 
pied by the Union forces, who came into possession of 
large quantities of stores, and were enabled to cut off 
the island from any communication by the Lower 
Mississippi. 

Encouraged by their success, the Union forces next 
brought their batteries to bear against the main body 
of the Confederate left, stationed on Island No. lO. 
But these operations, though prosecuted with vigor, 
were unproductive of any decided effect, and it was 



62 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

then determined by Pope and Foote to resort to other 
measures. They resolved to cross to the opposite 
shore, and seize the batteries which commanded the 
channel from that side. To do this it was first neces- 
sary to cut a canal across the narrow neck of land sep- 
arating New Madrid from the upper attacking force, so 
as to enable the gunboats to get a greater command 
over the insular defences than the winding course of 
the Mississippi would allow, and to give increased fa- 
cility to the transports engaged in carrying troops from 
New Madrid to the opposite side of the river. The 
length of this canal would be twelve miles, and its exe- 
cution would necessarily be a work of prodigious labor, 
seeing that, if done at all, it would be indispensable 
to finish it with the utmost rapidity. The work was 
undertaken, and successfully carried out. Half of the 
distance was through a swampy forest, where the trees 
had to be cut off four feet below the surface of the water ; 
the rest of the way was less difficult, but still such as to 
require a great expenditure of toil. By the first week 
in April, the canal was fully made, and the work had 
not at any time been interrupted by the Confederates, 
their attention having been fully engaged by the heavy 
fire of the Union gunboats and mortar-batteries, and by 
a few naval actions which succeeded in keeping the be- 
sieged in continual alarm. On the night of April 6, 
four steamers and a large number of transports were 
brought through the canal, of the very existence of 
whicli, beneath the shadow of its luxuriant trees, the 
Southerners were ignorant. A division, commanded by 
General Payne, was sent across the river in the trans- 
ports, and the men, landing without opposition on the 
left bank of the Mississippi, drove back the defenders 
of the batteries, who seem to have been completely 
taken by surprise. The defences on Island No. lo were 
at once abandoned, and the position was surrendered 



SHILOH. 



63 



to Commodore Foote, together with a large amount of 
warlike material. Extraordinary want of spirit and 
resolution was shown by the Confederates throughout 
the whole proceedings. It was important to their po- 
sition in the West that they should retain New Madrid, 
the island, and the batteries on the Kentucky shore ; 
but these were abandoned almost without a blow. 



> \r^ Ui Y. ilS^i 14 Aft hf'Ml 




BUILDING A CANAL. 



Shiloh (April 6, 7, 1862). — After the capture of Nash- 
ville, Grant proceeded with his forces down the Ten- 
nessee River to Pittsburg Landing, Buell prepared to 
march on foot to the same locality ; and the Union 
army, being thus divided, was exposed to the attacks 
of its enemy. The Confederates could now reckon on 
the services of two armies, both numerically strong, 



64 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



and comiiiandcd by officers of ability. At the head of 
one was Albert Sidney Johnston ; Beauregard was at 
the head of the other. To strike a concentrated blow 
at Grant, Johnston united his whole force with that of 
Beauregard on April i, and on the 3d the army began 
its march towards Pittsburg Landing. Altogether, the 
commanders had under their control rather more than 
40,000 men, divided into three corps and a reserve; but 
the regiments were defective both in organization and 
discipline. The march was very slow, partly owing to 
the inexperience of the men, partly on account of the 
thickly wooded country. The neighborhood of Grant's 
position was not reached until the afternoon of the 5th, 
and the attack was deferred until the next day. Grant, 
with singular want of prudence, had omitted to throw 
up any defences, and his divisions were scattered about 
the ground without any concentration or method. Sep- 
arated by numerous creeks, and covered with woods, 
the ground offered several facilities for a sudden attack, 
and made the difficulty of an improvised defence all the 
greater; though, with a little care beforehand, such a 
position should have been very awkward to assault. 
At daybreak on the morning of the 6th, the Confeder- 
ates advanced in four lines, and the Union pickets were 
driven in so rapidly that their respective divisions had 
no time to get under arms. The division of General 
William T. Sherman was among the first to bear the 
brunt of the attack, and nothing was in readiness for 
such a catastrophe. Many of the officers were in bed ; 
of the men, some were preparing their breakfast, while 
others were cleaning their rifles. 

The astonishment and dismay of the Union troops 
were for a time overwhelming. A portion of General 
Prentiss's division struggled into order, but was speedily 
driven back by the terrific fire which came blazing out 
of the woods. Prentiss himself was soon taken pris- 



en \ I 




66 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

oner, together with three of his regiments ; but in a 
httle while some of Sherman's brigades got into line, 
and offered a brief resistance to the advancing foe. 
Nevertheless, the Confederates continued to gain 
ground, and, pursuing the forces of Prentiss and Sher- 
man, now in full retreat, passed through their deserted 
camps, and captured the greater part of their field-ar- 
tillery. Presently, they came in sight of General 
McClernand's division, posted upon some rising ground. 
These troops for a time made a stand, and, though 
some among them gave way at the first onset, the 
others were sufficiently steady to chcclc the Confederate 
advance, and to induce General Braxton Bragg, who 
commanded one of the supporting bodies, to bring his 
troops into action. In conjunction with a {&\n of the 
other brigades, he attacked tlie Union troops with much 
animation, driving them back from their positions, and 
creating the utmost confusion among the opposing 
lines. When the Confederate left had been reinforced 
by General Polk's corps, McClernand's division, which 
formed the second Union line, was completely routed, 
and very little chance of retrieving the day remained to 
them. Two divisions of Grant's army, however, 
still retained their positions ; and these, being 
well planted and amply provided with artillery, with- 
stood the Confederate assaults from half-past ten in the 
morning till four in the afternoon. The attack was led 
by Bragg in person, and was again and again renewed, 
but with no other effect than to strew the field with 
dead and wounded, mowed down by the continual fire, 
both of rifles and artillery, which the Union troops 
kept up from out the woods where many of their num- 
ber were posted. Towards the end of the engagement, 
General Johnston, while superintending the right of the 
line, was struck in the leg by a rifle-bullct; hut he re- 
fused to dismount, and continued to give his directions 



SHILOH. 67 

until a feeling of extreme weakness showed that an 
artery had been cut, and that death was close at hand. 
The centre of the Confederate line was still held in 
check by the two Union divisions commanded by Gen- 
erals Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace; yet victory, on 
the whole, lay with the attacking force. It seemed as 
if with one more effort the Union troops would be com- 
pletely crushed ; but that effort was not made. The 
Confederate troops were exhausted, and it is admitted 
by Beauregard that the men were engaged towards 
evening in plundering the deserted camps, and loading 
themselves with spoil. Beauregard had succeeded to 
the chief command on the death of Johnston; and, feel- 
ing doubtful whether his army was in a condition to do 
more that day, he ordered the several divisions to re- 
tire. The number of the Union troops was about the 
same as that of the Confederates, and with the natural 
advantages of their position they should have done 
better. But want of generalship had been conspicuous, 
and the day was lost for lack of reasonable foresight. 

On the night of April 6, the disordered masses of the 
Union army were scattered about the immediate vicin- 
ity of Pittsburg Landing, under shelter of the ironclad 
gunboats drawn up in the Tennessee River. The Con- 
federates held the greater portion of the battle-field. 
They had taken all the enemy's encampments but one, 
together with nearly all his field-artillery, about thirty 
flags, colors and standards, more than 3000 prisoners, 
several thousands of small arms, an immense supply of 
subsistence, forage, and munitions of war, and a large 
amount of means of transportation. The struggle, how- 
ever, was not yet concluded. The next morning, the 
Union troops were again seen ranged in order of battle. 
Buell had arrived during the previous day on board a 
steamer and had at once proceeded to Grant's head- 
quarters. Some of his troops had even reached the 



68 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

ground in time to take part in the final stand made by 
the Union forces on the evening of the 6th. Others 
crossed the river during the night, and four divisions 
marched into camp early on the morning of the 7th. 
The Union forces were thus reinforced to the extent of 
about 20,000 men, several of wliom might be described 
as veterans. Fighting was resumed at five A. m., when 
the fresh troops, having placed themselves in front of 
their disorganized comrades, advanced to the attack. 
BucU was the officer in command and he made his dis- 
positions with great ability. Grant's forces were so 
completely dispirited by the combat of the previous day 
that they were not able to render effective assistance, 
and on neither occasion does Grant himself appear to 
have done much in the way of personal supervision. 
General Nelson was sent forward with the regiments 
under his direction, and the contest was general by seven 
o'clock. The battle was maintained for some hours 
with considerable spirit, but the Confederates aimed at 
nothing more than holding their opponents at bay while 
they effected their own retreat. The Union forces con- 
tinued to recover the positions they had lost on the 6th, 
and to repossess themselves of the guns and colors cap- 
tured by the Confederates. When the main body of the 
Southern forces had got safely away, the front line, 
which had been keeping the Union forces in check, also 
quitted the ground, and rejoined their comrades, who 
had retreated to Corinth. Several rallies had occurred 
during the day, and there had been moments when the 
Confederates seemed as if they were about to achieve 
another victory; but they were, in truth, quite unfitted 
to meet the fresh and unwearied troops which Buell had 
brought into the field, and, notwithstanding a few tem- 
porary gains at various points, they were compelled, 
about four o'clock in the afternoon, to leave the ground 
in entire possession of the enemy whom they had van- 




>H>;^^'§^^^v^' 



70 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

quished not many hours before. No regular pursuit 
was attempted until the 8th, and even then but little 
was done. The Union loss on the two days had been 
1735 killed, 7882 wounded, and 4044 missing. The 
Confederates lost 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, and 959 
missing. The battle has been variously called by the 
names of Shiloh and of Pittsburg Landing. It was one 
of the most hard-fought encounters that had yet taken 
place. 

Success crowned the Union arms, at this period, in 
other regions besides the West. At the beginning of 
1862, it had been observed to be a part of the Confed- 
erate design to shut up the Union troops in Port Royal 
Island, South Carolina, by placing obstructions in the 
neighboring rivers, by erecting batteries in the vicinity, 
and by massing troops so as to be able to throw a 
large force on the most vulnerable points whenever it 
should be considered advisable to do so. These plans 
it was determined to frustrate. The river approaches 
to the city of Savannah are defended by Fort Pulaski, 
a casemated work situated at the mouth of the river 
Savannah, and by Fort Jackson, a barbette-work on the 
mainland, only four miles below the city. The left or 
northern bank of the river is formed by a succession of 
islands, which, dividing the stream into a number of 
creeks and bays, render navigation difficult. On one 
of these islands stands Fort Pulaski, distant about 
eighteen miles from the city of Savannah. At the 
period in question, it was armed with 47 guns, and gar- 
risoned by a force of 300 men, under Colonel Olmstead. 
liefore the invention of rifled cannon, it had unquestion- 
ably been a place of great strength ; but the changed 
conditions of warfare had left it comparatively weak. 
For the reduction of this position, four regiments from 
the Eastern States, and some companies of engineers, 
were detached from the Union Army of the South. 



FORT PULASKI. 



71 



Batteries were placed on Tybee Island, and the left 
bank of the Savannah River was occupied by a force 
sufficient to intercept communication with the city, and 
to prevent the Confederate gunboats from carrying suc- 
cor to the fort. The batteries were not completed until 
April 9, owing to the great labor involved in convey- 
ing the guns to their insular position, and there erect- 
ing them. When the works were completed, however, 
36 pieces of artillery were ready to open fire on the 
fort. During the time that these guns were being 
placed in position, the garrison made not the slightest 
attempt to interrupt the work. The bombardment 
commenced on April 10, and a hot artillery-duel con- 
tinued during that day and the next. So large a breach 
had been effected in the walls by noon on the i ith, that 
preparations were made for storming the fort ; but about 
two hours afterwards, before active operations could be 
commenced, the commander surrendered. By the de- 
struction of the wall on the south-eastern face of the 
fortress, the magazine had become exposed to the fire 
of the batteries, so that further defence was impossible, 
and the only choice lay between immediate submission 
and instant death in the ruins of the structure. Great 
vexation was experienced in the South at the fall of 
Fort Pulaski. The capture of Savannah did not follow 
the exploit, as was expected, and the interior parts of 
Georgia were not reduced. The defences of the city 
were increased, and a sufficient force was stationed in 
the neighborhood to repel any attack that might be de- 
signed. The possession of Pulaski prevented any fur- 
ther attempts to run the blockade into Savannah by the 
mouth of the river; so that the siege was not entirely 
barren of results. Other expeditions about the same 
period were directed against various positions on the 
coast of Georgia, and these were attended by a degree 
of success which sufficiently repaid the labor expended 



^2 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

in conducting them. In North Carolina, Fort Macon 
was taken on April 25, by a force sent out by Burnside 
from the town of Newbern. The fort was defended 
with great determination, but it was at length com- 
pelled to succumb to the superior fire of the Union 
forces. The capture of this fort gave Burnside a safe 
port of entry for the vessels employed in furnishing 
supplies to his army of occupation. The Union arms 
had now obtained complete command over the coast of 
North Carolina ; but the loyal sentiment alleged to ex- 
ist among the people was found to be entirely absent. 

Burnside was not wanting in activity. About the 
time that Fort Macon surrendered, a reconnoisance was 
made in the direction of Norfolk, Virginia, from Eliza- 
beth City, North Carolina. A body of Confederate 
troops was encountered at a distance of 35 miles from 
that town, and, after an indecisive action, the forces of 
both belligerents drew back. Norfolk thus remained 
untouched ; but the Confederates were doubtful as to its 
safety, and its evacuation occurred shortly afterwards. 
These, however, were small results in comparison with 
the capture of New Orleans, which took place during 
the spring. It was a very important matter to secure 
this city, which is by far the greatest port in the South- 
ern States of America. The people of Louisiana gene- 
rally had given a most enthusiastic support to the Con- 
federacy, and, both from diversity of descent and dis- 
tinction of interests, entertained a hearty detestation of 
the North. The commerce of New Orleans was ruined 
by the blockade, and nowhere did a more intense feel- 
ing of animosity towards the Union prevail than in that 
fine emporium of the Mississippi which Jackson had so 
successfully defended against the British. The river- 
fleet employed against the blockading squadron had re- 
cently been increased; but two additional ironclads, 
commenced some time before, still remained unfinished 



74 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



at the beginning of April. It was believed by the citi- 
zens that the forts near the mouth of the river would be 
sufficient to prevent the passage of ships ; and it was 
thought by many that New Orleans was imperilled 
rather from the north, by a fleet which might possibly 
descend the stream, than from the south, by one ap- 
proaching from the Gulf of Mexico. In the latter di- 
rection, the city was protected by two lines of defence. 
The outer line consisted of Forts Jackson and Philip, 
built on opposite banks of the river. 

New Orleans was in no condition for repelling an 
attack when the Union forces determined to reduce it. 
The city had been almost denuded of troops, to aug- 
ment the Confederate army in Tennessee under Beaure- 
guard. Forts Jackson and Philip (situated about 
75 miles below New Orleans, and 25 from the mouth 
of the river), were garrisoned, for the most part, with 
regular troops, many of whom had formerly belonged 
to the United States Army ; but in the city itself only 
one company remained. Three thousand volunteers 
for ninety days were raised as a substitute for the regi- 
ments that had been withdrawn ; but the newcomers 
were insufficiently armed. Still, something had been 
done to meet impending dangers. A few heavy guns 
had recently been sent to the forts from Richmond, at 
the urgent request of Brigadier-General Lovell, who 
had the principal command in Louisiana. A boom had 
been thrown across the river from fort to fort, and, 
when carried away by the spring floods, had been suc- 
ceeded by another of more elaborate construction. 
The river was further protected by a fleet of seven 
.steamers, provided witli iron prows to act as rams, and 
covered with cotton bulkheads so as to ward off the 
action of shot ; and the steam ram Manassas was sta- 
tioned a short di.stance above Fort Jackson. Yet the 
defences of New Orleans, though good in some re- 



NEW ORLEANS. 



75 



spects, were on the whole insufficient to resist the 
extraordinary resources of the Union forces. Louisiana 
was so distant from the chief seats of war that the 
inhabitants do not seem to have very seriously con- 
cerned themselves about their safety. It was only 
when news had been received as to the probability 
of an immediate attack that any extra measures were 
adopted. 

The combined naval and military expedition now 
sent forth had been in preparation for some months. 
The fleet was under the command of Commodore Fara- 
gut, and included 30 armed steamers and 21 mortar 
vessels, the direction of which was confided to Com- 
modore Porter. General Butler was at the head of the 
land forces, which had been recruited chiefly from the 
Eastern States. The first instalment of troops arrived 
at Ship Island, in the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of 
Mississippi, on December 3, 1861 ; the second instal- 
ment reached the same spot in January, 1862 ; and the 
squadron under Farragut followed shortly after. 
While the united forces were staying at Ship Island, a 
reconnoissance was undertaken to determine the best 
mode of approaching New Orleans. It was determined 
to proceed by way of the river. This proved to be a 
work of difficulty. It took nearly three weeks to get 
all the ships over the bar at the south-west entrance 
to the Mississippi, and Farragut found the depth con- 
siderably less than had been indicated on the official 
maps — a difference which had been accounted for by 
the suggestion that the channel had been partly filled 
up, owing to the absence of traffic since the blockade. 
When at length the vessels got fairly into the stream, 
some of the gunboats and mortar-vessels crept 
cautiously up, making observations as they went, and 
concealing their presence by wreathing their masts, 
rigging and hulls with bushes, reeds and willows, which. 



1^ 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



mingling in appearance with the thick woods on the 
left side of the advancing squadron, would be likely 
to deceive any Confederate observers who might be in 
the neighborhood. A station for the fleet was selected 
22 miles below the forts, and the gunboats were sent 
farther up the river, with orders to oppose any of the 
enemy's vessels which might be visible, and to shell the 
woods, so as to clear them from Confederate sharp- 
shooters. This was in April ; and, the channel having 
been thus surveyed and protected, the troops were con- 
veyed in transports to a position 12 miles in the rear of 
Fort Philip, on the north-eastern bank of the stream. 
Two schooners from the mortar-fleet occupied a bayou, 
or creek, in the rear of Fort Jackson soon afterwards ; 
and on April 13 several of the Union gunboats were 
within two miles of the latter fortification. The boom 
which the Confederates had stretched across the river 
had been damaged shortly before, partly by the action 
of a storm, and partly by the breaking loose of some 
fire-rafts which drifted against the obstruction. Every- 
thing being now in readiness, the bombardment com- 
menced on the 1 8th, the mortar-vessels taking the lead, 
and the gunboats assisting whenever the others re- 
quired relief A terrible fire was in this way concen- 
trated on the forts, but especially on Fort Jackson, the 
citadel of which was in flames on the very first day. 
On the following day the officers' quarters were entirely 
consumed and the artillerists driven from the parapet- 
guns. Owing to the soft and spong)' nature of the soil, 
the shells penetrated eighteen or twenty feet into the 
ground where they exploded with a muffled noise and 
convulsion suggestive of an earthquake. The levee — 
that elevated portion of the river-bank which is artifi- 
cially made — was broken in more than a hundred 
places, and the water, rushing into the fort, flooded the 
parade-ground and casemate. 



NEW ORLEANS. 



77 



During six days this horrible bombardment con- 
tinued, and the forts could do little in reply, owing 




COMMODORE DAVID G. FARRAGUT. 



to the short range of their guns. Fire-barges were fre- 
quently sent down the river by the Confederates ; but 



78 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UiYION. 



these, while doing no harm, inflicted considerable injury 
upon the Southerners themselves, by setting the 
wharves of Fort Jackson on fire and enabling the 
enemy, after dark, to point his guns with greater ac- 
curacy. On the night of the 20th, no fire-ships were 
sent down from the forts, and the Union squadron, 
taking advantage of the obscurity, despatched some of 
their gunboats, under cover of a heavy fire, to com- 
plete the destruction of the boom, and drag off the re- 
maining schooners which still impeded the channel. 
The feat was one of much difficulty and peril, for the 
guns of Fort Jackson opened fire on the gunboats with 
great animation ; nevertheless, it was safely accom- 
plished. Attempts were made to blow up the boom by 
means of a galvanic current acting on petards ; but the 
explosives failed to ignite. Lieutenant Caldwell there- 
upon boarded one of the hulks, slipped the chain, and 
made an opening large enough for the fleet to pass. 
His vessel was swept ashore by the current ; but she 
was afterwards got off, in sj)ite of the cannonade from 
Fort Jackson, and the river was now free to the invading 
force. The bombardment, however, continued th ree days 
longer, and it was not until the early morning of the 
24th that the squadron moved up the Mississippi in 
two columns. The previous day had been occupied by 
preparations for passing the forts; and while these were 
going on, the enemy's positions were still vigorously 
shelled. Much ingenuity was shown in protecting the 
engines and machinery of the vessels from the action 
of the hostile artillery. The signal to get under way 
was given at two o'clock a. m. on the 24th, and on ap- 
proaching the fort a terrific cross-fire was opened on 
them. The Hartford, in which Farragut was leading the 
left column, caught fire from one of the combustible 
rafts, and for a time got aground ; but the flames 
were speedily extinguished, and the guns were so well 




J^ 



go THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

worked that in a little while Fort Philip was nearly 
silenced. Some of the other vessels became entangled 
in the remains of the barrier, and were not extricated 
without difficulty. 

Before the Union squadron had quite passed the 
forts, the Confederate fleet of gunboats and rams ap- 
peared in sight and took part in the conflict. The ad- 
vance was much facilitated by the darkness of the night 
and the dense vapor from the guns ; for, although Gen- 
eral Duncan, who commanded the coast defences, had 
sent instructions to the naval officers to keep the river 
lighted with fire-barges, in anticipation of an immediate 
attack, nothing of the kind was done until the Union 
vessels were off the forts. It was now that the river-fleet 
did its utmost to oppose the advancing enemy. The 
Manassas, and an ironclad called the Morgan, attacked 
some of the Union vessels, one of which was run down, 
though not with such suddenness but that her crew- 
were enabled to escape. The Morgan, being much 
damaged by the collision, shortly afterwards surren- 
dered ; three other Confederate ships were captured ; 
and the Manassas, in aiming a blow at one of her ad- 
versaries, ran ashore, was abandoned by her crew, and 
finally blew up, after floating some distance down the 
current. All this while, the Union fleet was progress- 
ing up the river, to a greater extent even than the com- 
manders were aware ; for, when morning dawned, they 
discovered to their surprise that the vessels had passed 
the forts, and that the Confederate flotilla had been 
nearly destroyed. It was therefore determined to push 
on at once to New Orleans. A regiment of troops en- 
camped on the banks of the river was compelled to sur- 
render; and on the morning of the 25th the advanced 
guard encountered the batteries of the second line 
of defence, at Chalmette, which, however, was too 
weak to offer much resistance. As the Union vessels 



NEW OE LEANS. gl 

drew near to the grand object of their attack, burning 
steamers, fire-rafts, and cotton-siiips in flames, came 
floating down the tide. It was evident that the people 
of New Orleans were in a mood of angry desperation, 
and that everything was being destroyed which could 
be harmed by fire. 

At one o'clock on the 25th, the Union squadron 
anchored in front of the city. A terrible spectacle 
presented itself Black clouds of smoke rose for miles 
along the levee, indicating that the vast stores of cotton 
in the neighborhood were being consumed. Tiie river 
was covered with burning ships, which threatened the 
Union vessels with conflagration. An excited crowd 
was drawn up on shore, and all Union sympathizers, 
who ventured to give expression to their feelings, were 
at once shot down with pistols. For a long time, the 
people had believed the lower defences of the river to 
be absolutely impregnable. When they discovered 
their mistake, and plainly heard the enemy's guns 
engaging the upper defences, astonishment, despair, and 
rage filled the hearts of the citizens. The town itself 
was completely open to attack, and the hopelessness of 
maintaining it, with not more than 3000 raw troops, 
was so apparent to General Lovell that he retired at 
once to Camp Moore, on the Jackson Railway, together 
with a ^Qw of the volunteers, though the greater number 
disbanded, and returned to their homes. The civil 
authorities having practically resumed their control 
over the city. Captain Bailey, of the Cayuga, which 
headed the right column of tlie squadron, went ashore 
to demand the surrender of the place. He was at once 
threatened by a violent mob, but, being protected by 
the more respectable citizens, made his way to the 
mayor's office, where he demanded the submission of 
New Orleans to the forces of the United States. Far- 
ragut had by this time stationed his ships at intervals 
6 



32 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

off the levee, with their guns pointed against the city; 
and the Confederates had no force with which to en- 
counter the strength of their enemies. Farragut was 
aware that his own situation was not devoid of peril. 
He had in his rear two strong forts and some war- 
vessels. He was separated from all other Union forces, 
and was surrounded by a violently hostile population. 
It was therefore very advisable to proceed with caution. 
A sharp controversy took place between the commodore 
and the mayor, mainly on the question whether the 
city authorities themselves should haul down the Con- 
federate flag, and substitute that of the United States 
(as Farragut demanded), or whether the Union troops 
should do it. A detachment of sailors and marines 
went on shore on April 26, hauled down the symbol of 
rebellion, and ran up the stars and stripes. By about 
the close of the month, the Union flag was floating from 
all the public buildings ; but the exasperation of the 
people found vent in acts of insult which sorely tried 
the patience of the Union oflicers. At one time, Farra- 
gut considered it necessary to menace the city with 
iDombardment ; and the mayor replied in a high-flown 
communication, assuming that the commodore desired 
to murder women and children, though he had requested 
that they might be at once removed. No bombardment, 
however, followed ; and New Orleans, conquered, but 
not submissive, set itself to the invention of new forms 
of annoyance, as the only solace remaining to its 
wounded pride. 

Louisiana lost heart with the fall of New Orleans. 
If Farragut had any anxiety with regard to the forts in 
his rear, the occasion for such a feeling was very soon 
removed. When morning dawned on that memorable 
24th of April which witnessed the passage up the river 
of Farragut's squadron, Porter, whose detachment of 
gunboats and mortar-vessels still lay below the two 



NEIV ORLEANS. 



^l 



forts occupying the right and left banks of the Missis- 
sippi, prepared to engage those works, as well as the 




5<;:;^ 



COMMODORE DAVID D. PORTER. 

remains of the Confederate fleet, with the force at his 
disposal. Some steps towards reducing the forts had 



34 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

already been taken. The army under Butler had been 
sent round to the rear of Fort Philip, and plans had 
been commenced for cutting off the garrison of Fort 
Jackson. But it was obviously desirable that the two 
positions should be taken as speedily as possible, and, 
on the morning of the 24th, Porter sent a demand for 
their surrender. This being refused, the bombardment 
was again opened on the 26th, and next day the demand 
for surrender was repeated. The terms proposed by 
the commodore were honorable to his adversaries. The 
officers were to retain their sidearms ; both officers and 
men were to be paroled ; and private property was to be 
respected. 

The officers in the forts were desirous of continued 
resistance; but the soldiers were mutinous, and their 
superiors saw that they had no longer the means of 
fighting at command. When intelligence arrived that 
New Orleans was in the hands of the enemy, and when 
it was seen that Butler had cut off the garrison from 
retreat, the troops refused any longer to obey orders, 
and, seizing the guns, turned them from the ramparts. 
Some of the cannon were spiked, and officers who 
ventured to interfere were fired at. Several of the men 
deserted with their arms, and surrendered to Butler's 
pickets ; and the aspect of affairs grew alarming during 
the night of the 27th. A capitulation was consequently 
inevitable, and on the morning of the 28th a boat was 
sent off to Porter, with a letter stating that the forts 
would be given up on the terms proposed. Porter went 
to Fort Jackson, and, while discussing the terms of 
capitulation, observed the Confederate ironclad, Louis- 
iana, drifting on fire towards the Union ships. The 
Confederate naval officers had in fact towed the ram to 
a point above the forts, had set her in flames, and then 
turned her adrift with guns shotted, apparently in the 
expectation of her blowing up in the midst of the Union 



NEIV ORLEANS. 



85 



squadron. Just before the discovery of this fact, Porter 
had been informed that the articles of capitulation would 
not include the naval force ; but he regarded the firing 
of the Louisiana as a breach of faith. He asked 
whether there was any powder on board, but could 
obtain no satisfactory answer. Sending word therefore, 
to the captains of his ships to be on their guard, he 
continued the negotiations. The catastrophe on board 
the Louisiana came sooner than was anticipated by 
those who prepared it. As the ironclad got abreast 
of Fort Philip, it exploded with a terrific report, and 
the guns, as they became red-hot with the flames, which 
had been burning for some time, scattered shot and 
shell in various directions. It is marvelous that wide- 
spread injury was not the result; but the only casualty 
was to a Confederate soldier in the fort, who was killed 
by one of the fragments. The capitulation having been 
completed, Porter took measures against the three 
Confederate steamers which were lying about half a 
mile above the forts. One of these had already been 
scuttled ; the others surrendered without resistance. 
Considering that he had been treacherously dealt with 
in the matter of the Lo7iisiava, Porter made prisoners 
of the naval officers and crews, and sent them to the 
North. It was the opinion of General Duncan, the 
Confederate commander of the coast-defences, that the 
ironclad was set on fire previous to the Union boats 
coming to anchor abreast of the fort; but the facts 
looked suspicious of a sinister design. 

Before the actual surrender of the forts, General Lov- 
ell, the Confederate chief in Louisiana, had received an 
incorrect intimation that the event had already taken 
place. He accordingly ordered the evacuation of the 
forts on Lake Ponchartrain ; and when this order was 
afterwards countermanded, the troops had left the 
works, and some had deserted the flag. The gunboats 



86 THE. BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

and armed steamers on the lake were destroyed, and 
the Confederate power ahiiost ceased to exist in that 
region. At New Orleans Farragut observed several 
ironclad rams in course of building ; but the principal 
of these soon came floating by in flames, and another 
was sunk in front of the Custom House. Eight miles 
above the city, Farragut found two forts, where the 
guns had been spiked, and the gun-carriages set on 
fire. A mile higher up were two earthworks, not 
armed; and at this fort a boom of enormous dimensions 
was discovered, so fashioned as to stop the passage of 
gunboats, but not yet placed in its position across the 
stream. The Confederates, therefore, had evidently ex- 
pended a good deal of time and labor in the defence of 
the Mississippi, but had postponed many of their works 
until it was too late to complete them. On May i for- 
mal possession of New Orleans was taken by General 
B. F. Butler, at the head of the land forces of the U. S. 

Butler's measures were only such as are usual in 
conquered cities which are evidently determined to 
continue an irregular resistance after a formal and 
hated submission. He established what was in fact 
the rule of martial law. In his proclamation he plainly 
intimated that all acts of violence against Union soldiers, 
and all disorders, disturbances of the peace, and crimes 
of an aggravated nature, interfering with the forces or 
laws of the United States, would be referred to a mili- 
tary court for trial and punishment. Other matters 
(including civil causes) would be left to the ordinary 
courts. The transmission of communications by tele- 
graph was placed under military supervision ; and in 
short a complete censorship over the publication of 
news or opinions was established together with the sub- 
ordination of the civil power to that of the sword. The 
assembling of persons in the streets was prohibited, and 
the police arrangements of the city passed into the 



NEW ORLEANS. 



^7 



hands of the occupying force. For all this, Butler had 
abundant justification in the state of popular opinion, 
and it is clear that he could not have discharged his 
duties in any other way. 

The submission of New Orleans being secured, the 
Union steamers ascended the river as far as Baton 
Rouge, the capital of the State, which was given up 
without a struggle. The town had in fact no means of 
resistance and simply yielded to necessity. Its sym- 
pathies were wholly with the Confederacy, and out of a 
population of about 5428 it had contributed 875 men 
to the Confederate Army, and 240 to the Home Guard. 
But it was impossible to encounter the naval force by 
which it was threatened, and with its submission a large 
tract of cotton-bearing and sugar-producing country 
fell under Union power. Still pursuing their career of 
conquest up the Mississippi, the Union vessels received 
the submission of Natchez, and the fortunes of the Con- 
federates in all the Western States were rendered criti- 
cal by the subjection of Louisiana. The raising of the 
blockade of the Mississippi made it advisable for the 
Confederates to evacuate the forts and navy-yard of 
Pensacola, on the south coast of Florida; for, with the 
Union fleet at liberty to pursue other operations after 
its recent successes, it seemed very doubtful whether 
that exposed position could be maintained. The com- 
mandant, General Jones, had for some time been in- 
vested with discretionary power to abandon the place 
whenever such a step appeared to him advisable ; and 
that time he considered had now come. He trans- 
ported to Mobile whatever weapons, stores, and ma- 
chinery he could manage to get off, and then resolved 
to fire the public buildings of Pensacola. But the act 
of removal was no easy matter in view of the hostile 
flotilla which was known to be lying off Fort Morgan, 
at the entrance to Mobile Harbor. The task, however. 



88 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

was accomplished with great ingenuity. Sham guns 
were mounted on the works, and other arrangements 
made for deceiving the enemy ; many valuable mate- 
rials were sent by rail, or in a small river-steamer to a 
place of safety; and on the night of May 9 the infantry 
were marched out of the town. Three companies of 
cavalry were charged with the duty of setting fire to 
the public buildings ; and it was not until the flames 
burst out simultaneously from many quarters that the 
Union forces had any suspicion of what was being ef- 
fected. The garrison of Fort Pickens then commenced 
a furious bombardment ; and on Porter arriving with 
his vessels, the military and naval officers de- 
manded the surrender of Pensacola. The demand was 
at once complied with by the civil authorities, and a 
force under General Arnold endeavored to save what 
remained of the forts and navy-yard. To some extent 
the endeavor was successful ; but the destruction of 
public property was very large. 

With five exceptions, the harbors along the coast of 
the Confederate States had now fallen. The South- 
erners were therefore compelled to carry on their com- 
mercial transactions with Europe in an irregular way. 
Nassau, one of the Bahama Islands, and a British pos- 
session, became the port of entry for the commerce of 
the Confederate States with P^ngland ; and steamers 
proceeded from thence to Charleston or Mobile, run- 
ning the blockade with frequent success. In this way 
the South was furnished with several of the necessaries 
and luxuries of life. Yet the blockade kept out a great 
many things which the Confederates wanted, and 
almost destroyed the export trade of the planters. 
During the spring of 1 862, the prospects of the Rebel 
Government looked so black, that President Davis 
ordered a fast-day, and directed that prayers should be 
ofiTcred up on Friday, May 16, for the strengthening 



NEIV ORLEANS. 89 

and protecting of the armies. In his proclamation he 
admitted the gravity of the situation. " Recent dis- 
aster," he observed, " has spread gloom over the land, 
and sorrow sits at the hearthstones of our countrymen." 

Butler's position continued to be onerous and difficult. 
The markets were so insufficiently supplied with food, 
that the people stood in danger of starving. Butler 
gave orders for the safe conduct of cargoes of flour, 
live stock, and other necessaries, from Mobile and 
various places in the interior. He had captured a 
quantity of beef and sugar intended for the rebels in 
the field and looo barrels of stores, which he dis- 
tributed among the deserving poor — " even though 
some of the food will go to supply the craving wants 
of the wives and children of those now herding at 
Camp Moore and elsewhere, in arms against the U. S." 

Whatever his faults, Butler had certainly restored 
the State to the Union. He was superseded on Decem- 
ber 14, by General Banks, who at first tried a more 
lenient mode of administration, but was soon compelled 
to give up the attempt, on finding that his clemency 
produced no other effect than riotous demonstration, 
cries for President Davis, and threatening language 
towards the military. New Orleans was like a pas- 
sionate and wayward child, which mistakes generosity 
for weakness, and can only be kept in decent order by 
the use of the strong hand. Butler acknowledged this 
from the first ; Banks preferred to buy his experience. 

Beauregard's position at Corinth became extremely 
perilous after the capture of Island No. 10, the Con- 
federate defeat at Shiloh, and the fall of New Orleans. 
The Union forces had now possession of the Missis- 
sippi, and large forces were gathering in different direc- 
tions to crush the rebels. Annoyed at the discomfiture 
of the Western Army on April 6 (though the reverse 



90 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



had been repaired on the following day), General Grant 
was superseded in his command, and the army was 
strengthened by Pope's division. An advance on 
Corinth was commenced at the close of April, and 
each successive camp on the road was fortified at an 
inmiense expenditure of labor. Seven of these lines of 
fortifications — one of them 12 miles in length — were 
erected between Pittsburg Landing and Corinth; and 
towards the end of May the town was evacuated by 
the Confederates. Halleck, who commanded the Union 
troops, entered Corinth on the 29th ; but the enemy 
had escaped. Pope was sent forward to pursue the 
retreating columns. Beauregard had suffered some 
losses on the road of his retreat ; but he succeeded in 
saving by far the greater part of his army, and in 
establishing himself at Tupelo, about 50 miles south of 
Corinth. The Union forces had acquired a command 
over the Mobile and Ohio Railway, and were thus in a 
much better position than before. Fort Pillow, on the 
Mississippi, was abandoned by the Confederates on 
June 4, and the Union gunboats at once descended the 
river, and anchored next day off Island No. 45, close to 
the city of Memphis. Here the Confederate fleet 
engaged the naval forces of the enemy on the morning 
of June 6, and, after a sharp encounter, was defeated 
with heavy loss. The surrender of Memphis followed 
as a matter of course, for the city had now no means 
of defence. It was one of the principal places of 
export for the produce of those regions ; but its pros- 
perity was ruined for a time, and it was evident that 
there had been a great destruction of cotton before the 
entry of the conquerors. 

The Union forces now determined to attack Vicks- 
burg, situated on a sharp bend of the Mississippi, in the 
State similarly named. The position was important, as 
it enabled those holding it to bar the passage of the 



VICKSBURG. QI 

river ; it was also strong, not merely by reason of its 
fortifications, but because of the vast swamps and 
forests, and the numerous creeks and tributary streams, 
which presented so many obstacles to a land force pro- 
ceeding against it. On the present occasion, however, 
it was to be attacked from the river. Farragut, advanc- 
ing up the Mississippi after the surrender of New 
Orleans, had by June 24, come within sight of Com- 
modore Davis, descending the stream from Memphis. 
With the fall of Vicksburg, the river would be opened 
to the commerce of the Western States ; but as long as 
the town and fortifications remained in the hands of the 
Confederates, the great water-highway would be 
effectually blocked. Siege was therefore laid to the 
place, and the bombardment opened on the 25th. It 
continued, with occasional intermissions, for a month; 
yet the storm of shot and shell failed to produce any 
serious effects. By the labor of more than lOOO 
negroes, a canal was dug through the small peninsula, 
formed by the bend of the river, which fronts the town. 
It was hoped in this manner to open a channel by 
which ships could pass up and down, out of reach of 
the batteries ; but the work proved a failure. An excit- 
ing incident occurred on July 15. The small Con- 
federate steamer, Arkansas, which had been roughly 
and hastily coated with iron, and had for some time 
been lying hidden in the Yazoo — an affluent of the 
Mississippi, which it enters a little above Vicksburg — 
issued forth from its place of concealment, drove away 
three Union gunboats which had been sent to make a re- 
connoissance, and, entering the larger river, boldly passed 
through the whole fleet, inflicting much damage, and 
finally anchored under the guns of Vicksburg. The 
Arkansas was itself a good deal injured by the fire ; 
but a subsequent attempt to sink her failed in its object. 
On the 24th, the siege of Vicksburg was abandoned 



92 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



for a time, and Farragut's vessels returned to Baton 
Rouge. 

The summer and autumn of 1862 did not pass with- 
out some operations in the West, by which the Con- 
federates hoped to recover the ground they had lost in 
that part of the country. A scheme of gigantic dimen- 
sions was elaborated : it was proposed to attack the 
Union forces at Baton Rouge, at Corinth (Mississippi), 
and in Eastern Kentucky. Tiiese three localities 
formed the two extremities and the center of the line ; 
and three armies were assembled under the orders of 
Breckinridge, Van Dorn, and Bragg, in Louisiana, in 
Upper Mississippi, and in Eastern Tennessee. Bragg 
had by this time succeeded Beauregard in the com- 
mand of the West, and by far the largest of the three 
armies was that which tiie Southern Government con- 
fided to his care. He had been an officer of the U. S. 
Army, and was well known as a strict disciplinarian. 
Van Dorn had on previous occasions given signs of 
ability; but of Breckinridge there was not much to be 
said. The campaign was opened by some dashing 
incursions made by Generals Morgan and Forrest into 
Kentucky and Tennessee. Morgan had already 
acquired distinction as a species of guerilla chief He 
was a purely amateur soldier, but had won the respect 
of his superiors by enterprise and skill. His force con- 
sisted of volunteers, raised principally among the 
wealthy classes of Kentucky and Tennessee ; and their 
number was small. 

At the time that Morgan was making his way through 
Kentucky, Forrest was marching with a calvary force 
into Western Tennessee. His methods of procedure 
were similar to those of other guerilla chiefs. Detached 
posts were attacked with success ; convoys were 
captured ; and Murfreesboro' was surprised, together 
with the garrison, who were all taken prisoners. Gen- 



GUERILLA WARFARE. 



93 



eral Crittenden, who had lately been appointed to the 
command, was one of those who fell into the hands of 
the enemy. Scarcely any resistance was offered to the 
Confede rate 
forces, nor had 
anyprc'caution 
been taken 
against sur- 
prise. Buell, 
who was in 
command of 
that district, 
reflected very 
strongly on 
the conduct of 
the o ffi c e rs 
and men 
whose duty it 
was to defend 
Murfreesboro' 
and his stric- 
tures do not 
appear to have 
gone beyond 
the justice of 
the case. 

B r e c k i n- 
ridge engaged 
in an attempt 

to gam pOS- GENERAl, JOHN C. BRFXKINRIDGE. 

S e S S i O n of ( Vice-President with Buchanan.) 

Baton Rouge. 

The design was to obtain some position on the 
Lower Mississippi, that the river might not be so 
much in the hands of the Union forces. The land 
operations were to be facilitated by the action of the 




Q4 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

ironclad Arkansas, which had been repaired after 
her engagement with the Union gunboats at Vicks- 
burg. It was hoped that a simultaneous attack by 
land and water would take place on August 5, but the 
Arkansas broke down when about 15 miles above 
Baton Rouge. The regiments under Breckinridge had 
suffered terribly from heat and scarcity of water in the 
sandy regions through which they had marched, and, 
when they reached the object of their attack, were not 
in the best condition for fighting. The Union forces 
also had been reduced by sickness ; but they had 
obtained some information as to the movements of their 
adversary, and Breckinridge, on arriving at Baton 
Rouge, found them drawn up in force outside the town. 
The invaders attacked with great spirit in the early 
morning of August 5 ; overwhelmed the first of the 
Union lines, captured the camp, and were proceeding to 
attack the second line, when a heavy fire from the 
batteries checked their advance. The pause, however, 
was only momentary. Forming their ranks afresh, 
they dashed forward, and drove the Union troops into 
the town. General Williams was killed at the head of 
his troops, and man}' other officers were stretched upon 
the field. The assailants had the best of the encounter, 
but, owing to the absence of the ironclad, were unable 
to maintain their position. The Union gunboats in the 
river severely galled their ranks, and from the houses 
came a continual fire of rifles. Breckinridge was there- 
fore compelled to order a retreat, which, however, was 
not commenced until the enemy's camp had been set 
on fire. In the meanwhile, the Arkansas had been 
attacked by the opposing gunboats, but was too much 
disabled to offer any resistance. She was therefore run 
ashore, fired, and abandoned, when she blew up and 
reached the termination of her career after a somewhat 
inglorious fashion. On August lO, Farragut bom- 



RICHMOND ASSAILED. 



95 



barded and partially destroyed the town of Donaldson- 
ville, between New Orleans and Baton Rouge; but the 
Confederates afterward fortified a position at Port Hud- 
son, nearer Vicksburg, and were thus enabled to exercise 
some control over the great water-highway for which 
both parties were contending. 

The campaign of Eastern Kentucky began early in 
August, when Kirby Smith issued from the passes of 
the Cumberland Mountains, pushed forward through a 
difficult country, and appeared in front of Richmond 
on the 29th. The town was defended by a force of 
8000 men, under command of General Manson. They 
were mostly raw levies, and had been so recently sup- 
plied with arms, that it might fairly be a matter of doubt 
whether they knew how to handle them properly. 
Manson had posted them upon rising ground, crossed 
by the road from Barboursville to Richmond ; and here 
they were attacked at daybreak of the 30th, and com- 
pelled, after some temporary success, to shift their posi- 
tion to a line somewhat nearer the town. The Con- 
federates renewed the assault with fresh energy, and the 
Union troops were driven in confusion to a line of hills 
in the immediate vicinity of Richmond. Though 
rallied for awhile, and covered by artillery, they con- 
tinued to lose ground, and a vehement attack of the 
adversary finally swept them into the town itself. At 
the same time, a body of Confederate cavalry, marching 
round Richmond, fell upon the wagons which had 
been sent to the rear, and captured almost the whole 
train. Finding themselves encountered by enemies on 
two sides, the unhappy soldiers of the Union, whose 
experience of war had in numerous instances com- 
menced that day, saw no choice before them but to sur- 
render. The triumph was sufficient to intoxicate the 
Confederates with a sense of their own invincibility. 
As the result of this one conflict, they had taken 5000 



96 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



prisoners, and had possessed themselves of nine pieces 
of artillery, 10,000 stand of arms, and a large amount 
of supplies. The capture of Richmond was followed 
by that of Lexington on September 2, and that of 
Frankfort on the 17th. Louisville and Cincinnati were 
now hastily fortified by General Wright, the Union 
officer commanding the Department of the Ohio. 
Frantic endeavors were made to organize volunteeer 
corps to meet the victorious legions of Kirby Smith. 
But the prospects of the Union in that Western State 
were extremely dark ; for the main army, under Bragg, 
was now moving forward in prosecution of the general 
scheme of the campaign, and Munfordsville, with about 
4000 men, surrendered to the advanced divisions on 
the 17th. Buell hurried from Nashville to the relief of 
his colleagues in the northern part of the State ; but 
Bragg was already between him and those whom he 
desired to assist. By ordinarily good management on 
the part of Bragg, Buell might have been disastrously 
defeated ; but he with singular imbecility, turned aside 
from the road by which he might have stopped his 
adversary, and suffered him to recapture Munfordsville, 
and to relieve Louisville. Bragg, who had been closely 
followed and in some degree harassed by Buell, seems 
to have been apprehensive of being overwhelmed by 
superior numbers. Turning to the west, he marched 
first to Bardstown, and then to Frankfort, where he 
inaugurated a provisional government of Kentucky. 
Thus Louisville was saved, and at the same time a Union 
detachment stationed at Cumberland Gap, which in the 
first instance had been cut off by the advance of Kirby 
Smith, was enabled, by the latter operations of that 
commander, to escape to Cincinnati. 

The bad management of the Confederates, after their 
first striking successes, changed the \vh(>le character of 
the war in those parts. The Union troops now re- 



98 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UXION. 



sumed the offensive, and Bragg saw that he must retire 
into Tennessee. Buell started in pursuit on October i, 
and fell in with the greater portion of the Confederate 
army on the road from Lebanon to Harrodsburg. By 
this time Bragg had discovered, as Morgan had dis- 
covered before him, that the people of Kentucky, with 
a few exceptions, were not inclined to support the Con- 
federates. He was naturally very anxious to quit the 
State, but thought it necessary to fight an action be- 
fore doing so, in order to redeem his credit, and to save 
from capture the large amount of stores which he had 
seized during his incursion. He therefore drew up his 
army in a position where he considered it probable that 
he should be encountered by the Union troops. His 
forces were divided into two portions, posted on two 
distinct roads, distant from one another about twenty 
miles. Bragg's headquarters were fixed, on the 6th, at 
the town of Harrodsburg, situated at the point of junc- 
tion of the two roads, which were being simultaneously 
watched. Polk, who was stationed on the road from 
Lebanon to Bardstown with three divisions, was di- 
rected to offer battle to the Union forces at Perryville, 
where a very warmly-contested action took place on 
the 8th. 

The Union forces, who were marching from the west, 
appear to have been taken by surprise, not knowing, 
until roughly undeceived, that the Confederates were so 
close at hand. Bragg had already sent orders to his 
other divisions, planted on the Louisville and Lawrence- 
burg road, to march with all haste towards Harrods- 
burg, so that he felt tolerably secure of being well sup- 
ported. Immediately on the Union forces being seen 
advancing, the Confederate infantry rushed forward, and 
a number of Bucll's raw troops who unfortunately hap- 
pened to be in the front line, fled in dismay. The 
older regiments maintained their ground ; and when the 







, \/^'^^ J 



IQO 'I'lIE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

Union troops had been largely reinforced, the strength 
of the opposing parties became more evenly balanced. 
The Union men resolved to act on the defensive until 
the whole of their division should reach the field. 
Polk, however, renewed his attacks with great fury; 
the Union troops were driven back, losing several of 
their officers ; and the action might have ended in a de- 
cided reverse for Buell's army, had not night put an end 
to the combat. Further reinforcements reached the 
Union forces during the evening ; and Bragg considered 
it prudent to retreat. He had gained his object in 
fighting, and had now to consider how he could best 
secure his withdrawal into Tennessee. In killed, 
wounded, and missing, the Union troops had lost more 
than 4000 men. The Confederate loss was estimated 
at about 2500; and this large expenditure of life had 
resulted in no positive advantage to the one side or the 
other. Buell blamed the conduct of some of his of- 
ficers in command of the less experienced troops; the 
Government blamed l)uell, and he was shortly after- 
wards removed from his command, and succeeded by 
General Rosecrans. It must certainly be admitted that 
Buell had not distinguished himself; yet, whether owing 
to good fortune, or to the bad management of his op- 
ponent, Kentucky had been cleared of invaders. Ac- 
companied by long lines of wagons, laden with plunder, 
by vast herds of cattle and horses, and by private car- 
riages conveying those families who preferred to throw 
in their lot with the South, the Confederates retired 
with (.leliberation, and passed safely through Cumber- 
land Gap. The Union troops were in no mood to press 
them closely, and, with their rear well guarded by cav- 
alry, they gained the safer regions of Tennessee. 

Mississippi, in the latter half of the year, was the 
scene of some important events. Sherman was in com- 
mand at Memphis ; Rosecrans, not yet appointed as the 



I^OS/:CRANS' DEFENCE OF CORINTH. jqi 

successor of Buell in Kentucky, was at Corinth, with 
directions to check the Confederate Army of the Mis- 
sissippi, should any attempt be made to cross the Ten- 
nessee River and harrass Buell in the operations just 
described. Price, commanding the Confederates, con- 
centrated his forces at luka, 30 miles to the south of 
Corinth, and on being attacked by Rosecrans, retreated 
in good order. Rosecrans had hoped to overwhelm 
his enemy, but, failing in his design, fortified himself at 
Corinth. Price waited till he was joined by Van Dorn 
and Lovell, and then attacked Corinth. The Union 
pickets were driven in on October 2, and on the morn- 
ing of the 3d the bulk of the Confederate army ap- 
peared in sight. Before the Union troops could be 
withdrawn behind the inner line of defence, they were 
attacked by the Southerners, and compelled to retire. 
Rosecrans, in the course of the night, made such excel- 
lent arrangements, that early next morning, he was 
ready to renew the fight. The Confederates had ap- 
proached from the south, but believing the northern 
side to be more exposed, they marched round to that 
point, only to find that Rosecrans had fortified his po- 
sition with great enterprise and skill. The Union 
troops were now fronting towards the north, when they 
were attacked on the 4th. Stationed behind their 
works, they managed their artillery with resolution, and 
in a few hours they silenced the Confederate batteries. 
Price now prepared to storm the defences. His troops 
rushed impetuously forward, captured some redoubts, 
and drove the defenders into the town. There the 
Union troops rallied, and Price's division, not being sup- 
ported by that of Van Dorn, which had been delayed 
by the difficult nature of the country, was hurled back 
by a vigorous effort, and compelled to abandon what it 
had won. When Van Dorn's columns arrived, they 
were too late to help their comrades. The Union 



I02 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



troops were again in possession of their batteries and 
breastworks ; but Van Dorn concluded to attempt to take 
one portion of the defences. His men advanced with 
extraordinary courage, making their way up a rugged 
ravine under a tremendous fire from the forts. Numbers 

dropped on 
that painful 
and deadly 
path ; the 
ranks were 
formed anew 
to fill the 
gaps that had 
been formed 
in them ; the 
guns still 
played with 
terrible in- 
tensity on 
those devo- 
ted men; 
but the ad- 
vancecontin- 
ued. When 
the attacking 

GENERAL \V. S. ROSECRA.NS. forCC had 

gained the 
edge of the ditch, the Union troops themselves slack- 
ened fire, as if overcome by the heroism which they 
could not subdue. The pause, however, was only 
momentary ; and when the guns once more opened 
at short range, the Confederates for the first time 
faltered, and reeled back. Then two regiments from 
the garrison leaped from the works, and rushed at 
their enemies with a furious charge. The exhausted 
Southerners staggered down the side of the hill, fol- 





GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON. 



103 



I04 l^ii^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

lowed by the Union troops; and Corinth was once 
more safe. 

The losses on both sides had been fearful, and the 
disappointment of the Confederates was all the greater 
on account of their preliminary success. Van Dorn re- 
tired behind the lagoons and marshes from which he 
had issued forth, followed for many miles by the Union 
troops, who, however, ultimately retired to their former 
position. The desperately contested Western campaign 
had resulted in both parties reassuming, with but few 
exceptions, the positions they had held at the beginning. 
In many respects the efforts of the South had been 
amazing ; in many respects the blunders of the North 
had been remarkable; yet the North was still in the 
position of command, and the independence of the South 
was still a doubtful dreani. 

On the defence of Port Hudson and of Vicksburg, 
the hopes of the Confederacy in the West now mainly 
depended. If the Southerners could retain possession 
of the river between those places, they would probably 
be able to hold the State of Mississippi, and in that case 
their position would be much stronger than if they lost 
every portion of the river, and, as a consequence, the 
vast provinces through which it runs. The command 
of the West was given to General Joseph E. Johnston, 
who commanded the Confederate Army at Bull Run, but 
who had for some time been incapacitated for active 
service by the serious wounds he had received at the 
battle of Fair Oaks. The Mississippi Army, which 
included the garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, 
was placed under General Pemberton, who acted in 
subordination to Johnston ; the Tennessee forces came 
also under the supervision of that able commander. 
The Union forces were well represented in the Western 
States by two large armies, one commanded by Grant, 
and the other by Rosecrans. The main body of Grant's 



MURFREESB OR 0\ 



105 



force was engaged during the late autumn in an expedi- 
tion from Western Tennessee into Mississippi, and a 
detachment was being organized for an attack on Vicks- 
burg. The army under Rosecrans was stationed 
partly at Nasliville, and partly along the line of the 
Cumberland River; and in this position it was watched 
by the Confederates under Bragg, who was assisted 
by the irregular operations of his guerilla chieftains, 
Morgan and Forrest. Rosecrans did not at that time 
feel himself strong enough for offensive operations ; 
indeed, it was as much as he could do to defend his 
position against the frequent incursions of his active 
enemies. It was found necessary to fortify Nashville, 
and in the month of December the movements of 
General Morgan were such as to excite some uneasi- 
ness. Hartsville, a small town on the right bank of 
the Cumberland, was taken by Morgan in the early 
morning of December 7, after a march of forty miles 
through snow and ice. The Union troops were sur- 
prised by the sudden appearance of the enemy on 
their side of the river, which they had considered it 
impossible to cross at that point. Their resistance 
was slight, and, in the result, about 1800 troops 
surrendered. After being sent as prisoners to Mur- 
freesboro', they were paroled, and permitted to de- 
part for Nashville, though not before they had paid 
a large ransom in arms, blankets, and overcoats. 
Shortly afterwards, Morgan was instructed to seize the 
railway between Nashville and Louisville, so as to 
isolate some of the Union detachments, while Forrest 
threatened Grant's communications with Columbus. 

Rosecrans abandoned his defensive position as the 
year was drawing to a close, and on the 26th advanced 
towards his opponents at the head of a large and 
well-appointed army. Less than forty miles interposed 
between Nashville and Murfreesboro'; but the progress 



X06 "^^^ B A TILES FOR TSE IS ION. 

o{ the Union troops was rendered diflficult by the 
Confederate skimiishers who thronged the woods on 
both sides of the road. It was not until the 50th 
tliat Rosecrans reached the vicinit\' (Si Murfreesboro". 
Fighting took place that day, and the pickets of the 
Southern commander, Polk, were driven in. The two 
armies bivouacked that night within sight of each 
other's fires, and Rosecrans disposed his troops for the 
operations of the morrow as well as the difiicult 
nature cA the country* would permit. The land was 
broken up into a number of low hills, which concealed 
the p<^sitions of the enemy; and the several divisions 
of the Northern force were so hidden from one another 
in the density of the forest, that anything in the nature 
of general superxision became almost impossible. The 
adversaries were now fronting one another on the banks 
of a stream called the Stone River, and portions of both 
forces stood on both sides c>\ the channel. The night 
of the 30th did not jxass in j>ertect inactivit\* as f;\r as 
the Confederates were concerned. A brigade cA their 
cavaln- moved round the enemy's rear during the hours 
of darkness, and made so vigorous an assault on the 
wagon-trains that stores to a large amount were cap- 
tured. The movement was as daring as it was success- 
ful — the cavalty actually jxissing round the whole body 
of the Union army, so that they rejoined their comrades 
on the opposite flank from that which they had quitted. 
The action ai. the 31st was commenced by Bragg, who 
ordered his left wing to advance, when the Union forces 
were again taken by suiprise, and driven back in so 
much confusion that several guns were captured before 
the horses could be harnessed. Two oi. the Union 
divisions were dispersed in rapid succession, and word 
was sent to Rosecrans to inforn\ him of the misfortunes 
that had already occurred. Other portions of tlie army 
made a more determined stand, and the Confederate 



ATf//x/-A'/:/:.':f{OA'0\ 



107 



attack vva , finally clicckcd, tliou;^h it had succeeded 
sufficiently to compel the whole of the Union right and 
center to recede, and to take u[) positions very diff';rcnt 
from those whicli they had held in tiie morning. The 
right-hand portion of the left wing still kept its ground 
be-tween the Stone River and the railway from Nashville 
to Murfrcesboro'; but, on the whole, the Union forces 
had been seriously injured by these vigorous operations-. 
The Confederates had not purchased their success, 
such as it was, without a considerable expenditure of 
life. The Northern troops, driven to bay, had fought 
with great resfjlutif)n, and their opponents had suffered 
terribly. A brigade of Polk's corjjs had lost a third of 
its number in attacking the division commanded by 
General Sheridan; and in other quarters the destruction 
of life among the field and staff officers harl been im- 
mense. The new jjositions taken \\\) by the Union forces 
were such as to render a fresh attack extremely difficult. 
Hoth flanks were protected by streams, with bridges and 
fords in the rear; and the spirit of the troops was for 
the most part good. TIk; Union left was planted on a 
hill near the Stone River, and, as this was the key to 
the whoUr {)osition, the i)artial triumph of the Con- 
federates was not of much value. If all their efforts 
were not to be thrown away, the attack must be renewed ; 
but the majority of the Confederates were in too 
cxhaustefi a condition to resume the combat. The 
change in tlu; Union position had been effected early in 
the aftf.Mnooii. An hour or two later, a fresh division, 
nnfler I>reckinridge, arrived on the ground, and advanced 
against the enemy. With great spirit the men rushed 
up a rising ground, u[)on the top of which the Union 
forces had planted a powerful line of batteries. The 
contest was maintained with admirable courage ; but the 
Confederates, notwithstanding their devotion, coultl mak'c 
no head against the obstacles to which they were op- 



I08 THE BATTLES FOR THE U.VION: 

posed. After losing many of their number, they retired 
to the point from which they had started ; and, as dark- 
ness had now closed in, little more could be done till 
the morrow. A clear moonlight enabled some of the 
Union batteries to continue their fire, but with this 
exception the night passed in quiet. Owing to the 
right wing of the Northern Army having been driven in 
upon the left, the Confederates were now in possession 
of a large part of the field which in the morning had 
been occupied by the Union troops. During the prog- 
ress of the battle, the conmiunication with Nashville 
had been often cut off, and the ammunition-train of the 
Union right wing was twice captured by the Southerners, 
and twice retaken by their antagonists. Thus, on the 
hard-fought field of Murfreesboro', the old year came 
to an end, and on the following day — January i, 1863 
— both armies were too worn out by what they had 
already undergone to do much more than recombine 
their shattered ranks. Detachments were sent out by 
the Confederates to threaten the Union communications, 
to capture supplies, and to reconnoitre the condition of 
the enemy's forces. Rosecrans withdrew his army a 
short distance to the rear, and the Southerners then 
occupied the ground between the river and the railway. 
The Union troops, who were reinforced by two brigades, 
entrenched themselves where they stood ; the wounded 
were sent to the rear, and every preparation was made 
to dispute any renewed attempt on the part of the Con- 
federates to get possession of the road to Nashville. 

On the morning of January 2, demonstrations were 
made along the whole Union line; but operations on a 
large scale were not commenced until three o'clock 
in the afternoon, when a numerous body of Confederates 
burst upon a Union division which, at an early hour of 
the morning, had been sent by Rosecrans to talce ground 
once more on the eastern side of the river. The attack- 



MlRFREESBORO\ 



109 



ing force consisted of the entire right wing, and for a 
time the Union troops were repulsed. On receiving an 
addition to their numbers, however, they pressed forward 
with so much impetuosity that the Confederates gave 
way, and, leaving many dead and wounded on the field, 
retired to their own lines. In this conflict, which was 
obstinately disputed for a considerable length of time, 
the Southern troops lost a battery and a stand of colors. 
Soon afterwards, Rosecrans gave the order for the entire 
line to advance, when the Confederate right wing was 
broken, and the flank so seriously menaced that Bragg 
considered it advisable to withdraw the whole of his 
forces. Breckinridge's division had been completely 
mobbed, and but for the interposition of a brigade from 
Polk's corps, which checked the pursuit and saved some 
of the abandoned artillery, the disaster might have been 
even worse than it was. Night fell once more upon a 
bloody and tumultuous plain ; and next day each army 
held the other in such dread that very little was even 
attempted. Rosecrans managed so skilfully as to induce 
his opponent to believe that large reinforcements had 
arrived during the night. This finally determined the 
action of the Confederate general. He felt that he was 
no longer able to maintain his position, and that Mur- 
freesboro' must be abandoned if Tennessee was to 
be retained at all. The prisoners and baggage-wagons 
were accordingly sent to the rear; at eleven o'clock at 
night the army commenced its retreat; and a new posi- 
tion was soon afterwards taken up behind the Duck 
River, some fifty miles to the south of Murfreesboro'. 
That town was occupied by the Union forces on the 5th, 
and 1500 of the Confederate sick and wounded were 
found there by the conquerors. It is a remarkable fact 
that in this series of battles the two combatants are 
thought to have lost about the same number in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners. Rosecrans, in his report, con- 



no THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

fesses to having been deprived of 8778 men. If we are 
to set down a similar number on the Confederate side, 
we reach a total loss of more than 17,000. Both armies 
had fought with singular determination, and, being 
equally matched, they had inflicted upon one another a 
frightful amount of injury. Such an action should have 
been a turning-point of the war ; but unfortunately its 
results bore little proportion to the cost. 

At about the same period, the guerilla chief, Forrest, 
had been unfortunate in his attempts to sever the com- 
munications of Grant's army in Mississippi. In the 
latter part of December, 1862, he effected a good deal 
of damage to the various bridges and lines of rail, and 
captured several Union detachments, but on returning 
to the Confederate lines, was attacked on two sides by 
separate bodies of Northern troops. After a sharp en- 
gagement, his force was utterly routed, and it was with 
difficulty that he and his men escaped across the 
river into Tennessee. Morgan was rather more success- 
ful, but the amount of damage inflicted by these two 
leaders was of a petty and vexatious, rather than a 
serious character. The general position of the Union 
troops in the West was not materially affected by the 
incursions of Morgan and Forrest, and the minor suc- 
cesses which they gained were accounted very poor 
compensation for the Confederate reverse at Murfrees- 
boro'. Engagements of this trivial nature continued 
to occur from time to time; but their importance is not 
sufficient to merit a detailed account. 

In the latter days of 1862, Grant, whose headquarters 
were at Oxford, Mississippi, was preparing to advance 
on Granada, the point of junction between the Memphis 
and Mobile and the Corinth and Mobile Railways. 
While doing so, his depot at Holly Springs was 
vehemently attacked, on December 19, by General Van 
Dorn, at the head of some Texan cavalry. The town 



GUERILLA DEPREDATIONS. m 

appears to have been badly guarded ; and when Van 
Dorn dashed into it, the Union troops were so over- 
come by surprise that, after the merest pretence at 
fighting, the garrison laid down their arms, with the ex- 
ception of a few cavalry, who escaped. The torch was 
then applied to the vast accumulations of flour, cotton, 
and other stores which the place contained ; the rail- 
way, the station and the rolling stock, were set on fire ; 
and the explosion of the magazine caused the destruc- 
tion of a large part of the town. Having effected his 
purpose. Van Dorn got safely away, and Grant, con- 
sidering that his plans had been seriously affected by 
this disaster, abandoned his advance into Mississippi. 
Not many days after, Sherman, who commanded a de- 
tachment of Grant's army, was unfortunate in a renewed 
attack on Vicksburg. He had under his direction four 
divisions, commanded by Generals Steele, Morgan, M. 
L. Smith and A. J. Smith. His force embarked at 
Memphis, Tennessee, on December 20, and next day 
was joined by Porter, with two gunboats. The main 
body of the fleet was at the mouth of the River Yazoo, 
which flows into the Mississippi a few miles above 
Vicksburg. The expedition now descended the larger 
stream, exposed occasionally to the attacks of sharp- 
shooters on the banks, whose assaults were revenged by 
the burning of houses, and the destruction of much 
property. The discipline of the men was extremely 
defective. The scene of confusion at the embarkation 
was such as to reflect discredit on all concerned. On 
the night of the 24th, and early morning of the 25th, 
the detachment arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo. 
The fleet consisted of more than 60 transports, with a 
number of ironclads and other gunboats and several 
mortar-boats. On the 26th, the expedition moved up 
the Yazoo, and troops were landed at various points ex- 
tending over a distance of about three miles. The 



112 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

assailants were now eight miles from the point of attack, 
for it was proposed by Sherman to assault Vicksburg 
in the rear — that is to say, from the north-eastern side. 
The Confederates, however, had already erected defences 
and were prepared for a vigorous resistance. A battery, 
reared upon a bank known as Haines' Bluff, barred the 
progress of the Union gunboats up the Yazoo; and be- 
tween that bluff and the threatened city itself a large 
number of Confederates were posted on a line of low 
hills stretching along Chickasaw Bayou, which connects 
the lower part of the Yazoo with a bend of the Missis- 
sippi a little above Vicksburg. Additional batteries 
and lines of breastworks were constructed by the 
Southern forces as soon as it became evident that the 
Union army had landed on the left bank of the Yazoo. 
Reinforcements were hurried up by rail from Jackson, 
and the defenders of the city felt so confident of success 
that several of the civilians, including ladies, stationed 
themselves on the higher bluffs, to watch any engage- 
ment that might occur. 

The Union troops being now ranged in order of attack, 
the division under Gen. Steele was sent to a point above 
Chickasaw Bayou, to operate against the battery which 
enfiladed that point from the right of the Confederate line. 
Fighting ensued on the 27th, but the battery was not 
taken. The action was renewed on the 28th, and the 
Union troops then attempted to cross the bayou, so as 
to bring their left and center into combination. Still no 
impression could be made on the Confederate position, 
which every hour grew stronger, as fresh works were 
thrown up, and fresh reinforcements arrived from Jack- 
son. Nevertheless, they held grimly to their purpose 
and, some militar\' bridges having been extemporized 
on the 29th, two companies of the 6th Missouri Regi- 
ment crossed the bayou, with instructions to under- 
mine the bank on which the Confederates stood. 



114 '^^'^^ BATTLES FOR THE UMON. 

The enterprise was one of great peril ; but the Mis- 
sourians set to work with quiet determination, and their 
spades and pick-axes made an impression on the 
crumbling earth. The sharpshooters of the 13th 
Regulars opened fire on the defenders of the bank, to 
prevent those firing on the men below ; but in some 
instances their aim was inaccurate, and two Union men 
were shot dead by their own comrades. The Mis- 
sourians called out, " Fire higher I " and the Confederates 
above responded with the exclamation, " Fire lower ! " 
The opposing ranks were so close together that con- 
versation was carried on between the two lines. " What 
regiment is below?" asked one of the Confederates. 
"The 6th Missouri," was the reply; to which the 
Southerner responded, " It is too brave a regiment to be 
on the wrong side." These Missourians had had no 
food for several hours, and one of them called out, 
" Have you got anything to eat up there ? I am 
hungry," A large loaf of bread was immediately 
thrown down to them. At the same time that this 
attempt was being made to undermine the bank, the 
division on the right attacked some other bluffs beyond 
the bayou. An advance over the center bridge was to 
have been made at this juncture; but, owing to a mis- 
take, the order was not given. This error caused the 
failure of the whole operation. The right division, not 
being properly supported by the center, was repulsed 
with great loss, and night came on, accompanied by 
torrents of rain. The ground, at the best low and 
marshy, was converted in a little while into a muddy 
swamp, where the wounded dropped in their exhaus- 
tion, and, being beyond the reach of assistance, 
perished miserably in the ooze, dying either of exposure 
to the cold, or of absolute suffocation in the slough. 
The Union forces had lost 3000 men, and were no 
nearer the realization of their project than when they 



GALVESTON. 



115 



had begun. At one time during the 30th, it was 
designed to attack Haines' Bluff; but a heavy fog 
came on, and it was apparent that the expedition must 
be abandoned. The troops re-embarked that evening, 
and returned up the Mississippi. Shortly afterwards, 
Sherman was superseded in the command of the 
detachment by McClernand, and the force was divided 
into two corps, under Sherman and Morgan. 

The failure at Vicksburg took place in the final days 
of the old year. On the first day of the new year 
(1863), the Union forces experienced another misfortune 
in the recapture of Galveston, Texas. General Ma- 
gruder, having collected artillery at Houston, marched 
towards the neighborhood of the town which he 
designated to take, and occupied in force the works 
erected opposite the island on which that town is 
situated. Two steam-packets he converted into gun- 
boats, which he rendered shot-proof by bulwarks of 
cotton-bales. The boats were manned by Texan 
cavalry, and were accompanied in their expedition by 
tenders and yachts, filled with spectators and volunteers. 
As the troops crossed the railway bridge which con- 
nected the island with the continent, the gunboats 
steamed up, and engaged the Union gunboat called the 
Harriet Lane. The latter soon drove off one of the 
Confederate vessels ; but the other, named the Bayou 
City, continued the contest with great determination. 
By this time, the land troops had obtained possession of 
the town, and the Union forces, being unprovided with 
artillery, surrendered at discretion. The blockade in 
that locality was at once raised, and the port was re- 
opened to commerce. The conclusion of 1862 and the 
commencement of 1863 were marked by serious re- 
verses to the Union arms. The future was involved in 
clouds and darkness ; yet the spirit of the Northern 
people did not fail one jot. 



CHAPTER III. 
The "Merrimac" and " Monitor" (March 8, 1862). 

" At the outbreak of the RebeUion," says Swinton, 
" an enormous disparity was visible between the naval 
strength of the Union and that of the Confederacy. The 
regular war steamers of the United States, though 
scanty in number, contained some of the finest ships 
in the world. On this navy was imposed the task of 
blockading 3000 miles of seacoast, stretching from Cape 
Henry to the harbor of Galveston. The department 
bought up everywhere the vessels of the mercantile 
marine, and every floating object propelled by steam 
which could be converted into a war vessel. 

" The Confederates had to get along with scantier 
means of provision. They wanted to break up the 
blockade, to repel naval forays on their rivers and 
coasts, and to send out ocean guerillas to cripple the 
vast commerce of the Union. For this purpose, and 
for most of the blockade-runners, they relied upon the 
English shipyards. From thence came the Alabamas, 
the Shenandoahs, the Sumters, and all their famous 
cruisers, zvIiicJi were b?iilt, furnished, armed, equipped, 
and manned in Eitf^lisli par Is." 

Shortly before McClellan's temporary advance toward 

Manassas, a naval action took place in Hampton 

Roads, off Fortress Monroe, which was a perfectly new 

experience in marine warfare, and it attracted great at- 

(116) 



Il8 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

tention, not only here, but throughout the world. It 
revolutionized the mode of fighting at sea, and rendered 
the ships, the armaments, and the tactics of Trafalgar as 
obsolete as those of Actium. Since then, all maritime 
nations have been compelled to arm their ships with 
iron plates of enormous thickness, to invent artillery of 
ever-increasing size and power, and to depend more on 
revolving turrets than on the old-fashioned tiers of 
guns. There has been no great naval war since 1862, 
and we are still ignorant of the ultimate effects likely to 
ensue from these new methods of warfare. But the 
combat of the Mcrriuiac and the Monitor drew a deep 
line between the past and the future ; and the naval 
heroes of days to come will have to fight under condi- 
tions the nature of which has not yet been fully tested. 
The Union fleet stationed in Hampton Roads con- 
sisted of five vessels, under the command of Captain 
Marston, of the Roanoke ; and it would be a great gain 
to the Southern cause if these could be destroyed or 
taken. The Confederates had raised and refitted the 
frigate Merriviac, which had been sunk, as we have 
seen, on the evacuation of the Navy Yard at Norfolk. 
This vessel had been converted into a shot-proof steam- 
battery. Its proportions had been cut down, and its 
sides plated with iron, which had been subjected to va- 
rious experiments, calculated to show the resisting 
power of the armor, and the best methods of manag- 
ing such a ship when in actual conflict with an enemy. 
A ram had also been added to its appointments, and 
the Merriviac was now in a condition to inflict the 
maximum of injury on her opponents, while receiving 
the minimum of injury herself Under her new desig- 
nation of the Virginia, the Merriuiac bore ten guns — 
eight at the sides, one at the bow, and one at the stern ; 
and she was placed under the command of Captain 
Buchanan, an officer who, previously to the Civil War, 



THE "MERRIMAC AND '^ MONITORr 



119 



had been in charge of the Washington Navy Yard. 
Towards noon on Marcli 8, the vessel was seen 
approaching the fleet in Hampton Roads, coining from 
the direction of Norfolk. The Union ships were imme- 
diately prepared for action, and the Qiiiiberlaiid was 
laid across the channel, so that her broadside could be 
brought to bear on the Merriinac. The latter, owing 
to her heavy structure, which assimilated her appear- 
ance to that of a sunken house, with the chimney just 
appearing above the water, could not move with much 
rapidity ; but this was not the object for which she was 
designed. At the distance of about a mile, the pivot- 
guns of the Oiniberland opened on her, but without the 
slightest effect. Not deigning to reply to the attack, 
she continued on her course, receiving a broadside from 
another ship, as well as from the Cumberland, but giv- 
ing no sign that she was at all injured by this powerful 
cannonade. She now fired in return, and again received 
several broadsides, with the same result as before. The 
pilot of the Cumberland, in a statement which he 
afterwards made, spoke of the balls bouncing from her 
sides, as if the vessel had been made of India-rubber. 
A shot from one of her guns killed five marines on 
board the Cumberland, and that vessel, being unable to 
escape, was soon crushed by the iron horn of the Mer- 
r/V/wr, which knocked a hole in her side near the water- 
line, as large as the mouth of a hogshead, and drove 
the unfortunate ship back upon her anchors with great 
force. Although the water came rushing into the hold 
with the utmost violence, the Cundwrland replied with 
spirit, and the action continued for half an hour. The 
broadsides of the Merrimac were doing fearful execu- 
tion on the deck of the Union ship, which caught fire 
in the forward part. The flames were soon extinguished, 
but the water proved a more formidable enemy. Noth- 
ing could keep it from pouring in at the horrible gash 



I20 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

which the ram had torn in the side of the Ciunbcrland, 
and, although the guns were still served with persist- 
ency, notwithstanding that the dead and dying layabout 
in large numbers, the bow kept sinking deeper and 
deeper into the sea, and it was plain that the injured 
ship must speedily succumb to the superior power of 
her foe. She went down with the flag still flying ; and 
even after her hull had grounded on the sands, 54 feet 
below the surfoce of the water, the pennant was yet 
seen fluttering from the topmast above the waves. 
None of the men were captured, but many perished as 
the vessel sank. Of the 400 on board, nearly half 
were killed during the fight, or drowned as the waters 
closed above the wreck. Some of the crew swam 
ashore, and others were rescued by small boats; but 
the list of dead was lamentable. The only consolation 
to the people of the Union was to be found in the 
splendid gallantry which had been exhibited, and the 
noble sense of duty which kept the flag flying to the 
last. 

The Merrimac now attacked the Congress at a distance 
of 240 yards, and getting astern, raked her fore and aft 
with shells, while one of the steamers attending on the 
ironclad kept up a fire on the starboard quarter. All 
this while, the Merrimac ranged slowly backwards and 
forwards, firing broadside after broadside, to which the 
Congress replied with resolution, but with scarcely any 
effect on the mailed vessel by which she was attacked. 
After 100 men had been killed, and the ship had taken 
fire in several places, and with no relief possible, the 
Union flag was hauled down, and the stubborn contest 
ended. The remaining officers, and a portion of the 
crew, escaped on shore ; the others were taken off by a 
Confederate gunboat; and during the night the van- 
quished ship was burned to the water's edge, and sank. 
The Congress had been even less able to resist her 




' '^'''i^ll''y*Wi,i|llto);J|lliiP;l|i'iJMIIlilg'll^^ ' '■'' "'''' i'!""' "' illl 



122 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

opponent than the Cumberlajid. Her only means of 
defence were two guns at the stern, and these were soon 
disabled. The Mcniuiac was accompanied by five 
armed steamers, which took part in the action, and 
placed the Union ships at a still greater disadvantage. 
To make matters worse, the steamship Minnesota, which 
had left Fortress Monroe shortly after the appearance 
of the Mcrrimac, got aground, and was unable to render 
any assistance. The frigate St. Lazvrcnce, which fol- 
lowed her, was equally unfortunate ; and the Roanoke, 
which also made an attempt to reach the spot, was 
obliged to return, owing to the shallowness of the water. 
On the evening of the same day, the Merriinae, ac- 
companied by two other vessels, proceeded towards 
the Minnesota, which lay some three miles below New- 
port News, quite unable to stir, having grounded while 
the tide was running ebb. Tiie commander of the iron- 
clad, wishing to capture the grounded vessel without 
inflicting any serious injury, made no attempt to run 
her down, but, standing off about a mile, threw shot 
and shell into her. The Mi)i>iesota replied with so 
much animation that one of the steamers attending 
the Merriniac caught fire, and was towed off by her 
companion. At nightfall, the Minnesota still remained 
untaken, and the Merriniac steamed in behind Sewall's 
Point. The effect of the day's operations was alarming 
to the Unionists in the neighborhood of Hampton 
Roads. They anticipated that the terrible stranger 
would again appear on the following morning, and 
resume its work of destruction, to which, it seemed, 
no effective resistance could be offered. It was only 
too probable that the Minnesota would be taken ; that 
all the other ships would be sunk or driven off; that 
the stores and warehouses on the beach would be fired ; 
and that the troops would be compelled to seek refuge 
in the fortress. A great surprise, however, was in 



THE "AIERRIMAC AND ''MONITORS 



123 



preparation, both for the Union men and for the Merri- 
mac. An ironclad, called the Monitor, had just been 
completed at New York, and was taken in tow by a 
steam-tug on the 6th of March. Her destination was 
Hampton Roads, and it was intended that she should 
be used against the Confederate ironclad, of which the 
Government liad received some information. The 
Monitor was a small vessel, more like a raft than a 
ship-of-war ; she was derisively called " A Yankee 
cheese box;" but her construction admirably fitted her 
for the kind of naval encounters which now seemed 
likely to be general. She was built in two parts, form- 
ing an upper and a lower vessel. The length of the 
upper vessel, which was shot-proof above the water- 
mark, was 172 feet; that of the lower vessel, 124 feet. 
Of these two vessels, the depth of the former was five 
feet, and of the latter six feet six inches ; with a breadth, 
in the one case, of 41 feet 4 inches, and, in the other, of 
36 feet at the top, and 18 feet at the bottom. The sides 
of the upper vessel were constructed of 25-inch thick- 
ness of oak, coated with iron plates of 5-inch thickness. 
The turret, built of 8-inch plates of rolled iron, increased 
in thickness near the port holes to ii inches. The deck, 
which was of 8-inch thickness of oak, was coated with 2- 
inch plates of wrought iron. The pilot-house was built 
of 9-inch plates of forged iron, but in the event it was 
found to be of insufficient strength. The vessel drew 
10 feet of water ; the height of her turret was 9 feet, the 
diameter 21 feet. She was armed with two Dahlgren 
guns, carrying shot or shell of from 162 to 168 pounds' 
weight. The deck was from two to three feet above 
water ; the cabins, which were below the water, were 
lighted artificially day and night ; and the commander's 
post was in the pilot-house, whence he directed the 
steering of the vessel and the movement of the turret. 
The architect of this remarkable ship was Captain Erics- 



124 ^-^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

son, and great reliance was placed on its power to meet 
any floating battery which the Confederates could bring 
into the water. 

At ten o'clock on the night of March 8, shortly 
after the disappearance of the Alcrrwiac, the Monitor 
entered Hampton Roads, and took up a station near the 
Miimcsota. The crew of that vessel were greatly re- 
lieved in the appearance of this much-needed friend ; 
but the powers of the Moiiitor had yet to be tried ; and 
it was still uncertain whether she would be able to cope 
with the Confederate ironclad. Her appearance was 
so unwonted that it was impossible for ordinary sea- 
men to form any precise idea as to her powers. Her 
deck was unprotected by any bulwarks, and stood not 
more than two feet above the water. The heavy tur- 
ret and the dwarfish [)ilot-house were strange features 
in a sea-going vessel ; indeed, the structure of the Mon- 
itor was so novel that, before she was launched, doubts 
were entertained as to whether she would float at all. 
Nevertheless there she was in Hampton Roads ; and, 
although she had encountered a heavy gale on her 
passage, and had suffered not a little from the effects of 
the storm, she had proved herself seaworthy. What- 
ever the result of the morrow's action, she would un- 
doubtedly fight ; and the surprise in preparation for the 
Mcrriniac had a character that was truly dramatic. 

During the night the Monitor \;\y between the Minne- 
sota and Fortress Monroe ; so that when the Confederate 
vessel approached in the early morning, the presence of 
the new-comer was entirely concealed. The Mcrriniac 
had been a good deal damaged in the action of the pre- 
vious day. In men she had indeed lost only two killed 
and eight wounded, though among the latter was her 
commander, Captain Buchanan ; but the vessel itself 
was mucii the worse for the encounter. Two of the 
guns were disabled ; the anchor and the flag-staff were 



126 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

shot away ; the smokestack and steam-pipes were rid- 
dled; the prow was twisted; the armor was battered, 
and the ram was wrenched. The officers, nevertheless, 
felt perfect confidence in the ability of their vessel to 
dispose of all the Union ships which they expected to 
fight. At six o'clock on the morning of the 9th, the 
ironclad was observed rounding the point of land at the 
mouth of the Elizabeth River, accompanied by two of 
her satellites. It must have been with some astonish- 
ment that the crew of the Mcrriniac, shortly afterwards, 
saw emerging from the further side of the Mi}inesota a 
small dark vessel, with an ironclad turret which rose 
almost sheer out of the water. The two floating bat- 
teries approached one another, and the Monitor was the 
first to open fire, which she did at the distance of a hun- 
dred yards. Her antagonist at once replied, and a 
vigorous interchange of shots went on, at first with 
rapidity, but afterwards with slowness and caution. The 
distance between the two combatants varied from fifty to 
two hundred yards, and it was found that the Monitor 
could move with greater speed than her opponent, and 
was more easily turned. The Mcrriuiac soon discovered 
that she had her match in the strange-looking craft 
which had so suddenly started out of the waves. She 
had begun by attacking the Minnesota ; but it was now 
evident that she had quite enough to do in holding her 
own aeainst the Monitor. For a little while the Merri- 
mac ran aground, but, on getting afloat again, steamed 
up the harbor towards Elizabeth River, followed closely 
by the Mo)iitor. Her shot produced no effect, and the 
Mcrriniac now made an attempt to run down her formi- 
dable antagonist. Five times did these two ironclads 
come into collision ; but the Mcrrimac's ram, already 
injured by the first day's action, was by this time en- 
tirely broken, and her engines were of insufficient 
strength to propel her with the necessary speed. Each 



THE "MERRIMAC' AND THE ''MONITORS 



127 



time that the vessels struck one another, one of the 
guns of the Mcniitor was discharged directly against 
the plated sides of the Mcrrimac, and the latter replied 
by bringing her guns to bear on the turret and pilot- 
house of her adversary. 

The J/tw//c^;' withdrew between one and two P. m., owing 
to her commander having been injured in the eyes by 
a shot which struck the pilot-house. The disappearance 
of the Union ironclad was viewed by the captain of the 
Minnesota with dismay ; but he was shortly afterwards 
relieved by seeing the JMcrrhnac and her companions 
steam up the river towards Norfolk. The great misfor- 
tune the Monitor experienced in the loss of her deter- 
mined commander prevented her from pursuing, and 
forcing the battle to a surrender. No one had been 
killed on board either vessel. The Mcrrimac was a 
good deal damaged. During the fight, the working of 
the Monitor guns had been directed from the pilot- 
house by signals to the first lieutenant stationed in the 
turret ; and the action proved that vessels of this char- 
acter were capable of effective handhng. 

Concerning this eventful action, Swinton remarks: 
*' Had the Merriniac continued the triumphant career 
which she began, it is difficult to compute her possible 
devastation. Beginning with the ATinncsota, which she 
would quickly overcome, she would have burst through 
the Union fleet in Hampton Roads like an avenging 
fury, destroying everything in her course, and scatter- 
ing all she did not destroy. The wooden fleet would 
have been powerless against this one mailed monster, 
as the story of the first day's battle tells." There cer- 
tainly was a Providence in the timely arrival of this 
David before the modern naval Goliath. 



CHAPTER IV. 

The Peninsula Campaign, from Yorktown to Get- 
tysburg ( 1 862-1 863). 

Inspired by the better condition of their armies, the 
Northern people, in the early days of 1862, became 
eagerly desirous for another advance on the Potomac. 
The Confederate position was unquestionably strong ; 
the troops who had conquered at Bull Run and Ball's 
Bluff seemed capable of conquering again ; and the 
country undoubtedly presented many difficulties to an 
invading force. McClellan had spent eight months 
organizing and disciplining his army ; and the people 
wearied of his cautious tactics, and murmured at his 
" masterly inactivity." 

In order to give a clear account of the campaigns 
about Washington and Richmond, down to the battle 
of Gettysburg, we shall present all these operations as 
one continuous narrative. 

McClellan's plan was to march against Richmond 
from the lower part of Chesapeake Bay, by way of 
Urbana, on the Rappahannock. The town was not far 
from Richmond, and could be approached by vessels 
of heavy draught. Its occupation would compel the 
enemy to abandon his positions near Manasses, so as to 
cover Richmond and Norfolk. The President did not 
approve of this scheme ; he thought it would be safer to 
march around Alexandria, or the entrenchments at 
(128) 



I^o THE BATTLES EOR THE CA'IOX. 

Bull Run. He, therefore, ordered a general movement, 
on February 22, 1862, of the land and naval forces 
against the enemy's positions on the Potomac. But the 
early weeks of the year slipped by without anything 
decisive being done. 

On March 10, General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew 
from his lines near Manasses, and took up a new posi- 
tion better adapted to support the defences on the 
Yorktown peninsula. Washington being full of spies, 
Johnston had been informed of the contemplated move- 
ment. Great disappointment was felt in the North that 
it was no longer possible to avenge the defeat of Bull 
Run on the very ground where it had been suffered. 

At length the main body of the Union army crossed 
the Potomac into Virginia. Now came tremendous 
downfalls of rain which rendered the fords on the large 
rivers impassable, the destruction of tlie bridges inter- 
posed another obstacle to any advance, and it was 
speedily seen that the route by the sea was the only 
route open. The army was countermarched ; and owing 
to the insufficiency of transports a fortnight elapsed 
before the 85,000 men could be conveyed to Fortress 
Monroe. 

Winchester. — General Banks was to open communi- 
cations with the Valley of the Shenandoah, where the 
Confederates were still in force. He occupied Win- 
chester, on March 12, and General Shields advanced to 
Strasburg, where a strong body of Confederates were 
posted under " Stonewall " Jackson. Here, on the 23d, 
Shields was attacked by Jackson, and he retreated to 
Winchester. The Confederates were driven back, but 
the battle was obstinately contested. 

A little before the advance towards Manasses, took 
place the naval action between the Mojiiior and the 
Mcrriniac. McClellan felt free to change his base of 
operations when the ability of the Monitor to encounter 



YORKTOWN. 



131 



the Tl/^rr/wrt^ became known to him. On April i, he 
reached Fortress Monroe, and then learned that the 
naval fleet could render but little assistance. The 
Mcrriniac still kept the forces in terror, and the James 
River was practically closed by its lurking presence. 
It was too late to draw back, and 56,000 men, and lOO 
guns, forming the first detachment, began their march 
to Yoi^ctown. 

YoRKTOWN (May 4, 1862). — General Magruder, who 
opposed McClellan, had defended the Yorktown Penin- 
sula by a line of entrenchments, extending 13 miles. 
Yorktown was very slightly fortified, but the York 
River was dominated by powerful water batteries, and 
by various works on Gloucester Point. Magruder had 
but 11,000 men; of these 6000 were at Yorktown, and 
5000 were strung along this long line of defence. 

McClellan had 90,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, 330 
field-guns, and a siege train of 103 guns. It seems 
remarkable that he should not have struck a telling 
blow at an adversary so slenderly supported, and owing 
his safety to the line of works by which he was covered. 

On May 16, General Smith forced a passage across 
Warwick Creek, and 18 pieces of artillery were brought 
to play on the Confederate trenches. These troops 
were attaclced, and after a sharp combat, they were 
driven back with considerable loss. McClellan's hesi- 
tating nature again declared itself He gave up the 
direct attack on the enemy's works, and undertook the 
slower operations of a siege. 

At the beginning of May, it was generally believed 
in the Union ranks that all the batteries would open fire 
on the Confederate works in a very few days. This 
would probably have been the case but that the enemy, 
losing heart, determined to evacuate his positions. In 
the early morning of May 4, it was discovered that the 
Confederate Army had retired, and McClellan ordered 



1^2 '^'^^^ BATTLES FOR 'THE UNION. 

a vigorous pursuit. The Union forces had antici- 
pated a signal victory at Yorktown, and this sudden 
disappearance of the foe was a great and bitter disap- 
pointment. The capture of the place was a gain of a 
certain kind, but it was not the brilliant success desired 
and expected by the country. The Southerners had 
accomplished their object. They had delayed the ap- 
proach to Richmond; had given the authorities time for 
increasing the defences of the city ; and brought the 
hot season nearer. The tedious work of crushing out 
the Confederacy at its capital had to be begun afresh. 
The pursuit of the Confederates was conducted by a 
strong force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, under 
General Stoneman. It was hoped to cut off a portion 
of the rear-guard; but the hope proved delusive. The 
retreaters were conducting their movement in good order. 

Stoneman's advance-guard at length caught up with 
the Confederate rear-guard, close to Fort Magruder. 
The fort opened fire, and a gallant attempt was made 
by the Union forces to take the position ; but it was 
impossible for a mere force of cavalry to take a fortified 
post, and Stoneman was obliged to retire. The infantry 
did not arrive till after the skirmish had terminated, and 
the conflict could not be renewed. During the night 
rain fell to such an extent that in the morning the roads 
were converted into channels of mud, which rendered 
necessary the laying down of planks. The delay thus 
created was very prejudicial to the Union forces and 
equally advantageous to the Confederates. The latter 
had now reached the narrowest part of the peninsula 
between the James and York Rivers, and had there 
fortified themselves in the city of Williamsburg; which 
it was now proposed to attack. 

Williamsburg. — On the morning of the 5th, General 
Hooker's division attacked the Confederates' forces with 
infantry and artillery. The forts opened fire, and the 







.vJf/', 



GENERAL GEORGE B. .NKCLliLLAN. 



^33 



124 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

advancing columns were driven back after nine hours 
of hard fighting. They retired to the woods and held 
their ground till other divisions came up. Deluging 
rains descended on the men hurrying to Hooker's relief. 
The sound of the cannon was heard in front, but the 
advancing divisions could not hasten their pace. On 
McClellan's arrival, new dispositions were ordered, 
which soon produced their effect. The enemy was 
attacked at the point of the bayonet, and driven back. 
In two hours the battle was over. The Confederates 
evacuated Williamsburg during the night, and Mc- 
Clellan's army entered unopposed. 

The Southern troops were now on their way to Rich- 
mond, and the Union forces were not in a condition to 
pursue at once. Some desultory fighting occurred, but 
the Confederates reached Richmond, with their bag- 
gage, and their supply train. They found it necessary 
to evacuate Norfolk. Some of the stores were saved ; 
the rest, together with several steamers and other ves- 
sels, were destroyed ; and the Confederate force 
marched for Richmond on May lo. Norfolk was at 
once occupied by General Wool. Both shores of the 
James River were now occupied by the Union troops, 
and Commodore Tatnall, who now commanded the 
Mcrrijiiac, believing he could not save the vessel, 
ordered her to be run ashore, set fire to, and 
blown up. Delivered from their enemy, the Union gun- 
boats pushed on to within twelve miles of Richmond, 
but on May 15 were worsted in an encounter with some 
Confederate batteries at Drury's Bluff. In the mean- 
while McClellan's forces were moving on Richmond by 
the line of the Pamunkey, and on the 21st the advance- 
guard had reached the River Chickahominy. The Con- 
federate capital was now near at hand, but the most 
difficult and dangerous part of the expedition remained 
to be accomplished. 



SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 



135 



Shenandoah Valley. — About the middle of April 
Banks had advanced along the Shenandoah River, and 
established himself at Newmarket. To his right was 
Fremont (at Franklin) ; to his left McDowell, who had 
occupied Fredericksburg, after its surrender. Stonewall 
Jackson commanded the Confederate forces in the 
Valley. He had fewer men at his disposal, but his 
thorough knowledge of the country, combined with his 
military tact, gave him great advantage over his Union 
opponents. 

Banks incautiously advanced up the Valley, and Jack- 
son retreating, drew Banks after him. Banks saw that 
Jackson was in a dangerous position. He was placed 
between the regiments of Banks, moving from the cast, 
and the advance-guard of Fremont's army, under Mil- 
roy, coming from the west. By rapid marches he got 
away from Banks, and hastened to the relief of a Con- 
federate detachment menaced by Milroy's division. 
Having inflicted a crushing defeat on that body, he 
turned back with masterly suddenness on Banks. A 
detachment of 1 200 men, under Colonel Kenly, were 
overpowered and nearly all killed, wounded or captured. 
Banks, fearing to be cut off, retreated to Winchester. 
An encounter with the Confederates on the 25th, out- 
side the town, ended in the defeat of the Union troops, 
who were driven as far as Martinsburg; whence they 
continued their course to the Potomac. Since the be- 
ginning of the retreat they had marched 53 miles (35 
miles of which were performed in one day). Jackson 
was not strong enough to pursue, and did not venture 
upon crossing the Potomac. 

The fears prevailing at Washington calmed down 
after a few days, when it was found nothing more was 
attempted ; and reinforcements were sent to Banks at 
Harper's Ferry. He, with Fremont (at Franklin), and 
McDowell (at Fredericksburg), were ordered to capture 



136 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Jackson. His position was now extremely dangerous ; 
but by the excellence of his arrangements, and the cool- 
ness and audacity of himself and his men, he escaped. 
He rapidly retreated, burning the bridges as he passed. 




GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON ("STONEWALL"). 



Fremont stopped him at Cross Keys (June 8). The 
losses on both sides were heavy, but Jackson had the 
best of the action, and the Union troops were not in a 
position to prevent Jackson falling upon Shields, who 
struck at him at Port Republic the next day, but was 



FAIR OAKS. 137 

driven back, and Jackson made good his escape from the 
Valley, having burned the bridges behind him. 

With 15,000 men Jackson occupied the attention of 
three generals and 60,000 men, prevented McDowell's 
junction with McClellan, alarmed Washington, and 
saved Richmond. 

Fair Oaks (May 31, 1862). — Jackson's success in 
the Valley embarrassed McClellan's operations in his 
advance on Richmond. It deprived him of the as^st- 
ance of McDowell's corps, and introduced an element 
of uncertainty into the whole campaign. Lincoln in- 
sisted on the immediate attack of Richmond. McClellan, 
therefore, ordered a reconnoissance in force to be pushed 
forward in the direction of Hanover Court House. On 
May 27, General Porter marched at the head of the 
Fifth Corps. The Confederates were attacked, and re- 
treated, followed by the Union cavalry and a portion of 
the infantry. The bridges over the Pamunkey were 
burned, and the adjacent railway was destroyed, after an 
action, in which 700 of the Confederates were brought 
in prisoners. The main body of McClellan's army was 
thus enabled to advance, and at the close of May the 
several corps were stationed on a curved line not far 
from Richmond. Two of these corps had been pushed 
beyond the Chickahominy River, and were exposed to a 
dangerous attack in the absence of their comrades, from 
whom they were separated by the stream at their back. 
Johnston had under his orders an army consisting of four 
divisions, commanded by Generals Longstreet, Smith, 
D. H. Hill and Huger, all of whom had formerly served 
in the U. S. Army. It was determined to attack the 
left wing of the Union forces on the morning of May 31 ; 
but the rains made the roads so heav}^ and difficult that 
one division of the Southern army was unable to reach 
the post to which it had been assigned, and was there- 
fore prevented from taking part in the action. Long- 



138 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



street nevertheless ordered Hill's division to coniinence 
the attack at 2 p. m. Casey's division of the Union Army 
bore the brunt of the assault. Several of the troops fell 
back, and the cainp was captured, together with the 
hospital and baggage-wagons. A stand was subse- 
quently made, and Casey sent word that he was being 
hard pressed, and needed reinforcements. Some time 
elapsed before Sumner could effect the passage of the 
the stream ; but he at length did so by means of two 
hastily-constructed bridges. The battle in the meanwhile 
had become hot, and the right of the Union left wing 
was driven back with great loss. Johnston personally 
directed the attack until, wounded by the splinter of a 
shell, he fell from his horse, and broke two of his ribs, 
when the command devolved on General Smith. Sum- 
ner's arrival did little to change the relative positions of 
the combatants. The Unionists continued to fall back; 
the Confederates continued to advance ; and it was only 
night which put an end to the combat. 

The two armies bivouacked that night on the field for 
which they had so furiously contended, and the Confed- 
erates were reinforced by Hugcr's division, which had 
overcome the difficulties of the muddy and forest-cum- 
bered roads. The engagement was renewed early next 
morning. It was now the Unionists that attacked, and 
the Confederates, finding themselves opposed by large 
bodies of fresh troops, fought with considerable languor 
and hesitation, and, after a struggle of five hours' dura- 
tion, were repulsed along the whole line. The Union 
troops again stood on the ground they had occupied 
before the first day's operations. McClellan arrived 
towards the close of the battle. There was little for him 
to do; but mucli for him to see, and that of the most 
distressing nature. 

The Confederates had suffered equally with their 
adversaries, and endured the mortification of losing 



THE SEVEN-DAYS BATTLES. 



139 



the battle. Their retreat was facihtated by the forests 
which covered the face of the country ; and even had the 
land been more open, it is probable that little would 
have been done in the way of pursuit, owing to the 
exhausted state of the conquerors. The Union troops 
lay down on the ground which they had won. The 
contest had been of a very sanguinary nature. During 
the two days' fighting the North lost 7000 men ; the 
South also suffered terribly ; yet this obstinately con- 
tested battle was attended by no definite or decisive 
result. 

Both armies entrenched themselves in the positions 
they had assumed at the close of the battle, which had 
been designated from two localities on the field, that of 
Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines. McClellan applied to 
Washington for reinforcements ; but the necessity of 
checking Jackson in the Valley prevented the President 
from sending any fresh troops to the neighborhood of 
Richmond. 

Johnston's injuries were so severe as to compel his 
retirement till he had recovered from their effects. The 
chief command now devolved on Lee, an officer of 
high reputation and known ability. 

The Seven-Days Battles. — Lee, who had taken the 
command, was anxious to assume the offensive. About 
the middle of June the Army of the Potomac were 
startled by a sudden exploit of the Confederates under 
General J. E. Stuart. McClellan had not expected any 
attack on his rear. The watchful Confederates knew 
where he was weakest, and Stuart, after leaving Rich- 
mond, on June 13, moved along the line of rail com- 
municating with Fredericksburg. Having penetrated 
as far as Kelby's Station, the forces turned eastward, 
and bivouacked in the vicinity of Hanover Court 
House, 22 miles north of Richmond. The expedition 
was conducted with entire secrecy. The thickness of 



I40 ^^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

the forest favored their designs, and at daybreak on the 
14th the troops marched on Hanover Court House, 
where they drove in a small force of cavalry, and after- 
wards defeated another and a large body of mounted 
troops. The camp was burned, and then Stuart deter- 
mined to get into the rear of the Union army, by mak- 
ing a circuitous march. In another direction, the main 
body of the Confederate cavalry captured a large train 
of forty wagons, took several prisoners, burned a rail- 
way bridge, and then, about midnight, made for the 
Chickahominy on their homeward march. It was 
necessary to construct an extemporary bridge over that 
river ; but, notwithstanding all obstacles, Richmond 
was safely gained in about two days after the expedi- 
tion had set forth. The incursion had inflicted a cer- 
tain loss on the Union army, and at the same time in- 
creased the self-reliance of the Confederate cavalry ; and 
all had been obtained with the loss of only one man. 

Jackson now excited uneasiness. His position and 
designs were shrouded in mystery, but it seemed prob- 
able that he was concentrating a force at Gordonsville, 
on the railway leading to Richmond, and that he was 
preparing to attack the Union rear on June 28. McClel- 
lan determined to anticipate any such movement by 
advancing along the Williamsburg road in the vicinity 
of Seven Pines. This was done on the 25th, by which 
time the bridges over the Chickahominy were completed, 
and the lines of entrenchment finished. After a very 
arduous engagement, the Union forces at the close of 
the day found themselves half a mile in advance of the 
positions they had quitted in the morning. It was 
determined to make the grand attack on the enemy's 
lines next day ; but that night McCiellan received 
a confirmation of the rumors respecting Jackson. He 
wrote to the Secretary of War, stating that the rebel 
force was believed to be 200,000 in number, including 



THE SEVEN-DAYS BATTLES. 



141 



Jackson and Beauregard ; and that he would have to 
contend against vastly superior odds, if those reports 
were true. So apprehensive did McClellan feel for the 
safety of his position, that, on June 26, he abandoned 
his base of operations on the Paniunkey for one on the 
James River, Jackson was marching through the 
country lying between the Chickahominy and the 
Pamunkey, while other divisions had crossed the 
former of those rivers, and were proceeding down the 
stream on the left or north-eastern bank — that is, on the 
side farthest from Richmond. Hill, in command of one 
of these divisions, attacked the village of Mechanics- 
ville, and, taking possession of it, posted himself on the 
road to the Confederate capital. In conjunction with 
General Branch, he then assaulted the Union lines at 
Beaver Dam Creek. Descending the right bank of 
that creek, which runs into the Chickahominy, the two 
commanders confronted the ranks of their enemies, 
who were stationed on the opposite side. The attack- 
ing forces endeavored to cross, but were driven back by 
the terrific fire opened on them from the breastworks 
crowning the left bank. Foiled in this attempt, they 
occupied a position on the right bank, and at nine 
o'clock at night the combat terminated without any 
definite results. Lee, who commanded in person 
intended to cut off that portion of the Union army 
which was encamped on the left bank of the Chicka- 
hominy ; but he failed in his design. Still McClellan felt 
insecure, and during the night withdrew his troops to a 
position some two miles lower down the Chickahominy. 
He was mistaken in assuming that he had 200,000 men 
in his front. The Confederate forces were not more 
than half that strength ; and, as McClellan himself had 
command of about 95,000 troops, his inferiority to the 
enemy was but slight. 

On the night of June 26, General McCall, on the ex- 



142 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



treme right of the Union position, was ordered to fall 
back on the bridges across the Chickahominy near 
Gaines' Mill, to join Porter's corps, and to make a 
stand in that locality, in order to give the army time to 
carry out its change of position. Porter was not to 
cross the bridges until evening, and was then to destroy 
them. Early on the 27th, the Confederate division 
under Hill, which had been held in check the previous 
day, opened a heavy fire of artillery on the front ranks 
of McCall, who retreated farther down the stream. 
Other Confederate troops now crossed the Chickahom- 
iny near Mechanicsville, and shortly afterwards the 
whole of the Southern line, except the right wing, under 
General Magruder, was ordered to advance. 

Porter's retreating corps were presently assaulted, but 
they stood firm, and, after a fierce and doubtful en- 
counter, the Confederates gave way in considerable dis- 
order. Being reinforced and formed anew, they again 
advanced to the attack, but as yet with no better suc- 
cess than before. Towards nightfall, they brought up 
large bodies of reserves, and the Union left, where the 
men had been fighting all day, and were exhausted, re- 
ceded with precipitation. The alarm soon extended to 
the centre of the Union lines, which also fell back in 
confusion, until supported by fresh brigades under 
Generals Meagher and French. The presence of these 
troops, and the opening of a battery which had been 
placed in position, checked the pursuit of the enemy, 
and darkness soon afterwards closed over the scene. 

During the night, the train of 5000 wagons, the siege- 
train, 2500 oxen and other material were in motion for 
the James River. The bridges over the Chickahominy 
were then destroyed, and Keyes' corps took posses- 
sion of the road across the White Oak Swamp, and of 
the principal lines of communication by which the 
Union army could be annoyed by the enemy. The 



THE SEVEN- DAYS BATTLES. 



143 



wounded were abandoned where they lay, and many 
perished in the woods and swamps. The Confederates 
flattered themselves that McClellan would be cut off 
from all power of retreat, and that the capture or de- 
struction of the entire Union army was certain. They 
were disapointed on finding that the immense stores ac-' 
cumulated at the White House had been partly removed 
and partly destroyed by McClellan's instructions, and 
that the several divisions had crossed the river. No 
further steps could be taken on the 28th, owing to the 
necessity of burying the dead, attending to the wounded, 
and allowing an interval of repose to the others ; but it 
was hoped to pursue the retreating adversary on the 
following day. The two armies were now divided by 
the line of the Chickahominy. The greater number of 
the Confederates were on the left bank, and the whole 
of McClellan's army had been united on the right bank. 
It was the afternoon of the 28th before Lee understood 
that his opponent was on his road to the James River, 
to form a junction with the fleet. It was believed, how- 
ever, that this design could be frustrated, and measures 
were taken for intercepting the Union army, and cut- 
ting off its communications with the river. The morn- 
ing of the 29th was spent by McClellan's troops in de- 
stroying all that could not be carried away. The corps 
of Sumner and Franklin were left at Fair Oaks, with 
instructions to protect the baggage and supply-trains on 
their way to the James River ; and McClellan pursued 
his course with the main body of the army. He was in 
a position of much gravity ; but, strange to say, the 
Confederates at Richmond were equally exposed to a 
reverse. After the action of the 27th, the Union troops 
were much nearer to the Southern capital than the 
chief divisions of the Confederates. The latter were 
posted on the farther side of the Chickahominy; the 
Union troops had been compelled to cross the stream, 



144 '^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

and were now on the side where Richmond itself is sit- 
uated. The corps of Sumner and FrankHn, acting as a 
rear-guard, were attacked, on the 30th, by Jackson, but 
maintained their ground, and prevented the further ad- 
vance of the enemy. Later in the day a battle was 
fought with the main body of the Confederates, who 
were attempting to advance so as to cut off the Union 
retreat. They were led by Longstreet, Hill, and Huger, 
and a conflict of the most furious and desperate nature 
took place between the opposing armies. Hill charged 
the Union masses several times ; and it seemed as if the 
Northern troops would have driven their opponents 
back upon Richmond, and have entered that city at the 
head of their victorious legions. ' The- cry of " On to 
Richmond!" was raised by them, and the imminent 
danger of losing their metropolis excited the Confeder- 
ates to the pitch of madness. The contending ranks 
were mixed together in a dark, bloody and tumultuous 
affray. Fighting hand to hand, in the rage of mortal 
hate, they neither asked nor gave quarter, but seemed 
bent on nmtual extermination, if that were a thing pos- 
sible. On no previous occasion had the two sides 
fought with such unmitigated ferocity. The hot and 
murderous encounter swayed to and fro with varying 
success ; the ground was strewn with dead ; and the 
horrible conflict did not terminate even with the ap- 
proach of night. When at length the combatants 
ceased from sheer exhaustion, no substantial advantage 
had been obtained by either. The Confederates were 
checked, but not repulsed; the Unionists held their 
ground, but were not delivered from the threatened 
peril. On the 30th, the long lines of baggage-wagons 
reached the height called Malvern Hill; and here they 
were in a position of some strength, and in commu- 
nication with their transports and supplies. 



146 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

All the Union divisions were united at Malvern Hill 
during the night, and the worst dangers had now been 
overcome. The Confederates were still close at hand ; 
but the position occupied by the Northern troops was 
favorable to defence, and in any case the river was 
available for retreat. 

The several corps had their backs to the river, and 
the left flank, held by Porter, was strengthened as much 
as possible, since it was in that direction that the 
enemy would be most likely to attack, supposing him to 
resolve on any further movement. That such was his 
intention became manifest as the day proceeded. Some 
skirmishing took place before noon, but nothing like a 
a general action occurred until three, when the Con- 
federate artillery opened on Kearney's division of Heint- 
zclman's corps, and on other portions of the army sta- 
tioned towards the right of the line. The Confederates 
advanced at the charge, but were driven back by the 
steady fire which was poured into their columns. The 
attempt to carry the position was frequently renewed, 
and the Confederates reformed their shattered ranks in 
the shelter of the surrounding woods. In this en- 
counter, the troops engaged on the Southern side were 
from Magruder's corps, which on the previous night 
had supported the divisions of Longstreet, Hill, and 
Huger, in their desperate attack on Heintzelman's 
forces. Toward the evening of July i. Magruder's 
regiments were reinforced by those of Jackson, who ar- 
rived from the White Oak Swamp, but too late to ren- 
der any important service. When darkness put an end 
to the -Strife, the Union forces were still in undisturbed 
possession of the ground and the Confederates had 
been worsted, with a serious loss in dead and wounded. 
The latter, finding that the adversary was now beyond 
their power, withdrew to Richmond and the Army of 
the Potomac took up a position at Harrison's Landing, 



CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 



147 



which had been selected by the engineers and naval 
officers as the most favorable spot for defence and for 
receiving supplies. By the night of July 3 all McClel- 
lan's divisions were in safety, and the general believed 
he had acquired a base of operations from which an- 
other advance on Richmond might in time be made. 

The movements executed by McClellan from June 25 
to July I, had cost him dear, and left him in a worse 
position than before. He estimated his losses at 15,249 
men, and 25 guns ; Lee, in a proclamation from Rich- 
mond, issued on July 9, said that the immediate fruits 
of the Confederate triumph were — " the relief of Rich- 
mond from a state of siege ; the rout of the great army 
that so long menaced its safety ; many thousand prison- 
ers, including officers of high rank ; the capture and 
destruction of stores of the value of millions ; and 
the acquisition of thousands of arms, and fifty-one 
pieces of superior artillery." It is probable that the 
truth lay somewhere between the two statements, but in 
any case it is clear that McClellan had reaped nothing 
but disaster. Still, it must be recollected that his oppo- 
nents were unfortunate as well as himself The Con- 
federates had lost 20,000 men, and although the enemy 
had withdrawn farther from the threatened capital, he 
was not vanquished, nor completely driven away, and 
it seemed probable that the operations of the last few 
months would be renewed, with a more resolute deter- 
mination than before. 

Cedar Mountain. — Secretary Stanton visited Mc- 
Clellan to learn whether there was any possibility of an 
advance on Richmond in the position which the Army 
of the Potomac then held. McClellan demanded 50,000 
additional troops for any ulterior operations. These 
could not be sent without leaving Washington and 
Baltimore defenceless. McClellan was then ordered to 
unite with General Pope, and to act under his commnnd. 



148 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Pope's main divisions were at Culpepper, about 70 
miles from both Washington and Richmond ; and at 
Fredericksburg, which was connected with Washington 
by steamboat and railway. He had about 38,000 men, 
and one part of his design was to cover Washington, 
while at the same time he diverted a portion of the 
Confederacy then threatening McClellan. 

Early in August, the Union out-pickets reported that 
the enemy was advancing towards Culpepper Court 
House. On the 8th, Jackson crossed the Rapidan, and 
took up a position near the main road from Gordonsville 
to Culpepper. Fighting did not occur until next day, 
when an obstinately-contested action took place in the 
vicinity of a hill called Cedar Mountain. The battle 
commenced at five p. m., and continued until late in the 
evening, by which time the Union troops had been 
driven back about a mile. The action might, perhaps, 
have been resumed next morning but for a disastrous 
incident which occurred late at night. The light of a 
bright moon showed the Confederate artillerymen that 
their adversaries, as they bivouacked on the ground, 
were within range of their guns. They at once opened 
fire, and a panic spread through a portion of the 
Union army. Some of the Confederate cavalry then 
charged the weary and dispirited troops, and Pope 
himself, with the officers of his staff, narrowly escaped 
capture. The loss on both sides was very serious, 
especially on that of the Unionists ; but, the latter 
having been reinforced, Jackson retreated during the 
night of the iith, and, recrossing the Rapidan, got 
safely off. The Government was so much alarmed at 
this exploit of Jackson, that McClellan was ordered 
to detach the divisions under Burnside (who had re- 
cently been recalled from North Carolina), and send 
them to Aquia Creek. At the same time, McClellan 
himself was to retreat to Yorktown and Fortress Mon- 



THOROUGHFARE GAP. j^q 

roe with a view to ulterior movements. The stores, 
baggage, and sick, belonging to the sometime Army of 
the Potomac, were shipped on board the transports at 
Harrison's Landing, and from the 17th to the 20th of 
August the army marched by way of Williamsburg to 
Yorktown and Newport News. The defences at York- 
town were strengthened, and the campaign in the Penin- 
sula was now at an end, after a series of operations 
extending over four months, involving an immense 
expenditure of life, yoX productive of no results com- 
mensurate with the efforts that had been made. 

Great activity and boldness were evinced by the 
Southern troops, and on August 22 Stuart marched 
into the rear of the Union troops, seized a good deal of 
the headquarters' baggage (including letters and plans 
of the commander), and got safely off It was now 
determined to execute a flank march round the right 
wing of Pope's army. The corps under Jackson was 
concentrated at Jefferson, opposite the Sulphur Springs, 
and on August 2i set out for Thoroughfare Gap. 
The men were badly clothed, and so ill-provided with 
food that they were compelled to feed on grain which 
they plucked in the open fields, and on the offerings of 
the peasantry. But they had confidence in themselves 
and in their commander, and thus inspirited they made 
their way through the mountain-pass which conducted 
them to the rear of their opponents. Pope had by this 
time been joined by most of the divisions under 
McClellan, and the combined army was both numerically 
strong and well appointed. But tlie soldiers were not 
pleased with their chief, and were wanting in the mili- 
tary qualities of subordination and self-reliance. These 
facts will explain the disasters which ensued. 

Jackson was favored with his usual success in the 
the daring enterprise on which he had entered. 
Thoroughfare Gap was so entirely free of Union soldiers 



J CO THE BATTLES FOR THE UMON. 

that his troops encountered no opposition in passing 
through it, and on the evening of the 26th they struck 
the hne of rail in Pope's rear at Bristow Station. The 
great depot at Manassas Junction was captured and set 
on fire, and the Union commanders seem to have been 
bewildered as to the exact locality of their opponents, 
and the precise combinations they ought to make in 
order to repel so threatening a movement. Taking 
advantage of this perplexity on the part of the Northern 
chiefs, the Southerners continued to advance, and to 
get still farther in Pope's rear. Some of them pushed 
forward to the old battle-ground of Bull Run, while 
others proceeded to Centreville. Jackson's corps was 
now actually between the Union army and Washing- 
ton. A large amount of stores had been destroyed ; 
the telegraph wires had been severed, and the rails 
torn up ; so that Pope's forces were at once discomfited 
and cut off from succor. When, however, they had 
recovered from their astonishment, they took measures 
for attacking the enemy, and, if possible, crushing him 
in his exposed position. Hooker's division had an 
encounter with Jackson's rear-guard, at Bristow Station, 
on the evening of the 27th. Pope marched along the 
Orange and Alexandria Railway, while McDowell, at 
the head of another large force, moved from Warren- 
ton, with the intention of interposing between Jackson 
and his line of retreat by Thoroughfare Gap. Jackson 
was certainly in danger of being annihilated It is true 
that the remainder of Lee's army was marching to his 
assistance; but it was still in the defiles of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains, and might not arrive in time. The 
efforts of the Union forces were thwarted by the want 
of concentrated supervision, by the scattered positions 
of the several corps, and by the confused and con- 
tradictory orders sent out from headquarters. 

Jackson appeared still confident of success. He now 



POPE'S DISASTER. 



151 



reversed his course, and moved south, to meet the 
Union troops who were following on his track. On the 
28th, General Kearney attacked the rear of Jackson's 
corps, and, occupying Centreville, reopened the 
communication with Alexandria, which the Southerners 
had momentarily closed. Towards the end of the day, 
a portion of Sigel's corps had an engagement with the 
Confederates, which resulted in the latter gaining pos- 
session of a ridge of hills near Sudley Springs, on the 
north-eastern bank of Bull Run. By the morning of 
the 29th, a large part of Jackson's corps had reached 
the other side of the stream, and he took up a position 
similar to that of McDowell when, in the same locality, 
he advanced against the rebels on July 21, 1861. The 
left of the Confederate line was now stationed near 
Centreville, on the ridge of hills which had been seized 
the previous night ; the right and centre were on the 
opposite bank of the little river, and stretched along 
the Manassas Gap Railway towards the main road from 
Warrenton. The several divisions, consequently, faced 
towards the south-east, and from that direction were 
attacked during the day by the Union troops, who had 
united their forces on the old battle-ground of a year 
before. Pope reached the field about noon, after the 
action had been going on for sometime ; but he doubted 
the propriety of ordering an advance along the whole 
line, as many of his troops had suffered severely from 
the fire of their antagonists. He was expecting the 
arrival of McDowell and Porter ; but Jackson himself 
was reinforced by the appearance, towards sunset, of 
the leading division of Longstrect's corps, which, after 
overcoming the resistance offered to its progress 
through the defile of Thoroughfare Gap, joined the 
regiments that had been contending since morning on 
the banks of Bull Run. Previous to this welcome 
advent, the Confederates, thoufih inflictinsr serious loss 



152 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



on their opponents, had been compelled to give ground 
slightly; and Pope telegraphed a victory to Washing- 
ton. In the afternoon he had been reinforced by 
McDowell ; but Porter's corps did not arrive during 
the 29th. Its commander was afterwards tried for dis- 
obedience of orders, and dismissed the service ; and 
certainly he appears to have done nothing towards help- 
ing the operations of the day. When darkness put an 
end to the combat, no decisive result had been achieved. 
The advantage, on the whole, was with the Union 
forces, for the Southerners had receded , but the 
Northern troops had been very sharply received, and 
were out of spirits with respect to their commanders. 
The Confederates were full of confidence, and eager for 
renewed action on the morrow. 

Early next morning the remaining divisions of 
Longstreet's corps, which had been arriving all through 
the night, had joined the corps under Jackson, and the 
Confederate army was now very strong. Longstreet 
took the right of the line, and the united forces covered 
a distance of five miles. Porter's corps was in position 
on this second day, and indeed commenced the battle 
by attacking some of the forces under Longstreet. A 
general action followed, and continued for several 
hours, with terrible slaughter on both sides ; and, 
toward evening, Lee, who was now commanding in 
person, ordered an advance. The Union troops who 
had already begun to lose form under the devastating 
fire of some batteries of artillery posted in command- 
ing positions, were driven back in confusion, and, under 
cover of darkness, crossed Bull Run, and took refuge 
behind the field-works at Centreville, where they were 
supported by the corps under Sumner and Franklin, 
which had arrived from Alexandria and the lines round 
Washington. The losses of the two previous days had 
been immense, and they were not due solely to death 



POPE'S REMOVAL. 1 53 

and injury in the field. Skulking had gone on to an 
extraordinary extent, and in many instances these 
fugitives could not be recovered. Banks, who had 
lingered behind at Bristow Station, in order to guard 
the railway, now hastily marched to join his comrades, 
having previously destroyed large quantities of stores 
and railway stock. When all Pope's divisions were 
concentrated behind the entrenchments at Centreville, 
the army felt tolerably secure against further mis- 
chances, though its confidence soon proved to be mis- 
placed. Lee hesitated about attacking the enemy in 
front, now that he occupied so strong a position ; but a 
demonstration against the right flank was made on 
September I, and Pope, finding the Confederates on the 
road to Fairfax Court House, and actually threatening 
Washington, begun to retreat with precipitation. 
Night closed in on the disheartened and scared ranks of 
the Union army ; a violent thunderstorm broke over 
them ; and the rear was harassed by frequent attacks. 
On the morning of the 2d, the whole of the Union 
legions (including the divisions at Fredericksburg and 
Aquia Creek) entered the fortifications immediately 
protecting Washington, where they were a year before. 
One thing was clear — that Pope must be removed 
from the position to which he had been appointed un- 
der a total misapprehension of his abilities. McClellan 
was reinstated in his command and assigned to the pro- 
tection of Washington. For this purpose no better 
man could have been selected. His genius lay much 
more in defence than in attack. Where an enemy was 
to be assaulted or out-manoeuvred, a certain timidity 
always restrained him, so that his opportunities slipped 
by again and again. Rut he was an admirable organ- 
izer, a strict disciplinarian, a watchful observer of what 
was going on in his front. He had saved Washington 
before, and might save it again by his prudence and 



154 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

caution. In conferring on McClellan the control of the 
Washington Army the President did not restore him to 
the position he had held from the beginning of Novem- 
ber, 1 86 1, to the early part of March, 1862. Halleck 
still remained at the head of the military forces, and 
McClellan came under his directions. 

Pope was sent off to Minnesota to look after the 
predatory Indians. 

The Invasion of Maryland. — Flushed with success, 
Lee now crossed the Potomac, and entered Maryland, 
hoping to secure volunteers and incite an insurrection. 
Jackson's corps entered Frederick City, on September 6, 
while Lee continued his march into Maryland. Jack- 
son advanced up the northern bank of the river, and re- 
crossing into Virginia he occupied Martinsburg, where 
he seized a large quantity of stores. Harper's Ferry 
was invested by Jackson, and on both sides of the Po- 
tomac squadrons of cavalry guarded the direct road to 
Pennsylvania. So far Lee had been entirely successful. 

McClellan was ordered to pursue the invaders. He 
had nearly 100,000 men under iiim, beside the garrisons 
at Harper's Ferry and Washington. To meet this im- 
mense army, the Confederates had about 75,000 men. 
Lee was put to great difficulty in avoiding the conse- 
quence of his spirited and daring movements. He 
abandoned the line of the Monocacy, sent a portion of 
Longstreet's forces to Boonesboro', north-west of Fred- 
erick ; and directed Hill to guard the passes of South 
Mountain, and to cover the siege of Harper's Ferry. 

Lee's order to Hill fell into McClellan's hands. From 
this it appeared that Lee's aim was to obtain possession 
of the ferry, where a garrison of 1 1,000 men were under 
the command of Colonel Miles. The position was 
strongly entrenched on heights overlooking the ferry, 
and commanding the main road from the Shenandoah 
Valley to P'rederick and Baltimore. Three distinct por- 



THE INVASION OF MARYLAND. 155 

tions of Lee's army made a vehement attack on Miles 
on the 13th. Powerful batteries were erected, and on 
the morning of the 15th a cross fire of terrible intensity 
was poured into the Union entrenchments. Miles felt 
obliged to surrender. A small body of cavalry escaped 
into Pennsylvania; but the rest were made prisoners 
of war, and 73 pieces of artillery, 13,000 small arms, 
and other stores fell into the hands of the victors. 

McClellan's troops were moving to the relief of 
Harper's Ferry ; but they had obstacles to overcome. 
The passage of South Mountain was stoutly disputed 
by the Confederates. McClellan's subordinates showed 
extreme dilatoriness in bringing up their respective di- 
visions, and the afternoon had arrived before the main 
body could come into action. Ultimately, however, the 
Confederates were driven back. They were reinforced 
by Longstreet, and the contest was resumed with much 
energy. At nightfall no great advantage had been 
gained on either side, but the Confederates had suc- 
ceeded in delaying the progress of the Union troops. 

Lee was in a dilemma, although he had sustained no 
decided reverse. Different portions of his force were 
separated from each other, not only by the Potomac, 
but by McClellan's army, which was moving forward in 
a north-westerly direction by roads leading from the two 
passes through .vhich the troops had forced their way. 
But there was no time to be lost. On withdrawing 
from South Mountain, Lee took up a position on a 
a range of hills extending in a semi-circle from the 
lower part of Antietam Creek to an angle of the Poto- 
mac, a little nearer to the north-west. Lee was now es- 
tablished on the western side of Antietam Creek, the 
lower part of which, near its junction with the Potomac, 
protected the right of his line. He had his back to a 
bend of the Potomac, with his face turned to the north- 
east ; and the centre of his hne was at Sharpsburg. The 



156 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Antietam is crossed by four bridges, and at that part of 
its course is too deep to be forded by troops. Jackson 
was summoned from Harper's Ferry, Lee's object was 
to concentrate nearly all his forces on the hills about 
Antietam Creek, as he knew he would soon be attacked 
by a superior force. Jackson's troops were so "much 
exhau.sted by their previous exertions that many of them 
straggled and fell out, and only a portion of their num- 
ber reached Lee on the i6th. Fortunately for the 
Southerners, the Union troops also were slow in their 
proceedings. Their movements were extremely slug- 
gish, and McClellan waited for the arrival of all his di- 
visions on the eastern side of the creek before he ven- 
tured on offering battle. As they came up he massed 
them on both sides of the road leading to Sharpsburg. 
Three of the bridges across the creek were in front of 
him ; but they were covered by Lee's batteries. Mc- 
Clellan planted his own batteries, and fighting began on 
the 17th. 

In the early morning the Union batteries on the left 
bank opened fire on the opposing lines drawn up be- 
yond the bridges. Thus aided, three divisions crossed 
the stream, and facing to the west, began a vigorous 
attack on the left of the Confederate line, that being the 
weakest point. Excepting as regarded position, McClel- 
lan was the better off He had nearly 95,000 men at 
his disposal. Lee, owing to the non-arrival of a large 
part of his army, had no more than 35,000 at the be- 
ginning of the engagement. That small force, however, 
was animated by the courage of desperation. Hooker's 
three divisions established themselves upon the other 
side of the creek, and erected field-batteries in a belt of 
wood which at that part covered the land. A sanguin- 
ary conflict ensued ; but the Confederates held their 
ground for some hours, though more than half the 
brigades forminer the first line were either killed or 



THE ENGAGEMENT AT SHARPSBURG. 



157 



wounded, together with nearly every regimental com- 
mander. At length they were borne down, and the 
Union troops pressed forward, cleared the woods of 
their opponents, and took possession of Danker Church, 
situated to the north of Sharpsburg. Beyond this 
point the Confederates made a fresh stand, and changed 
their defence into an attack, causing the Union line in 
some places to break and recede. Reinforcements to 
Lee's army arriving, the attack was renewed with con- 
fidence and energy, and nearly all the lost ground was 
in time regained. 

Hooker's corps was completely routed. Portions of 
Sumner's corps were also considerably shaken ; but the 
artillery in the first line of woods now came once more 
into play, and the Confederate pursuit was checked. 
Fresh Union divisions were hurried up to retrieve the 
fortunes of the day ; but they did little to alter the gen- 
eral posture of affairs. During the action on the left, 
McClellan visited the field in person, and felt uneasy as 
to the result of the several operations. The attack 
made by his riglit had to a great extent failed, and he 
feared the enemy would attack his center, and break 
his whole line of battle into fragments. 

On the Union left, Burnside's corps at an early hour 
of the day had been given the very difficult task of 
carrying the lower bridge over the Antietam. The ap- 
proaches were swept away by the enemy's batteries, 
and it was only after a severe struggle that the opposite 
bank of the creek was gained. The heights were not 
in Burnside's possession until the afternoon ; but by that 
time the Confederates had been driven back. After a 
while they rallied, and bringing up fresh troops, re- 
commenced the combat. Burnside's advance had car- 
ried him almost to Sharpsburg, near the center of the 
Confederate line; but the Southerners on the arrival of 
their reinforcements, opened new batteries on the hills, 



158 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



and drove back Burnside from the position he had car- 
ried, so that it was all he could do to hold the bridge. 
McClellan ordered Burnside to hold the bridge at all 
risks, but did nothing to help him by sending up fresh 
troops. Porter's reserves were posted between the two 
wings ; but McClellan feared to employ them, lest the 
Confederates should break through his center in their 
absence. Burnside maintained his ground, and when 
night came on, both wings of the attacking force were 
still on that side of the stream, though in positions not 
so far advanced as those occupied earlier in the day. 
The troops bivouacked on the ground that night and 
McClellan telegraphed to Washington that he had 
gained a victory. McClellan had been in a specially 
good position for overwhelming his antagonists. When 
the action began his numbers were more than two to 
one ; and even after the arrival of the Confederate rein- 
forcements, Lee had not nearly so many men as his op- 
ponent. Moreover, McClellan had by a rare stroke of 
luck acquired a knowledge beforehand of Lee's designs, 
and of the disposition of his several corps ; and the Com- 
ponent parts of the Confederate army had for a time 
been separated by the advancing forces of the North. 
Yet, owing to that extraordinary hesitation which neu- 
tralized all McClellan's better qualities, every oppor- 
tunity had been thrown away, and the general result 
was little short of failure. There had been no attack 
along the whole line, and the right and left wings had 
been checked in detail by operations which the Con- 
federates had had time to transfer from one part of the 
field to another, as occasion required. 

The losses of the day were severe. On the Union 
side, the killed and wounded amounted to about 12,500, 
and among them were many general and su[)erior 
officers. The Confederates had to mourn the loss of 
9000 men, together with some of their divisional com- 



l6o T^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

niandcrs ; and for all this expenditure of life neither side 
could show any result of equal value. The following 
day was passed in inactivity, for both armies were too 
much exhausted to renew the battle. The Southerners 
were sadly weakened by the fighting, and it appears that 
their total strength was now reduced to less than 6o,000 
men. Disorganization existed on both sides. 

The invasion of Northern territory, although daringly 
conceived and ably conducted, had entailed consider- 
able losses on Lee's army, and had brought home to 
the Confederates the unwelcome knowledge that the re- 
bellion had no chance of spreading north of the Potomac. 

McClellan's Removal. On November 7, 1862, 
McClellan was ordered to surrender the command of 
his army to General Burnside, and to report at Tren- 
ton, New Jersey (his home). Halleck alleged that he 
had needlessly delayed his movements ; that he was 
constantly complaining of want of supplies, clothing, 
and horses ; and that there had been no such want as 
to prevent his compliance with the order of October 6, 
to cross the Potomac at once, and give battle to the 
enemy, or drive him south. Burnside was a personal 
friend of McClellan, and possessed his confidence. He 
had on two or three occasions exhibited a fair amount 
of skill as a general, and had, before, been requested to 
take the position of McClellan, but refused, and now 
accepted the command only on the peremptory order 
of the War Department. 

The position of the Union army rendered Lee 
anxious for the safety of Richmond. He feared that 
his communications with that city might be severed, 
and he had an extensive tract of country to watch with 
a comparatively small force. While he was consider- 
ing what he should do, Burnside was reorganizing his 
army with a view to active measures. He now arranged 



BURNSIDE IN COMMAND. 



i6i 



it in three grand divisions, under the orders of Sumner, 
Hooker, and FrankHn ; and a body of reserves was 
formed, under the command of General Sigel. It was 
decided to make a demonstration on the Rappahannock, 
to march rapidly down the north-eastern bank of that 
river, to cross by means of pontoons at Fredericksburg, 
and to advance 
on Richmond 
by Hanover 
Court House. 
Accordingly, a 
few days later, 
Sumner was or- 
dered to march 
on Fredericks- 
burg, followed 
by Franklin and 
Hooker. The 
right rear of 
the army was to 
be protected by 
the cavalry un- 
der General 
PI ea s a n ton, 
while Sigel was 
to guard the 
Upper P o t o- 
mac, and to oc- 
cupy the direct ambkose e. buknsiue. 
route between 

Gordonsville and Washington. The success of the plan 
depended on the rapidity with which it was carried out ; 
but there proved to be delays that were not anticipated. 
Burnside calculated on Jackson being still west of the 
Blue Ridge, and on Lee having no knowledge of the 
scheme by which he was to be out-manoeuvred. In 
II 




1 52 TflE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

these respects he was mistaken ; and the consequence 
was another miscarriage, in addition to those which had 
gone before. 

Fredericksburg. — Lee had received information of 
Burnside's projects, and a portion of his army had con- 
sequently moved on a parallel line to that of the Union 
forces. The movements of his detachments were 
executed with greater quickness than those of Sumner 
and his colleagues, and the Confederate batteries were 
already posted at Fredericksburg, on the southern side 
of the Rappahannock, when, on November 20, Sum- 
ner's troops arrived at Falmouth, on the northern side. 
It was evident, therefore, that Fredericksburg could not 
be occupied without an engagement, and that the 
undisputed advance on Richmond, which it had been 
hoped to accomplish, was no longer possible. Still, 
something might have been done had Burnside been 
able to cross the river at once ; but the necessary pon- 
toons had not arrived, and he was obliged to wait. 
The delay was much to the advantage of the Con- 
federates, for it gave time to Jackson to join the other 
forces, so that by the 25th the whole Confederate Army 
was in position on the heights overlooking Fredericks- 
burg. It was the policy of the Southerners to await 
attack; it was equally Burnside's policy to eject them 
from their posts by a vigorous assault. But for the 
present no movement was possible. Three weeks 
passed in this state of compulsory inaction. Burnside 
at length felt compelled by the stress of popular opinion 
to do something. He determined to cross the river as 
soon as he could complete his pontoon bridges. The 
passage was to be effected at two points — immediately 
opposite Fredericksburg, and a mile and a half lower 
down the stream. Burnside had now no fewer than 
150,000 men ; his line extended over four miles on the 
northern side of the river ; his guns, which were ex- 



FREDERICKSB UR G. 



T63 



tremely numerous, commanded the town of Fredericks- 
burg, and the opposite bank of the Rappahannock ; 
and he was therefore able to make a powerful demon- 
stration, with fair probabilities of success. Lee's forces 
did not amount to more than 80,000 men : but they 
held a strong position on a semicircle of hills sweep- 
ing round from the river to the vicinity of Newport. 
Lee also was well provided with artillery, which he 
massed towards his center. To the right of his line 
he had the little river Massaponax ; other small rivers 
ran through the hills on which his divisions had 
been drawn up ; and in every respect his position 
was one which a resolute army would be likely to 
maintain. 

During the night of December 10, the Union pon- 
toons were carried down to the river, and the artillery 
was so placed as to be capable of being brought to bear 
immediately on the town. Next morning the men com- 
menced building four extemporary bridges. For some 
hours the work of construction was not perceived by 
the Confederates on the opposite bank, but when it was 
discovered a heavy fire of musketry opened from vari- 
ous positions on the shore, and from the houses in the 
town. The Union troops were for a time driven away, 
but, having been rallied, they again proceeded with their 
task. Once more they were compelled to abandon the 
attempt, and orders were then given to the artillery to 
open fire on the city. This di.spersed the Confederate 
sharpshooters, and did great damage to the city itself. 
The operation of throwing over the pontoon bridges was 
once more resumed, and although the Confederates for 
a time interrupted the progress of the work, they were 
unable to prevent its completion in the course of a day. 
Before dusk, Sumner's division had got over, together 
with a section of Hooker's. The transit was resumed 
early on the 12th, without further molestation; and 



164 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Burnside massed his corps near the river, in readiness 
for an advance when the proper moment had arrived. 

Very httlc of importance took place that day ; but the 
battle known as that of Fredericksburg began at an early 
hour on December 13, 1862. Franklin misunderstood 
Burnside's orders, and, instead of making a vigorous 
attack on the Confederate right, did nothing more than 
execute a feint, though he had two army corps under 
his command, and might therefore have struck a telling 
blow against the adversary. Burnside had hoped to 
cut the Confederate army into two portions, and, having 
taken the heights beyond Fredericksburg, to destroy 
the right wing of his enemy ; but he had entirely miscal- 
culated the knowledge possessed by Lee of the manner 
in which he was to be assailed. Lee declined to 
weaken his line, so as to repel a false attack which 
Burnside had ordered to be made some miles below 
Fredericksburg. Had he fallen into the trap thus laid 
for him, it is possible that he might have been beaten in 
detail ; but he kept his troops well together. On the 
left of the Union line an attempt was made to drive the 
Confederates across the Massaponax, by turning their 
position ; but, although the Southern troops were forced 
back nearly a mile, no decided advantage was gained. 
Franklin misapprehended his orders, and failed to bring 
up all his divisions, and to press the attack with vigor. 
On the right of the line, the fighting was desperate the 
whole day. The Confederates were posted among the 
woods and hills at the back of Fredericksburg, and two 
Union divisions were ordered to expel them at the point 
of the bayonet. In the face of a tremendous artillery 
fire, the assault was renewed again and again ; but as 
often as the endeavor was made, the regiments were 
shattered and driven back in extreme confusion. Sum- 
ner ordered up his artillery in support of the attacking 
force, and the contest continued until dark, without the 



^■' '' %E-'''/ A'-'I'f 



Hall ,T 1 1 




'y \^ 



1 66 Tli^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

Union troops winning a single yard, or their opponets 
being dispossessed of the positions they had assumed 
in the morning. During this terrible combat, which 
strewed the plain with dead and wounded, Lee person- 
ally superintended the operations of his men. Towards 
the close of the attempt to carry this strong position — 
made all the stronger by a stone wall behind which the 
Confederates were entrenched — Burnside sent instruc- 
tions to Hooker, who with a larger part of his division 
was still on the other side of the river, to hasten his 
men over the bridges, so that he might support Sumner 
and his lieutenants. Hooker proceeded to the scene of 
action, but soon afterwards sent word to his superior 
that the heights were impregnable. Burnside insisted 
on the movement being carried out, and Hooker then 
sent forward one of his divisions, with orders to assault 
the position. Nothing, however, could be done. The 
men staggered back before the terrible fire of their op- 
ponents, and, leaving a third of their number on the 
ground, sought shelter in the rear. At half-past five in 
the evening, the musketry fire ceased ; that of the artil- 
lery continued until long after dark. 

Next day was Sunday, and both armies remained 
comparatively quiet. It was n day of great misery and 
depression. The shattered houses of Fredericksburg 
were crowded with the dead and d}^ing, and there were 
numerous stragglers, who would have crossed the bridges 
to the northern side of the river, had they not been 
driven back by the guards posted there. In many in- 
stances the men refused to be led forward again, so 
that Burnside felt that he was in no position to renew 
the struggle. Personally, he was desirous of once 
more advancing against the enemy ; but his lieutenants 
saw that in the existing temper of the troops such a 
movement could entail none but the most fatal conse- 
quences. To many it was a subject of surprise that 



FREDERICKSBURG. 167 

Lee did not assume the offensive on the 14th, and by a 
determined onslaught drive his enemy into the river. 
It appeared tliat Lee expected to be himself attacked ; 
at any rate, he made no preparations for an advance, 
but on the contrary threw up fresh works of defence. 
His army was inferior to that of Burnside, and the bat- 
teries on the opposite side of the Rappahannock were 
sufficiently powerful to suggest caution. Probably for 
these reasons, combined with ignorance of the real con- 
dition of the Union troops, the Confederates remained 
inactive and so allowed the Northerners to repair the 
disaster they had suffered. There was, in truth, only 
one way of repairing it, and that was by a retreat across 
the river. Influenced by the advice of his generals, 
Burnside determined to withdraw from the perilous 
position in which he found himself. The greater number 
of the wounded were removed on the 15th, and during 
the ensuing night the army evacuated Fredericksburg, 
and retired to its former lines. Lee was astonished, on 
the i6th, at beholding nothing before him but a deserted 
land, a ruined town, a winding river, and a line of bat- 
teries frowning from the opposite shore. 

The Union loss was certainly great. It probably 
amounted, in killed, wounded, and missing, to 13,771 
men. The " missing" are said to have been 2078. The 
Southerners, having been sheltered by their works, lost 
comparatively few men; the total is stated at 1800. 
The affair altogether was most disastrous to the Union 
cause; but Burnside took upon himself the entire re- 
sponsibility of the movement. He attributed his re- 
verses to the fosf on the morning of the iith, and to 
the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the 
pontoon bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to 
concentrate his forces in a strong position. "As it 
was," he said, in his report to Halleck, " we came very 
near success. Failing in accomplishing the main 



1 68 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

object, we remained in order of battle two days — long 
enough to decide that the enemy would not come out 
of his strongholds to fight us willi his infantry." Burn- 
side was perhaps hardly to be blamed for the misfor- 
tune by which he had been overtaken. His plan of 
operations had a reasonable chance of success, and it 
failed partly because the Confederates were in a 
stronger position than had been supposed, and partly 
because the Union troops were not so well handled by 
the subordinate generals as had been hoped. Never- 
theless, the ruin of Burnside's scheme proved the ruin 
of Burnside himself He had now entirely lost his hold 
on the officers and men under his command. Desertions 
were increasing to an alarming extent, and he found 
himself confronting a powerful enemy with a weapon 
which was almost broken in his hand. The army before 
Fredericksburg accordingly remained inactive for several 
weeks. 

Chancellorsville (May 2, 3, 1863). — Burnside, after 
his defeat at Fredericksburg, was succeeded by General 
Hooker, on January 26, 1863. Winter passed away 
without any actions of importance. Nothing on a large 
scale could be begun because the roads at this season 
are flooded with rains so as to make the movement of 
large bodies of men almost impossible. From the 
commencement of hostilities till the beginning of 1863 
there had been about 2000 battles and skirmishes. The 
expenditure of men and money had been appalling, 
and the end seemed still distant. The Confederate 
Army was at its strongest about the beginning of 1863 ; 
its numbers soon afterwards diminished to a considerable 
extent, owing to the expiration of the term of enlist- 
ment of several of the men. In the spring of that 
year, the numerical superiority of the Northerners was 
marked. 

Longstreet and his corps had been sent off to Ten- 



CHA NCE LLORSVILLE. 1 6^ 

nessee to assist General Bragg. This left Lee with but 
60,000 men to oppose the Potomac army of over 
100,000 men, and offered a favorable opportunity for an 
attack. 

In this condition of affairs, it became known that 
Hooker was contemplating a renewed attack on Rich- 
mond. The Confederate capital was at the same time 
being threatened by General Foster, operating from 
North Carolina, by General Peck from South-eastern 
Virginia, and by General Key from the vicinity of the 
Pamunkey. Lee was therefore compelled to divide his 
forces among several localities, and the numbers at his 
disposal were small in comparison with those of his 
opponent. Hooker determined to make his attack in 
two places. To cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan 
some distance west of Fredericksburg, and so fall on 
the left wing of the Confederates, while at the same time 
his own left wing should occupy the heights above the 
same city, and seize the Richmond Railway. The 
cavalry was to co-operate with these movements by 
getting round the Confederate position, cutting off the 
retreat of Lee's army on Richmond, destroying the 
railways and burning the bridges over the North and 
South Anna Rivers. Crossing the Rapidan on the 
30th, the Union troops entered an uncultivated and 
almost deserted country called the Wilderness. Here 
they camped near Chancellorsville, and were presently 
joined by two more corps. Sedgwick made a simulta- 
neous movement across the Rappahannock below 
Fredericksburg, and Lee was thus perplexed as to the 
precise direction in which he was to be attacked. 

In a little while it became evident that the brunt of 
the battle would be at Chancellorsville, and, on the 
night of April 30, Lee massed the greater number of 
his divisions on the roads leading from Fredericksburg 
to that town. A detachment under Early was left to 



170 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



guard the lower position, and Lee threw up some earth- 
works on the roads which would be traversed by the 
enemy. The Union cavalry were already in possession 
of the Richmond Railway, a portion of which had been 
destroyed ; so that, in the event of the Confederates be- 
ing vanquished, their retreat would be seriously en- 
dangered. The position was undoubtedly very perilous, 
and some of the Confederate officers looked upon it 
with gloomy forebodings. Lee himself, however, was 
cheerful and self-possessed. 

Hooker directed an advance to be made from the 
vicinity of Chancellorsville towards Fredericksburg. 
Immediately after, on ascertaining that Lee was march- 
ing against him with his whole army, he drew back on 
a line of earthworks and felled trees which he had 
hastily constructed in the forest, and which he strength- 
ened during the evening and night. His front was 
towards the east, and Fredericksburg was the objective 
point at which he aimed. He desired to choose his 
own ground for fighting, and force his opponent into 
accepting it; but Lee was too wary to be thus en- 
trapped. Hooker was endeavoring to outflank the 
Confederate ; the latter determined that he should him- 
self be outflanked. Lee therefore sent the corps under 
Jackson round the right rear of the Northern army, 
while with but two divisions he kept the army engaged 
in front. The chances were very much against the 
Southerners ; but the desperate nature of their situation 
required a bold and daring policy. Nothing could be 
better suited to secret operations than the character of 
the land where the contending armies were now watch- 
ing one another. The whole of the country is covered 
with dense forests, and in the midst of these tangled 
thickets the Union pioneers had thrown up very strong 
entrenchments at right angles to the turnpike and 
plank-roads which connect Chancellorsville with Fred- 



CHA NCEL L ORS VI L L E. 



171 



ericksburg. Drawn up within the line of their en- 
trenchments, with their artillery massed on some high 
ground a little in the rear, the Northerners presented a 
formidable appearance, and it was at once evident to 
Lee that any attempt to carry the position from the 
front must be attended by a fearful loss of life, and 
would probably 
end in failure. 

Fighting oc- 
curred on May i, 
though not to 
any serious ex- 
tent. It was nec- 
essary to the suc- 
cess of Lee's 
plans that he 
should conceal 
the flank move- 
ment of Jackson, 
and he therefore 
made a series of 
feigned attacks 
on his front. 
Hooker was thus 
led to suppose 
that the Confed- 
erates were in full 
strength immedi- 
ately before his position, and, conceiving it advisable that 
he should be supported by nearly the whole of his forces, 
he ordered Reynolds' division to cross the Rappahan- 
nock, and join the main army about Chancellorsville. 
While this movement was being carried out, Jackson 
was commencing his flank march. He started on the 
night of May I, taking with him three divisions, com- 
manded by Hill, Coulson, and Rhodes. The thickness 




GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER. 



1/2 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



of the forest was favorable to his design, and by the 
afternoon of the 2d, he had gained the road from 
Orange to Fredericksburg, south of the Rapidan. 
Having deployed his columns, he suddenly poured 
down like a torrent on the rear of Hooker's position, 
where he unexpectedly appeared about five o'clock in 
the evening. The first part of Hooker's army to feel 
the brunt of Jackson's attack was Howard's corps, which 
was bivouacking in the forest with so complete an un- 
consciousness of danger that in this direction no defen- 
sive works had been thrown up. The Confederates 
burst upon their antagonists with a tremendous yell, 
and the Union divisions on the right fell back in panic. 
Nearly the whole of the nth corps was routed, and 
driven in towards Chancellorsville. Some gallant at- 
tempts were made to rally the fugitives, and Plooker 
himself did his utmost to inspire confidence in the 
troops. At the same moment a vigorous atack in front 
was being made by Lee, and a feeling of terror spread 
through the masses of the Union army. There was one 
exception to this rule of fear and disorganization. The 
reserves, under General Sickles, exhibited the qualities 
of good soldiers. Sickles himself, his staff, and a body 
of cavalry under Pleasanton, took post near a stone wall 
directly in the line of retreat, and placing themselves 
boldly in a gap of that wall, through which alone the 
road could be pursued, succeeded in rallying some of 
the artillery, though the infantry, overcoming all ob- 
structions, managed to continue their discreditable 
flight. Howard, who was in command of the corps 
that had been first surprised, strove hard to rally the 
flying troops. Hooker himself spared no pains, and 
freely exposed his life where his presence appeared 
specially needed ; for, whatever his deficiencies as a 
commander, he undoubtedly possessed great courage. 
Towards nightfall, something like order was restored to 



CHA NCEL L ORS VI L LE. 



173 



the shattered divisions. The Union guns were turned 
on the advancing enemy, and the pursuit was checked; 
but the Northern army was now in a contracted posi- 
tion between Chancellorsville and the fork of the two 
rivers, and it became doubtful wiiether Hooker's plans 
were not damaged beyond the hope of recovery. 

The Confederates had so far attained a marked suc- 
cess ; but they also suffered a great personal misfortune 
in the death of General Jackson. In the evening after 
his successful onslaught, while riding back to camp 
from a reconnoissance of the front, Jackson was fired 
upon by his own men, who mistook his escort for Union 
calvary. This heroic officer died on May 10, 
bequeathing to his country generally, a reputation for 
prowess, gallantry, and military genius which the 
Western Continent has never surpassed. 

The battle, cut short by darkness on the night of the 
2d, was resumed next morning (Sunday). To drive 
the Union forces back towards the rivers, and thus 
sweep them out of the advantageous ground which they 
held, was the difficult task now undertaken by the 
Confederate commander. The three divisions of Jack- 
son's corps had been placed under Stuart's command, 
and these veteran troops began the renewed attack. 
They were received with so hot a fire from the Union 
entrenchments that the advancing ranks wavered and 
hung back, but, on being rallied and inspirited by 
General Rhodes, again pushed forward with energy, 
and drove their opponents towards Chancellorsville. 
At another part of the field, the strongly fortified posi- 
tion held by Slocum was attacked with equal spirit. 
The outer defences was carried after a fierce struggle, 
and the Union forces were compelled to take refuge 
behind a second line of breastworks, in the rear of 
Chancellorsville. Some time before noon, the Northern 
troops had been compelled to recede about a mile 



174 '^^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

towards the river, and Hooker, beaten out of his first 
entrenchments, was obHged to create a second hne with 
as much expedition as he could. 

Satisfied with what he liad accompHshed, Lee directed 
his attention toward the neighborhood of Fredericks- 
burg, where events of importance were proceeding. 

It has already been related that when the Union troops 
began their movement south of the Rappahannock, 
Sedgwick's division crossed below Fredericksburg, in 
order to divert a portion of the Confederate army. 
After parting with several of his troops to reinforce 
Hooker, he was still left with about 25,000 men. He 
soon ascertained that Lee's division had vacated the 
whole of their works, except Marye's Heights, and had 
gone to encounter the Union ranks at Chancellorsville. 
The Southern garrison on the heights was a very small 
one, as Sedgwick knew from balloon reconnoissances. 
Yet, though his numbers were superior, he took no 
action at the very time when action would probably 
have ensured success. Although his position was as- 
sumed on April 28, he did not attempt to aid his 
Chief until the evening of May 2. Throughout the 
whole of the 1st and 2d, had he marched upon the 
rear of Lee, who had only half as many troops as his 
opponent, it is not unlikely that he would have given a 
totally different character to that memorable affair. When 
at length he moved, his advance was slow, and un- 
necessarily cautious. Not more than four miles of 
ground divided him from the two regiments drawn up 
behind a wall on Marye's Heights; but it was not until 
midday of the 3d, that he came within sight of his 
enemy. The elevated ground was then surrounded, 
the works were carried with a loss of about 1,000 killed 
and wounded, and at six o'clock in the evening Sedgwick 
sent forward a column four miles on the road towards 
Chnncellorsvillc. Lee, on hearing of the capture of 



CHA XCELLORSVILLE. 



175 



Marye's Heights, despatched McLaws to check any- 
further advance of the Union detachment, which he did 
by a rough breastwork. An attempt to carry the posi- 




GENERAL T. E. B. STUART. 



tion resulted in the loss of numerous troops. Nothing 
more was done at that time, and Sedgwick's division 
spent the night loosely scattered about the road leading 



176 



THE BATTLES FOR THE rXION. 



from Marye's Heights to Salcni Chuich. The battle 
was renewed next morning; but Sedgwick's troops 
fou;^ht with so much languor that the Confederates, c^n 
the arrival of reinforcements under Early, had but little 
trouble in defeating them. They were speedily out- 
flanked by the Confederates, who re-took Marye's 
Heights, and captured a Union convoy. Fearing that 
his communications with Fredericksburg would be cut 
off, Sedgwick hastily withdrew, leaving behind him 
numerous supply-wagons, mules, and horses. The 
retreat was no better than a disorderly flight, and after 
dark the Union detachment recrossed the river on 
pontoon-bridges, their movement accelerated by a re- 
newed attack of the Confederates, which spread con- 
fusion and dismay through several regiments. A diver- 
sion which might have been attended by the happiest 
results, had it been vigorously and boldly pushed, had 
ended in nothing but disaster, rout, and loss. 

Lee lost no time in pursuing the advantages he had 
already gained. Having disposed of Sedgwick, whose 
advance had for some time threatened his rear, he once 
more turned on the main body of the Union forces 
cramped within their narrow lines in the neighborhood 
of Chancellorsville. But a change in the weather 
occurred on the 5th. A deluge of rain caused the 
waters of the Rapidan and Rappahannock to rise so as 
to threaten the bridges at the United States Ford, by 
which alone the Union army could retreat. To withdraw 
from their desperate position was now the only course 
open to them. Hooker consulted with his chief subordi- 
nates, and determined upon relinquishing his enterprise. 

Preparations for the retreat began immediately after 
dusk, and at daybreak on the 6th, the whole army stood 
in safety on the left bank of the Rappahannock, and 
commenced marching back to its former camps at Fal- 
mouth. 



CI J A NCELLORS VILLE. 



177 



Again had the Union troops been defeated in their 
endeavors to march on Riclimond ; again had there 




r' r 







CENKRAI. ROBERT E. l.EE. 



been an enormous expenditure of life without any cor- 
responding advantage. The number of killed and 

12 



178 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



wounded in that week of fighting has been variously 
stated; but Hooker admitted a loss of nearly 11,000 
men. The prisoners were numerous : no fewer than 
4600 were sent back from Richmond upon exchange, 
within a fortnight after the battle. In Sedgwick's force 
alone, 5000 men were returned as killed, wounded and 
missing. The Confederate loss was about 10,000; so 
that altogether nearly 30,000 men must have been 
removed from the ranks of the combatants. The dis- 
aster to the Union cause was so extreme that Lincoln 
and Halleck visited Hooker at his camp, to investigate 
the causes of so grave a misfortune. On their return 
to Washington, they announced that Hooker's demon- 
stration was not a disaster, but simply a failure. This 
opinion did not find acceptance with the public. It was 
seen that Hooker had been completely beaten, and it 
was certain that his removal from command could not 
be long delayed. The spring campaign in Virginia was 
now at an end ; for the Union ranks were weakened, 
not merely by the casualties of battle, but by the de- 
parture of many regiments whose terms of service had 
expired, and who showed no readiness to re-enlist. 

The Southerners, induced by these successes, would 
have assumed the offensive, had their strength been 
equal to such a feat ; but their numbers were compara- 
tively small, and they feared at that time to risk a repe- 
tition of the ill luck which had attended their invasion 
of Maryland the year previous. Frequent cavalry skir- 
mishes occurred in the open country, and in the passes 
of the Blue Ridge Mountains ; but, though characterized 
by great gallantry on both sides, and by varying fortune, 
they produced no lasting or important effects. 

The two Presidents now put into effect in their 
respective sections the laws for obtaining soldiers by 
enrolment and draft. 



GETTYSBURG. 



179 



Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863). — Lee now planned to 
conquer upon the soil of the loyal States. Swinton 
tells us that the official records show that " the Southern 
agents near the leading governments of the Old World 
were at this time able to announce that should Lee, 
after the astonishing successes he had achieved in Vir- 
ginia, carry his army into the North, and there make a 
lodgment promising some degree of permanancy, the 
South could receive the long-coveted boon of foreign 
recognition." 

Since the time when Lee had been forced to abandon 
Maryland, two great battles had been fought. At 
Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac, under an 
incompetent leader (Burnside), was hurled in reckless 
slaughter against a fortified position of impiiegnable 
strength, and after a fearful carnage, was repulsed, 
terribly shaken in morale. At Chancellorsville, Hooker, 
after a successful passage of the river, contrived by 
unskilful combination to be thoroughly beaten in de- 
tail by a greatly inferior force acting on the offensive, 
and was forced to recross the Rappahannock, leaving 
his reputation as a General behind him. In these 
two actions the Confederates killed nearly 30,000 
men, and their experience in these battles inspired 
them with a sense of invincibility. The Union forces, 
distraught by repeated disaster and change of com- 
mander, had sunk in energy, and lapsed from their faith 
of victory. 

These two causes conspiring together determined the 
Richmond authorities to assume the offensive, carry the 
war into the Northern States, and dictate terms of peace 
in Philadelphia or New York. 

The Confederate forces now in Virginia amounted to 
75,000 men — irrespective of Stuart's Cavalry. They 
were divided into three corps of equal size, and the 
ability of Lee, Longstreth, and Ewell was a guarantee 



l8o THE BA7TLES FOR THE UNION. 

that they would be liandled in the most effective manner. 
Lee rapidly moved down the Shenandoah, crossing the 
Potomac, and advanced to Chambersburg. 

Hooker, though he exhibited dashing qualities as a 
subordinate, was no match for these men. He requested 
to be relieved of the command, and was succeeded by 
General George G. Meade. 

Towards the end of June Lee's headquarters were at 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Ewell, who preceded 
him there, was then ordered to send Early's division to 
the eastern side of South Mountain, so as simul- 
taneously to threaten Harrisburg and Baltimore. Other 
divisions were sent in various directions, charged with 
the task of burning bridges, and destroying railways 
and canals, so as to hinder the advance of the Union 
troops. Orders for a forward movement were issued by 
General Meade the day he assumed command (June 
28). Maryland was entered on that day, and the garri- 
son at Harper's Ferry was called in, under an incorrect 
impression, on Meade's part, that it was destitute of 
provisions. The Army of the Potomac was then con- 
centrated in and around the city of Frederick, Maryland. 
On June 29, Lee's forces moved in an easterly direction 
towards Gettysburg. With the exception of two corps, 
Meade's army was moved northward at the same time ; 
but on the morning of the 30th Meade changed his 
line of march, and directed the whole of his corps 
towards Gettysburg. Thus the two hostile armies were 
moving in parallel lines on the same place. Gettysburg 
was indeed a position of importance to both ; for it is a 
central point to which many roads converge. Lee was 
ill-supplied with information as to his adversary's move- 
ments. The cavalry had not yet rejoined him, and it 
was only by a difficult march round the right flank of 
the Union forces, and therefore between them and 
Washington, that Stuart was able, on July 2, to recom- 



GETTYSBURG. 



i8i 



bine his detachment with the main body of the Con- 
federate army. On the two previous days, Lee had 
scarcely any means of ascertaining what Meade was 




doing; so that in marching on Gettysburg he was 
io-nora'nt of the fact that the Union commander was 
marchincr there too. 



1 82 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

At this moment, the position of the Southern Con- 
federacy was one of extreme peril. Nearly all the de- 
fenders of Richmond had been sent to join Lee in his 
invasion of the North ; and the naked condition of the 
Confederate capital, and of the country surrounding it, 
became known to the Federal Government. 

Meade's army was within a few miles of Gettysburg 
on June 30. A little to the north, but moving in the 
same direction, was Lee's army. Meade ascertained 
the proximity of his adversaries in the course of that 
day, and, pushing forward with celerity, entered Gettys- 
burg on the morning of July I. In the meanwhile the 
Confederates continued their advance, and at ten A. m. 
one of their divisions became engaged with Reynold's 
corps on the western side of the town, a little beyond a 
line of hills called Oak Ridge. Reynolds rode forward 
to superintend his troops in person, but was im- 
mediately killed by a rifle-bullet. The command of the 
corps then devolved on General Doubleday, who was 
enabled to bring three divisions into action ; yet the 
Confederates were not checked. The scene of the 
fighting was a small open valley, consisting of ploughed 
fields bounded by thickly-wooded uplands. The en- 
counter was prolonged and desperate, and the Southern- 
ers themselves admitted that the Union troops fought 
well. Before his death, Reynolds had sent orders to 
the iith corps, under Howard, to come to his support 
as quickly as possible. This body was to the south of 
Gettysburg, and it was some time before it could turn 
towards the north-west, cross the Oak Ridge, and de- 
ploy into the little valley. Its arrival was eagerly de- 
sired by tiie overmatched Union forces in the latter 
position ; but it was not until about one p. m. that 
Howard, riding in advance of his troops, reached the 
field of action. He took command of the entire force, 
and his men, coming up shortly afterwards, occupied a 



GETTYSBURG. 



183 



position to the right of the Ist corps. Notwithstanding 
this accession of strength on the Northern side, the 
Southern troops continued to gain ground. The iith 
Union corps, consisting principally of Germans, was 
driven back in broken heaps, though not without a very 




GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK. 



creditable attempt to withstand the enemy. The dis- 
comfiture of this body spread dismay through the rest, 
and a retreat towards Gettysburg soon afterwards set in. 
By this time General Hancock had been sent forward 
by Meade to take the principal command, and, with the 



1 84 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



assistance of Howard, he formed the broken corps 
afresh on the summit of the rising ground. The 
Southern Generals, Hill and Ewell, were at first dis- 
posed to resume the attack at once, but as the evening 
drew near, and the exact strength of the opposing forces 
was not known, it was considered advisable to abstain 
from further action for the present. The Confederates 
therefore occupied the town, and prepared for renewed 
action on the following day. In the course of the night 
Meade arrived, and posted his troops in a semi-circular 
line, of which the convex center was towards Gettys- 
burg. The hill formed part of a curving ridge, which 
in some portions was rocky and thickly wooded ; and 
Meade's left flank, lying to the south-west of Cemetery 
Hill, rested upon an almost perpendicular peak, covered 
with forest trees, called the Round Top. To the west 
and north of this ridge was a narrow valley, between 
one and two miles in width, beyond which the heights 
known as Oak Ridge ran nearly parallel with the first 
line of hills. On the morning of July 2 the Confeder- 
ate line of battle was formed on the slopes of the 
further ridge, its right facing the Round Top, its left 
overlapping Gettj'sburg, and turning somewhat to the 
south. Believing that the whole Confederate army was 
in his front, Meade had on the previous evening 
hastened up all his outlying corps ; and his entire force 
was on the ground by seven A. m. on the 2d, with 
the exception of the 6th corps, which did not arrive 
until 2 P. M. The Confederates had concentrated their 
divisions by about the same time, and it was seen on 
both sides that an action of a desperate character would 
presently ensue. The Union troops held a strong posi- 
tion, the advantages of which they augmented by throw- 
ing up breastworks and other defences. Lee ques- 
tioned the prudence of attacking an enemy so formid- 
able in numbers, and so well entrenched on command- 



GETTYSBURG. 



185 



iiig hills. But these considerations were overruled by 
the suggestion that to retreat without a further engage- 
ment might have been attended by consequences abso- 




GENERAL LONGSTREET. 



lutely fatal. A battle thus became unavoidable ; and 
Lee determined to fight, though it would appear that he 
and Longstreet were both apprehensive of the result, and 
doubtful as to the propriety of an offensive movement. 



1 86 TI^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

The key of the Union position was Cemetery Hill, 
which was regarded as the center of the line, though it 
lay much more to the right than to the left. Here 
Meade established his headquarters ; and at about a 
quarter past four in the afternoon, the Confederate 
batteries opened fire. Under cover of their guns, the 
Confederates then advanced simultaneously against the 
extremities of the opposing line, and the Union left, 
commanded by Sickles, was vehemently assaulted by 
Longstreet in person. Sickles was an amateur soldier, 
but his courage, as he had shown at the battle of 
Chancellorsville, was all that could be desired ; and he 
clung to his position with grim tenacity. After awhile, 
however, he was badly wounded, and carried from the 
field ; his men were driven back with terrible loss from 
the advanced position which he had taken up ; and the 
Southerners pushed on towards the eastern ridge. 
Meade now strengthened his left by the 5th corps under 
Slocum, and the Union guns did murderous execution 
among the Confederates, who lost some of their best 
officers. Longstreet headed the attack with remarkable 
gallantry ; fresh troops arrived in support of those 
whom he already commanded ; and at one time the 
summit of the ridge was nearly gained. But the Union 
forces were being continually reinforced, and the South- 
ern troops were finally compelled to retire towards the 
undulating ground, near Emmetsburg road, which Sickles 
had previously occupied, but from which he had been 
expelled. While the left was thus assailed, Ewell 
attacked Cemetery Hill, and demonstrations were also 
made against other portions of the Union line. These 
attempts, however, were not well supported, nor sus- 
tained with sufficient spirit ; consequently, although 
some breastworks were temporarily carried, the general 
result of the day's operation was that the Confederates 
were driven back with enormous loss. But the loss was 



GETTYSBURG. 



187 



not wholly on one side : Meade's troops also had suf- 
fered very severely, and their commander vi^as doubtful, 
when night closed in, whether his army could bear 
another attack. Orders were drawn up by the chief 
of the staff against the contingency of a retreat; but, 
on considering all the circumstances of his position — 
the valor which his men had shown, and the formidable 
nature of the rugged hills on which he was entrenched 
— Meade determined to remain, and once more offer 
battle on the following day. 

The struggle began again on the morning of the 3d ; 
this time on the left of the Confederate line. The 
assault was conducted with so much vigor that for 
awhile Meade was apprehensive lest his right flank 
should be turned ; but, after a desperate effort, the Con- 
federate left was hurled back, and the fighting was then 
transferred to the center and the Union left. Great de- 
lay, however, ensued in carrying out these later move- 
ments, and the time was turned to good account by the 
Union troops in adding to their outworks, and strength- 
ening the batteries which were to sweep the intervening 
valley. At half-past twelve a furious cannonade was 
opened from more than 100 guns forming the batteries 
of Longstreet and Hill, as well as from Ewell's artillery, 
stationed in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, and di- 
rected against the slopes of Cemetery Hill, They were 
replied to with equal vehemence, and for two hours the 
narrow valley blazed and roared with this infernal in- 
terchange of fire and death, which tore great limbs from 
the trees, splintered the rocks, and scattered destruction 
far and wide. Then the Confederate brigades descended 
the hill on which they had been posted, and moved 
against the Union line. The slaughter was excessive, 
for the men were within full range of the Union guns 
— guns of enormous size and power. Nevertheless, 
they pressed forward with devoted gallantry, and 



J 88 >^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

Pickett's Virginians even planted their colors within 
the hostile works. But the less experienced troops 
were in time staggered by the obstacles before them, 
and, after wavering in their march, halted, and then fell 
back in confusion. Pickett's regiments, composed of 
men who were justly regarded as among the best troops 
in the army, were exposed, by the retreat of their com- 
rades, to the utmost fury of the adversary. Attacked 
both in front and flank, these courageous men were 
swept off the worlcs they had captured, and at length, 
though unwillingly, forced to retreat. In that desperate 
struggle every brigadier of the Virginian division was 
killed or wounded, and, out of 24 regimental officers, 
only two escaped unhurt. Leaving an enormous pro- 
portion of their number dead or wounded on the 
ground, the Virginians retired to the slopes from which 
they had started, and Longstreet, apprehending an im- 
mediate advance by the Union forces, made hasty prep- 
arations for defending his position. Lee himself rode 
amongst the shattered ranks, reassuring the soldiers by 
his calm and sympathetic manner. The several detach- 
ments were formed again, under cover of the woods, 
and the men were ordered to lie on the ground until 
the moment when they should be attacked. But no 
attack came. The Union troops were exhausted, 
and had spent nearly all their anmiunition. The 
third day's battle, therefore, came to a close about 
six o'clock in the evening. Detached engagements 
of a desultory nature took place in other parts of 
the line, but were attended with no important ef- 
fect. The attack had not been well planned, and 
Longstreet afterwards admitted that the Confederates 
had made a mistake in not concentrating their army 
more, and in attacking with 15,000 men, instead of 
30,000. The Southerners had found the position of 
their opponents too strong to be carried, and 't was 



GETTYSBURG. 



189 



obvious that any further attempt would lead only to 
the worst results. 

On the other hand, Meade saw that it would be 
highly imprudent on his part to follow up his success 
by any attack upon the enemy. He admitted having 
lost during the campaign upwards of 23,000 men in 
killed, wounded, and missing. Meade therefore re- 
mained quietly 
within his lines, 
probably expect- 
ing the speedy 
retreat of his ad- 
versary. Lee had 
in truth deter- 
mined to aban- 
don a country in 
which little could 
be gained, and 
everything might 
be lost; but it 
was not neces- 
sary to act with 
precipitation, and 
the greater part 
of the 4th was 
devoted to bury- 
ing the dead, and 
sending the 
wounded to the 

rear. At night, the several corps began tiieir retreat, and 
by the morning of the 5th the whole force was out of 
view. Sedgwick, with the Sixth corps, was sent in pur- 
suit, and came up with the Confederate rear-guard on the 
evening of the 6th. The position, however, could not 
have been attacked without great risk, and the main body 
of the Union army marched on Middletown in a direc- 




GENERAL GEORGE E. PICKETT. 



IQO THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

tion parallel with that of the Southerners. Part of the 
Confederate train moved by the road through Fairfield, 
and the rest by way of Cashtown, guarded by Iniboden. 
The great number of the wagons exposed them, while 
passing through the mountains, to the attacks of the 
Union cavalry ; yet they succeeded in reaching VVil- 
liamsport without serious loss. At that place they 
were attacked on the 6th, but the assault was repelled 
by Imboden, and detachments of Meade's cavalry were 
subsequently defeated by Stuart, and pursued for several 
miles in the direction of Boonesborough. The Union 
army crossed the South Mountain on the 9th, and 
Meade then established his headquarters at Antietam 
Bridge. 

The discomfited army, with its immense train of 
wagons and ambulances, halted at Williamsport and 
threw up entrenchments and batteries to guard the po- 
sition. The Union troops lay in force barely two miles 
off, but did not venture to attack. Meade, acting on 
the advice of his generals, decided to await reinforce- 
ments. Late on July 13, the movement into Virginia 
commenced. The Union cavalry made a spirited dash 
at the Confederate rear-guard, which was covering the 
approaches to the bridge ; but the assailants were driven 
back with considerable loss, and by one p. m. the whole 
of Lee's army was again in the Old Dominion. 

Thus ended the second invasion of Maryland and 
Pennsylvania. It had entailed a loss of at least 50,000 
men, if both armies are taken into the account ; and it 
had been unproductive of the slightest good to the 
Confederate cause, while it made still more apparent the 
ever-increasing power of the Union Government, and 
its ability to encounter the Southerners wherever they 
dared to show their flag. The effect of this battle was 
to put an end to the idea of a Northern invasion. 



CHAPTER V. 

ViCKSBURG AND THE OPERATIONS IN THE WeST (1863). 

The reduction of Vicksburg was determined upon, 
and no pains were spared to bring about the result. 
Grant resolved on cutting off all communication with 
the east by turning the defences on the Mississippi and 
the Yazoo. His headquarters were at Milliken's Bend, 
on the western shore of the Mississippi — the shore op- 
posite to that on which Vicksburg stands ; and on 
March 29 McClernand was sent to occupy New Car- 
thage, some miles to the south. These operations were 
assisted by the advance of Banks from New Orleans, so 
as to threaten Port Hudson in combination with the 
fleet. The movements of Banks and of the ships were 
impeded by the burning of bridges and the placing of 
obstructions in the river. Banks passed into a region 
west of the Mississippi called Bayou Teche. Con- 
stantly driving the enemy before him, he advanced, on 
April 20, to Opelousas, a town lying about 180 miles to 
the northwest of New Orleans ; after which he estab- 
lished himself for a (cw weeks at Simmsport. The Red 
River, another tributary of the great stream, which it en- 
ters between Port Hudson and Natchez, was blockaded 
by Farragut after he had succeeded in passing the river- 
batteries with two of his vessels. Porter, who was still 
above Vicksburg, made frequent attempts to join his 
comrade, but for a long time without success. On the 
(192) 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 



193 



night of April 16, however, the feat was accomplished 
by an act of great boldness and resolution. 

During that day eight gunboats, three transports and 
several barges laden with supplies, tried to descend the 
Mississippi after dark. The movement was watched in 
breathless silence by the Union troops stationed about 
the town, and the passage of the huge, dim, almost 
shapeless vessels through the wide obscurity was most 
impressive in its stealthy mystery and lurking possibilities 
of harm. Silently and darkly they passed on, and drew 
near to Vicksburg. Nearly an hour elapsed without any- 
thing being heard ; then, two bright, sharp lines of flame 
pierced the darkness, and in another moment the whole 
length of the heights was ablaze. The forts had 
opened fire on the vessels ; the vessels were not long in 
replying to the forts. It was a part of Porter's plan 
that his fleet of gunboats, when in front of the batteries, 
should engage them with their broadside guns, and 
then endeavor to descend the stream under cover of the 
smoke. The batteries, however, had been the first to 
fire. Presently all down the river the bristling guns of 
the Confederates poured forth flame, and smoke, and 
storm of deadly missiles; and the roar and rush of 
sound added another terror to the fierce encounter. 
The passage of the fleet was visible in gliding fire, as 
point after point was reached, and battery after battery 
replied to the moving gunboats. 

After the cannonade had gone on for some time, a 
gleam of light, different from that of the guns, spread 
upward into the heavens immediately above the city. 
This grew and intensified every moment, passing from 
pallor to redness, and at last glaring upon the night with 
such fulness and power that the Union on-lookers ex- 
claimed, "Vicksburg is on fire ! " But the light pro- 
ceeded from a beacon-pile, which had been kindled in 
order to illuminate both reaches of the river (at that 



194 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



point curving with a rapid bend), and thus to enable 
the gunners to aim with greater accuracy at the Union 
vessels. The flame burned steadily and keenly, without 
any smoke, and served its purpose well ; but it also 
helped the gunboats to reach the batteries with more 
certainty than they could have done in the dark. The 
vessels were still pursuing their way down the river, 
but the artillery duel continued with the utmost fury. 
It was a duel in which the boats necessarily had the 
worst of it. The Forest Queen, one of the transports, 
received a shot in the hull and another through the 
steam-drum, which at once disabled her. In conse- 
quence of this accident the Hefiry Clay, another trans- 
port, which came next, was stopped, to prevent her run- 
ning into her unfortunate comrade. The result was dis- 
astrous. The crew of the second vessel became 
alarmed by the stoppage, which left them exposed to 
the unmitigated force of the Confederate fire; and in a 
little while they launched the yawl, sprang into it, and 
made for the shore. Shortly afterwards the Henry Clay 
caught fire, owing to the explosion of a shell amid the 
cotton with which the engines were protected, and, 
giving out great volumes of smoke and flame, floated 
down the stream until it disappeared below Warrenton. 
The Forest Queen was taken in tow by a gunboat, and 
escaped without further injury ; while the third trans- 
port, the Sik'er IFaz'e, ran past without being touched. 
Before the approach of dawn, the whole of the gun- 
boats had got beyond the uttermost batteries without 
any material damage. On the Benton, Porter's flagship, 
one man was killed, and two were wounded, by the 
bursting of a shell; but this was the utmost injury to 
life. The great exploit had been accomplished, and 
Porter was now safe in the waters below Vicksburg. 

Grant was so well satisfied with what had taken 
place that he ordered six more transports to be pre- 



196 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



pared to run the batteries in the same manner. These 
were to carry supplies for the army, which it was hoped 
would soon be engaged in an attack on the southern side 
of Vicksburg, and ultimately to convey the army itself 
across the river. These six vessels, towing 12 barges, 
set out on the night of April 22, and all but one suc- 
ceeded in getting past the batteries, though six of the 
barges were either sunk or injured. By this time. Grant 
had arrived with two army corps, at New Carthage, 
where Porter's gunboats were stationed. He had been 
compelled to follow a very circuitous route, and to make 
his way through a country rendered peculiarly difficult 
by marshes and streams ; but the obstacles were all 
overcome after much delay, and he was in a favorable 
locality for ulterior operations. A few days later he 
moved his forces still farther south to a place called 
Hard Times, lying on the Louisiana shore of the Mis- 
sissippi, and thus took up a position just opposite Grand 
Gulf, which is situated a little below the mouth of the 
Rig Black River. It was essential to Grant's plans that 
Grand Gulf (which was strongly fortified) should be 
quickly taken ; and he had repeatedly instructed McCler- 
nand, when at New Carthage, to make the attempt. Mc- 
Clernand always hesitated, making perpetual excuses for 
his delay; and Grant, seeing that the opportunity was 
slipping away, went to the front himself and took im- 
mediate command. His vigilance during the whole of 
these operations was very remarkable. 

On April 29 Grant embarked a portion of his army 
on board the transports and moved to the front of Grand 
Gulf His scheme was that the gunboats under Porter 
should silence the fortifications, and that the troops 
should then land, under cover of the gunboats, and 
carry the place by storm. The attack from the river 
began early in the morning, and la.sted nearly six 
hours, at the end of which time Porter had silenced the 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 



197 



lower batteries. The upper battery, however, being 
high, strongly built, and mounted with guns of a very 
heavy calibre, was able to maintain its fire. Grant, 
finding that the enemy's works could not be entirely 
neutralized, and fearing to risk the lives of his men in 
an attempt to storm them, determined to land lower 
down the stream, and take the position in reverse. The 
army was disembarked, and ordered to march down the 
western side of the Mississippi, and be ready for cross- 
ing opposite Bruinsburg. The transports were to run 
past the batteries at Grand Gulf, and to take up posi- 
tions such as would enable them to ferry the troops 
across. As soon as it was dark, the gunboats again 
engaged the batteries, and all the transports got by 
without much injury. Next morning, the soldiers em- 
barked, and the 13th corps landed on the eastern bank 
of the river, and was pushed forward towards Port Gib- 
son, situated near the Bayou Pierre, and connected with 
Grand Gulf by a railway. These troops were followed 
by others ; but no action took place that day. 

The position of Pemberton, who commanded at 
Vicksburg, was becoming grave. He telegraphed for 
instructions to Johnston, and was ordered to attack 
Grant at once. Johnston was not able to send any re- 
inforcements, being himself closely pressed by Rose- 
crans in Tennessee. Pemberton was therefore obliged 
to do the best he could with the troops at his disposal, 
and he directed General Bowen, commanding at Grand 
Gulf, to cross the Bayou Pierre, and oppose the march 
of the Union troops to Port Gibson. At two on the 
morning of May i, Bowen's division was encountered 
four miles south of the latter place. A hotly-contested 
action followed, and at the close of the day the Confed- 
erates were driven towards Port Gibson. The country 
was so cut up by ravines, swamps, cancbrakes, and 
jungles, that very little generalship could be exhibited 



198 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



on either side ; but the hand-to-hand fighting was 
furious, and strewed the dismal, solitary ways with the 
bodies of the fallen. Grant was in personal command 
shortly after the action began. Fresh divisions con- 
tinued to arrive throughout the combat, and they were 
able to advance in force on the morning of the 2d, 
when it was found that the Southerners had retreated 
across the two forks of the Bayou Pierre, on the road 
to Grand Gulf, and had burned the bridges behind 
them. So hurried was Bowen that, in retreating, he 
abandoned his hospitals and many of his wounded. A 
brigade of Logan's division was sent forward on the 2d, 
to occupy the attention of the Confederates while a 
floating bridge was being thrown across the south fork 
of the bayou at Port Gibson ; and, on the bridge being 
completed, McPherson's corps got over, and pushed on 
to the north fork, eight miles off Here, the bridge at 
the Grindstone Ford was found still burning ; but the 
fire was extinguished, and the bridge repaired in the 
night. Early next morning the troops passed over, and 
the Southerners were pursued to Hankinson's Ferry, on 
the Big Black River. Skirmishing continued during 
the whole day, and many prisoners were brought in ; 
but the fighting in itself was not important. Neverthe- 
less, the Union successes were such as to make their 
adversaries doubt the possibility of defending Grand 
Gulf They accordingly evacuated the position, and 
Porter, on making a demonstration during the 3d, dis- 
covered that he had no enemy to encounter. 

Grant rode into the town and found Porter's naval force 
in possession. The place was one of great strength, 
and was in course of being made still stronger. The 
Confederates, however, considered it advisable to con- 
centrate their forces atVicksburg; but before leaving 
Grand Gulf they blew up their magazines, and buried or 
spiked their cannon. Pcniberton said that Grant's 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 



199 



movements were so rapid, and his facilities for trans- 
portation so great, that his own actions had been 
seriously embarrassed in consequence. He had been 
unable to withdraw his heavy guns, and thirteen pieces 
fell into the hands of the conquerors. The Union base 
of operations was now transferred to Grand Gulf For 
three days, Grant had not been in bed, nor had his 
clothes off; but his energy continued unabated, and he 
wrote to his subordinate commanders at distant points, 
giving them minute instructions as to what they should 
do. To Sherman he stated that the road to Vicksburg 
was open, and that that fortified position would shortly 
fall into his hands. 

When the major part of the Union army moved from 
Milliken's Bend, Sherman was ordered to make a dem- 
onstration against Haines's Bluff, in order to prevent 
reinforcements leaving Vicksburg for Grand Gulf 
Sherman crossed the Mississippi, landed his forces on 
the left bank of the Yazoo, and, with the aid of the 
gunboats, made an attack on the position on May 6. 
It was no part of his design to take the bluff, and on 
the 7th the expedition returned. The Confederates 
had been prevented from sending reinforcements to the 
south, and the divisions under Sherman now prepared 
for joining Grant, who intended to collect his forces at 
Grand Gulf, and to concentrate at that spot a large sup- 
ply of provisions and ordnance stores before moving 
against Vicksburg. An army-corps was then to be de- 
tached, to co-operate with Banks against Port Hudson, 
and ultimately a recombination of the forces was to be 
effected ; but as Banks could not return to Baton Rouge, 
from his position west of the Mississippi, before the 
lOth, Grant was compelled to abandon this portion of 
his scheme. Delay might have wholly ruined his 
chances of success. Troops were to be sent to Jackson 
by Beauregard ; and it was therefore essential that 



200 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

Grant should act with promptitude, so as to strike while 
the adversary was at his weakest. He determined to 
anticipate the arrival of the Confederates at Jackson by 
attacking that town himself The campaign was being 
managed by a master, and all the collateral arrange- 
ments conspired to a happy issue. A cavalry expedi- 
tion in the rear of Vicksburg, pursued during the month 
of April by Colonel B. H. Grierson, was of great service 
in destroying the enemy's lines of communication, and 
preventing the early concentration of reinforcements at 
the chief Confederate position. Grierson was in com- 
mand of the first cavalry brigade of Grant's army, and 
the descent into Mississippi was an idea originating 
with himself At the head of three regiments, he left 
La Grange, close to the southern frontiers of Tennessee, 
on April 17, and crossing the Tallahatchie, moved 
southward until he struck the Macon and Corinth Rail- 
way. He tore up the rails, cut the telegraph-wires, 
burned the stores, and sent out detachments in various 
directions. When these had executed their several 
purposes, all tending to the distraction of the enemy, 
and to the harassing of his lines of communication, the 
force was once more concentrated, and resumed its 
principal march. Grierson now turned towards the 
south-west, seized the bridge over the Pearl River, and 
burned a number of locomotives on the Jackson and 
New Orleans Railway. He next moved along the line 
of that rail in a southerly direction, crossing many 
streams, and making his way with difficulty through 
swamps and marshes. On May 2, he entered Baton 
Rouge, then in possession of the Union troops, who 
were astonished at the feat that had been performed by 
those jaded and wayworn men. The whole of this 
great ride had been accomplished in not much more 
than a fortnight, and in the course of that brief interval 
several towns had been attacked, many spirited skir- 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 2OI 

mishes had been fought, numerous prisoners had been 
seized, and Confederate supplies to a large amount had 
been destroyed. 

Sherman's corps having arrived at Hankinson's Ferry 
by the 7th, an advance was ordered by Grant. The 
united army moved up the eastern bank of the Big 
Black River ; McClernand's corps on the right, McPher- 
son's on the left, and Sherman's in the rear. All the 
ferries were closely guarded against surprise until the 
troops had got well on their road. McClernand 
marched on Raymond, a small town 18 miles south-west 
of Jackson, and connected by a branch line with the 
Jackson and Vicksburg Railway, Here his progress was 
disputed by two Confederate brigades, with whom a 
brisk engagement took place on the 12th. The action 
resulted in the defeat of the Southern troops, and the 
Union forces entered the town. On the same day, Mc- 
Pherson's and Sherman's corps encountered the enemy 
near Fourteen Mile Creek, across which they succeeded 
in forcing a passage. Grant now received information 
that Johnston had arrived at Jackson, at the head of a 
force with which he hoped to relieve Vicksburg. Grant 
determined to make sure of the former place, and to 
leave no enemy in his rear. On the 13th, McPherson 
was ordered to move on Clinton. Occupying the town, 
he destroyed the railways and telegraphic wires. Mc- 
Pherson and Sherman advanced towards Jackson on the 
14th, and an action took place in front of that town. 
The Confederates occupied a strong position on the crest 
of a hill, but, after a fierce encounter, were driven back 
towards the city, which they shortly afterwards evac- 
uated. Jackson was then entered by McPherson, who 
found the place deserted and the stores on fire. Johns- 
ton had not been in sufficient force to defend the posi- 
tion, and he, therefore, retired to the north. 

Shortly after arriving at Jackson, Grant learned, from 



202 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

intercepted despatches, that Johnston had ordered Pem- 
berton to march out from Vicksburg, and attack the 
Union rear. Grant resolved to meet any such attack 
by advancing towards the enemy, and intercepting him 
on the hne of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railway ; 
but, for the present, Sherman was left at Jackson, to 
destroy the railway, bridges, factories, workshops, and 
arsenals, the obliteration of which was considered neces- 
sary, as Grant had no intention of holding the place, 
and feared it might become a base of operations for 
Johnston while he himself was besieging Vicksburg. 
The orders were carried out with unfaltering severity 
on the 15th, and very little was left of the town after 
the torch was once applied. 

By this time, Pemberton had crossed the Big Black 
River ; and Grant ordered Sherman to evacuate Jack- 
son, and join the rest of the forces. Pemberton was at 
the head of nearly i8,000 men, whom he posted on the 
south-west bank of Baker's Creek, across the Vicksburg 
and Jackson Railway. On the morning of the i6th. 
Grant's army was a good deal scattered. Three divi- 
sions were on the line of the railway; four were advanc- 
ing on the road from Raymond; one was still farther to 
the left on the Big Black River, and two were under 
Sherman in the neighborhood of Jackson. The Con- 
federates held a good position among woody hills, and 
Grant had come upon them sooner than he expected. 
Seeing the gravity of the situation, he sent orders to 
the three divisions approaching from Ra^miond to 
quicken their march as much as possible. The action, 
however (which has received the title of the battle of 
Champion's Hill), had proceeded some time before 
these reinforcements could reach the ground. The 
division of General Hovey, which had begun the battle 
by attacking the center of Pemberton's line, was 
repulsed with some loss, but was again sent forward by 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 203 

Grant, on his being told by Logan, commanding on the 
right, that, if the Confederates could be again attacked 
in front, he could act with advantage against their left 
flank. The renewed advance was attended by tem- 
porary success, but after a while Plovey's division 
was once more driven back and thrown into disorder. 
The divisions from Raymond, however, had now 
arrived, and the whole line swept onward against the 
Confederates. The southern forces were completely 
shattered ; panic set in among their ranks, and a 
precipitate flight ensued. Their defeat had been 
rendered still more extreme by Logan's operations 
against the left and rear, which distracted their atten- 
tion and divided their strength. Thus assailed in three 
direction^ at once, the Southern line was broken into 
fragments ; the regiments became mingled in tumultu- 
ous rout and for a time all military order was at an 
end. Some degree of discipline was afterwards restored 
by the exertions of the principal officers ; but the 
fortunes of the day could not be retrieved. The 
greater portion of the army retired towards the Big 
Black River; but one division was cut off from the rest, 
and compelled, with the loss of its artillery, to withdraw 
in a different direction. 

On finding the Confederates in full retreat, Grant 
ordered Carr to pursue them with the utmost speed to 
Big Black River, and to cross that stream if he could. 
The movement continued until after dark, and stores to 
a large amount were captured ; but the retreating 
columns were not overtaken. The bridge across the 
river was strongly guarded by the Southerners, who 
presented so formidable a front of artillery and infontry 
that the Union forces considered it prudent not to push 
their advantage any farther for the present. The 
pursuit was renewed early next morning when the 
enemy was found strongly posted on both sides of the 



204 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



Big Black River, at a point where the bluffs on the 
west side extend to the water's edge. On the east side 
the land was open and cultivated, surrounded by a 
bayou of stagnant water, and protected by a line of 
rifle-pits, to which the bayou served as a species of 
external ditch. This difficult position was at once 
attacked by the Union troops, who afterwards discovered 
that by moving under cover of the river-bank they 
could gain a position from which the enemy might be 
successfully assaulted. The attempt was made ; the 
ditch was passed, and in a few minutes the entire gar- 
rison laid down their arms, and surrendered 17 pieces 
of artillery with which the works had been defended. 
On the 1 8th, Sherman crossed the river, and after a 
brief rest, began his march on Vicksburg by. the road 
from Bridgeport. When within three miles of the great 
object of attack, he turned to the right, in order to 
obtain possession of Walnut Hills and the Yazoo River. 
This accomplished he occupied a strong position to the 
north of Vicksburg, and the other corps, on arriving, 
placed themselves so as nearly to surround the town 
and its fortifications. In the meanwhile, Porter, from 
his station in the Mississippi, had been anxiously look- 
ing out for the approach of Grant's army. About noon 
on the 1 8th, firing was heard by him in the rear of 
Vicksburg. The cannonading continued for some 
time, and by the aid of a telescope he discovered a 
company of artillery advancing, taking position, and 
driving the Confederates before them. Sherman's divi- 
sion had got to the left of Snyder's Bluff, and the 
Southerners at that place had been cut off from joining 
the forces in the city. Porter accordingly sent a num- 
ber of gunboats up the Yazoo, to open communications 
with Grant and Sherman. The vessels and the troops 
arrived at Haines's Bluff about the same time, and 
found that the works had been evacuated, and the 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 



205 



place abandoned. The garrison had withdrawn within 
the h'nes of Viclvsburg. Porter described the works at 
Haines's Bluff as very formidable. Such a network of 
forts, he declared, he had never seen before, and the 
guns were supplied with ammunition enough to last a 
long siege. Fearing that the position might again fall 
into the enemy's hands, he burned the gun-carriages, 
blew up the magazine, and destroyed the works 
generally. 

After receiving intelligence of the defeat at Baker's 
Creek, Johnston had ordered Pemberton, in the event 
of his being unable to hold Haines's Bluff, to evacuate 
Vicksburg, and to form a junction with his own army, 
which was stationed at Canton, some way to the north 
of Jackson. These orders it was now impossible to 
execute, because of the positions assumed by the Union 
army. Pemberton was in fact completely shut up in 
Vicksburg, and the position was rendered desperate by 
his having only sixty days' provisions with which to 
feed his troops and the inhabitants of the town. John- 
ston made endeavors to bring together a sufficient force 
to relieve his comrade, and to break up the Union 
investment; but this was no easy task, for the Confed- 
erates in that part of the country were nearly exhausted, 
and the Union forces were strong, not only in numbers, 
but in the consciousness of success. Pemberton's men, 
however, did not yet despair. The works were 
strengthened wherever they seemed weak, and the 
fortifications were manned by soldiers who were at least 
determined that any further triumph should be dearly 
purchased. Fearing that he might be attacked in his 
rear by Johnston, Grant resolved to assault the position 
at once. At two a. m. on May 19, the 15th army-corps 
advanced to the attack, followed by the 13th and 17th 
corps. The ground over which these troops had to 
move presented many obstacles not easy to overcome. 



2o6 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

The clay soil had been rendered muddy by the over- 
flowing of streams, and was covered with a dense forest. 
Rugged chasms frequently intervened, and a large 
amount of timber had been felled by the Confederates 
to obstruct the progress of any attacking force. The 
difficulties of the way prevented the assaulting parties 
from reaching the trenches in good military form. A 
body of infantry, however, got up to the external 
works, and planted the national colors upon the slope ; 
but inmicdiatcly afterwards the commander, Captain 
Wasiiington, was mortally wounded, and 77 out of 250 
men were either wounded or killed. The troops 
maintained their position during the whole day, keep- 
ing up a sharp fire on the defenders of Vicksburg, who 
replied with equal spirit ; but the attempt was not suc- 
cessful, and after nightfall a retreat was ordered. 

The enterprise was renewed on the 22d. This 
time the attack was to extend along the whole line, and 
all the commanders of corps set their watches by 
Grant's, so that the movement should be absolutely 
simultaneous. At ten A. M. the three army-corps then 
in front of the Confederate works commenced the 
assault. Again was no small degree of gallantry 
exhibited ; again were Union flags planted on the outer 
slopes of the bastions ; again did the troops remain in 
their exposed positions till nightfall ; but the attack was 
no more successful than that which had gone before. 
The best soldiers in the Union army flung themselves 
repeatedly against the Confederate works, and were as 
often driven back with grievous loss. For a moment 
they gained a footing in the rifle-pits, but were swept 
out of them by the fierce recoil of the Southerners. 
Their fire was rapid and deadly throughout, and the 
assailants suffered a loss of 2,500 men before they 
retreated to their lines. 

During the attack, Porter had engaged the defences on 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 20/ 

the river, and had thrown shells into the town from his 
mortar-boats. The river-forts, however, replied with so 
much effect that Porter received more damage than he 
inflicted. Several of his vessels were struck below the 
water-line, and the whole fleet dropped down the river, 
and got beyond the range of fire. Although the at- 
tempt to carry the defences had been unsuccessful, the 
people of Vicksburg had all that day endured the 
utmost anxiety and alarm. They had excavated caves 
in the hill on which the city stands, and here they hid 
themselves during the height of the bombardment, 
expecting every moment that the enemy would burst his 
way into the heart of the town. By the close of 
the day, their apprehensions were for a time re- 
lieved ; but next morning the bombardment re- 
commenced, and for six weeks a devastating storm 
of shot and shell was hurled into the place. Still, the 
casualties were not numerous, and people in time grew 
familiar with the appearance of the bursting shells, and 
regarded them with more of curiosity than fear. After 
the 26th the firing on the town continued day and 
night, and it was estimated at Vicksburg that 6,000 
mortar-shells were thrown into the town every 24 hours, 
and 4,000 on the line in the rear of the city. The month 
of June was rainy, and the civilians were compelled by 
the influx of water to abandon the caves in which they 
had for some weeks shrouded themselves. In addition 
to their other sufferings, the prospect of famine now be- 
came imminent. For five days after the commence- 
ment of the siege, the troops had been allowed full 
rations ; but the daily amount of food for each man 
was reduced. By the middle of June, Grant's army 
had been reinforced, and this enabled him to make his 
investment more complete, and at the same time to ap- 
point a large reserve for watching the movements of 
Johnston. Haines's Bluff was now fortified on the land 



208 THE BATTLES FOR 7 HE UNION. 

side, and preparations were made for resisting any de- 
tachment which might come to the rehef of Vicksburg. 
Sherman was placed in command of all the troops 
designated to look after Johnston, who on June 25 
crossed the Big Black River with a portion of his force. 
Grant's army was by this time strongly entrenched, 
and Johnston hesitated to attack it. The siege con- 
tinued in regular form. Parallels and approaches were 
constructed, and mines were sunk; everyday the deadly 
coil of the attacking force grew closer and more strict 
in its embrace ; and at length the Union works were 
pushed so near the walls that the sharpshooters on the 
opposing sides were within 20 yards of one another, and 
the contending batteries not more than 300 yards apart. 
Some feeble and desultory attempts to reach Vicks- 
burg were made by the Confederates in various out- 
lying localities ; but Grant's stubborn grip was not to 
be shaken off A heavy mine was fired by the Union 
troops on June 25. This mine, which was excavated 
in the cliff on which one of the forts had been erected, 
extended 35 feet from the point of starting; and 1500 
pounds of powder were deposited in three branch 
mines, together with 700 in the center one. Fuses 
were arranged so as to explode them all simultaneously, 
and troops were held in readiness for ulterior opera- 
tions. A severe artillery fire having been opened along 
the line, so as to distract the attention of the besieged, 
the mine was fired, and the ground was rent as if by 
an earthquake. A red glare burst forth, and a few 
rebel soldiers were hurled into the air; but the South- 
erners had detected the making of the mine, and had 
withdrawn most of their troops beyond the reach of 
harm. The cavity thus produced was large enough to 
hold two regiments; and before the smoke had cleared 
away, a column of Union infantry, which had laid con- 
cealed in a hollow near the fort, rushed forward into 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 



209 



the breach with loud and repeated cheers. These de- 
voted men were met by a number of Southerners of 
equal gallantry, and a desperate fight took place within 
the crater which the explosion had torn in the earth. 
Hand grenades were used by both sets of combatants, 
and the gunners in the rear joined in this infernal con- 
flict, even at the risk of killing their own men. With 
quiet determination, the Confederates erected a new line 
of breastworks inside the gap, so that the Union troops 
were unable to force their way into the town. Never- 
theless, they did not give up the favorable position 
they had won, and, on the night succeeding the ex- 
plosion, fresh troops relieved their predecessors in the 
difficult and perilous task of holding the chasm. The 
sanguinary struggle was prolonged during the whole 
of that night ; for, although the Southerners had re- 
tired out of view, they continued, from a distance, to 
throw grenades into the attacking force. The crater 
was called by the soldiers " the death-hole ; " yet the 
Union men desperately clung to the ground, and the 
next day constructed a line of rifle-pits across the aper- 
ture. A covered gallery was also commenced, from 
which further mines could be made to open out, and 
one of these was sprung on July i, causing the demoli- 
tion of an entire redan. 

The condition of the city and of its inhabitants was 
fast becoming desperate. Provisions were extremely 
scarce ; the flesh of mules and dogs was eaten by all 
classes, for meat of any other kind was hardly to be 
obtained. Bean-meal was made into bread, and corn- 
meal served in place of coffee. The soldiers were 
almost worn out by constant duty in the trenches; the 
weather was hot and oppressive, and the numerous un- 
buried corpses infected the air with horror. Scarcely 
a buikiing in the town had escaped the Union shells ; 
even the hospitals were occasionally struck, though of 
14 



2IO ^'-^^-^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

course not intentionally. Fodder was exhausted, and 
the horses were reduced to subsist wholly on corn-tops. 
Pemberton was able to communicate now and then 
with Johnston, and repeatedly implored relief; but 
Johnston's forces were not strong enough to encounter 
the serried ranks of Grant, and every day brought 
nearer the inevitable catastrophe. Grant felt assured 
that the fall ofVicksburg was certain, and it had be- 
come evident to the Confederates themselves that this 
was the case. Sherman was informed that another as- 
sault on Vicksburg would be made at daybreak on 
July 6, but the necessity for any such attempt was re- 
moved by the action of the besieged themselves. 

Early on the morning of July 3, a flag of truce was 
seen on the crest of a hill outside the town. A mes- 
senger was sent to bring in the bearers of the flag. 
They carried a despatch from Pemberton to Grant, in 
which proposals were made for an armistice, with a view 
to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. 
Pemberton said he made this proposition to save fur- 
ther effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed 
to a frightful extent, but added that he felt himself fully 
able to maintain his position for a period still indefinite. 
Grant declined to appoint commissioners, because he 
would consider no other terms than an unconditional 
surrender of the city and garrison. An interview sub- 
sequently took place between Grant and Pemberton. 
The scene was an orchard, midway between the con- 
tending forces. Grant said he would put his proposi- 
tions into writing, and after some interchange of notes, 
it was agreed that the garrison should be paroled, and 
allowed to return to their homes, not to serve again 
until properly exchanged, and that the town, stores, 
arms and trophies should become the prize of the 
victors. The negotiations were concluded on the 4th 
of July — the great historical day now rendered more 



THE ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 



211 



illustrious by the surrender of a fortified city for the 
possession of which both sections had for two years 
fought with equal valor, devotion and military skill. 
Grant had receded from his demand of unconditional 
capitulation ; but in his report he said that this altera- 
tion saved the Government the trouble of sending the 
garrison all the way to the North, while it left the 





r,f:i>W -^-,-15?^.' M.^-^ .f^T~^^^^±m ^ _:^, y^ 










INTERVIEW BETWEEN GRANT AND PEMBERTON. 



Union troops free to operate against Johnston. At lo 
o'clock on the 4th, the Confederates marched out, and 
stacked arms in front of their works; after which the 
city was occupied by three divisions of the Union 
troops. At night, fireworks were let off; but this was 
done in celebration, not of the victory, but of Inde- 
pendence Day. By the surrender of Vicksburg, the 
Confederates lost the services of nearly 27,000 men, 



212 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

including three major-generals and nine brigadiers, 
with upwards of ninety pieces of artillery, and about 
40,000 small-arms. During the whole of the campaign. 
Grant had captured 37,000 prisoners, including 15 
general officers; and arms and munitions of war for 
60,000 men had fallen into his hands. Equally impor- 
tant was the command which the Union forces had in 
this way obtained over the great Mississippi River, which 
enabled them to divide the Confederate States into two 
distinct portions — that to the east and that to the west 
of the stream — and to render it very difficult for either 
to give assistance to the other. The fall of Vicksburg 
was lamented all over the South as a weighty misfor- 
tune; and certain it was that the Confederate cause 
was materially weakened by Grant's splendid success. 
After the capture of this great stronghold. Grant re- 
ported that his troops were so much fatigued as to 
require several weeks' rest before undertaking another 
campaign. Those who were the least exhausted he 
sent out on various expeditions ; but the greater number 
remained at Vicksburg, the defences of which they 
strengthened against any movement which the Confed- 
erates might undertake. Sherman went in pursuit of 
Johnston, who was menacing the rear of the Union 
army ; and his operations were so vigorously carried 
out that Johnston evacuated Jackson on the night of 
July 16, and retreated towards the east. Grant had 
become the hero of the day. He had proved himself 
tiie best general that the North had yet produced, and 
the President wrote to him : — " I do not remember 
that you and I ever met personally. I write this now 
as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestima- 
ble service you have done the country." Grant after- 
wards left Vicksburg to assume the command east of 
the Mississippi, and McPherson then moved with a 
part of his force to Canton, where he scattered the 



THE SURRENDER OF PORT HUDSON. 213 

Confederate cavalry, destroyed a large amount of ma- 
terial, and broke up all the roads by which the enemy 
might annoy the Northern forces. 

The tide of success was now running completely in 
favor of the Northern men, and the capture of Port 
Hudson on the Mississippi was an event second in im- 
j)()rtance only to that of Vicksburg. Banks quitted 
Simmsport about the middle of May, and, having crossed 
to the eastern side of the Mississippi, advanced towards 
the object of his attack on the 22d. On the 25th, the 
defenders of Port Hudson, who were commanded by 
General Gardner, were driven from the outer works, and 
a powerful assault was made on the 27th. Banks had 
a large army with which to conduct his attack, and 
was assisted by a fleet of gunboats, wiiich bombarded 
the defences from the river. Gardner could not place 
more than 6,ooo men within his entrenchments, and the 
works, which had been hastily constructed, were fur- 
nished with but feeble artillery. Nevertheless, a suc- 
cessful resistance was offered to the attacking force; 
but the Union troops were in a position of such im- 
mense superiority that the capitulation of the city was 
only an affair of time. 

The assault of May 27 having failed. Banks com- 
menced the siege in regular form. Gardner was sum- 
moned to surrender on June 13, but replied by a 
refusal. Next day, another assault was delivered. 
Several storming parties were led against the works, 
and a few men even got within them ; but the sup- 
porting column did not arrive in time, and the assail- 
ants, falling back, lay down for hours in the cotton- 
furrows, as their only protection against the hail of 
bullets which came rushing out of the forts. Banks 
now resumed his siege operations, and the trenches 
were pushed forward still nearer to the walls. The 
garrison were getting short of provisions, and the 



214 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



probability of any succor arriving grew less with each 
succeeding day. When at length it came to Gardner's 
knowledge that Vicksburg had surrendered, he saw that 
further resistance would be altogether vain. The place 
was surrendered on July 9, and the Confederates were 
treated with kindness and consideration by their con- 
querors. Full possession of the Mississippi zuas noiv 
restored to the Union forces, who held possession of that 
magnificent stream from its source in Minnesota, down 
to its outfall in the Gulf of Mexico. The great bulk 
of the Confederacy was split in two, and through the 
rift the enormous forces of the Union could pass to and 
fro, dealing their bolts of death far to the right hand 
and to the left — to the west and to the east. 

To pursue their advantages in Tennessee was now 
one of the chief objects of the Union commanders. 
After the battle of Murfreesboro', at the beginning 
of the year, Rosecrans refrained for several months 
from any important operations. Detachments from his 
main body had several encounters with the enemy ; but 
for the most part the Union Army of the West main- 
tained an observant attitude. Early in June Rosecrans 
was requested to take measures for driving Bragg into 
Georgia, and thus securing Eastern Tennessee. It was 
believed that Bragg's ranks had been greatly weakened 
by the despatch of reinforcements to Johnston, in the 
neighborhood of Vicksburg ; and it was therefore 
thought that the time was singularly propitious for an 
advance. Rosecrans himself did not share this view. 
He represented that his army was not then prepared for 
a forward movement, and that his subordinates doubted 
the advisability of active operations until the fate of 
Vicksburg had been deterniined. Notwithstanding these 
opinions, Hallcck considered that something should be 
done, and expressed the dissatisfaction of the President 
with the inactivity that had so long prevailed. Influ- 



OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE. 



215 



enced by Halleck's representations, Rosecrans, on June 
24, commenced a series of movements from Murfrees- 
boro', for the purpose of forcing Bragg to retreat 
from his position on the Duck River. In this design 
he was successful. Some scattered actions occurred on 
various parts of the line, and Bragg, finding himself in 
danger of being outflanked by his adversary's occupa- 
tion of some of the mountain passes, retired to Chat- 
tanooga, on the south side of the Tennessee River, not 
far from the borders of Georgia and Alabama, though 
nearer to the former than the latter. The town was a 
place of some importance as a seat of industry, and as 
a meeting-point of several lines of rail ; and here Bragg 
determined to make a stand. He fortified his position, 
and constructed defensive works at the crossing of the 
river. His retreat had been much vexed by the Union 
cavalry, and his operations were hampered by the de- 
sertion of several of his men belonging to Tennessee, 
who, now that their State was about to be abandoned, 
considered, according to the true Southern view of Con- 
federate claims, that they had done everything which 
could in reason be demanded of them. But as soon as 
he had entrenched himself at Chattanooga, Bragg felt 
tolerably secure against attack. 

That Rosecrans might have every assistance in his 
movement against Bragg, Burnside was directed to 
march from the Ohio into Eastern Tennessee. Great 
slowness, however, continued to mark the proceedings 
of the Union troops, owing partly to the prevalence of 
heavy rains. On July 4 Bragg withdrew to Chattanooga ; 
it was not until August 16 that Rosecrans commenced 
his advance on that town, and that Burnside left Camp 
Nelson, in Kentucky, for the scene of his ulterior op- 
erations. The progress of Burnside was scarcely dis- 
puted by the Confederates, who retired before him, and 
united their small scattered forces with those of Bragg. 



2i6 ^^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

General Buckner was among the Confederate officers 
who retreated towards Chattanooga ; but two of his 
brigades were cut off from the main body. One of these 
held Cumberland Gap, and Jefferson Davis was greatly 
incensed at the readiness with which, on September 9, 
the position was yielded to two Union detachments, 
without a shot being fired in its defence. Cumberland 
Gap commands one of the principal roads from Ken- 
tucky into Tennessee, and its surrender exposed Eastern 
Tennessee and Southwestern Virginia to hostile inva- 
sion, besides breaking the line of communication be- 
tween the Confederate seat of government and the 
region where Bragg was desperately contending against 
superior odds. In his march through Eastern Ten- 
nessee, Burnside was received with enthusiasm, and the 
populace displayed their attachment to the old Union 
and the old flag. The inhabitants of that mountainous 
land had never been well-affected to the Confederacy, 
and Burnside was hailed as a deliverer wherever his 
forces penetrated. 

The delay in Burnside's march, caused by his turning 
aside to reduce the Confederate position in Cumberland 
Gap, prevented his joining Rosecrans as early as was 
desirable. In the meanwhile Bragg was receiving rein- 
forcements from the Army of the Mississippi, from Lee's 
Virginian Army, and from other sources, and was ulti- 
mately enabled to present a much more formidable front 
to his adversaries than would have been possible a 
short time before. The army under Rosecrans reached 
the northern bank of the Tennessee River, opposite 
Chattanooga, on August 20, and preparations for pass- 
ing the stream were completed by September 4, when a 
large part of the army crossed over to the southern 
shore, and threatened the communications of Bragg 
with the country in his rear. The position became un- 
tenable, and on the 7th it was abandoned. Chatta- 



OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE. 



217 



nooga was then occupied by a Union corps, and Bragg 
retreated to Lafayette, in Georgia. Here he concen- 
trated his divisions, and matured his plans for resisting 
the enemy. The forces of Rosecrans were now divided 
into three columns, widely separated from one another 
by the defiles of a mountainous region, extending in a 
south-westerly direction from the southern side of the 
Tennessee River 
towards Alabama. 
Rosecrans sup- 
posed the enemy 
to be weaker than 
he really was, and 
that he might safe- 
ly advance in loose 
order against a fly- 
ing foe. Bragg 
considered that he 
could attack these ■ 
scattered bodies in 
detail, and thus 
secure a series of 
victories, such as 
would have been 
utterly beyond his 
reach had the sev- 
eral corps been united. But he was met by an un- 
expected degree of opposition in one of his subordi- 
nates. General D. B. Hill objected to making a for- 
ward movement against General Thomas, who was 
encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain, to the 
left of the Union advance; and the duty was conse- 
quently assigned to Buckner, in combination with Gen- 
eral Hindman. The movement resulted in failure. 
Owing to the dilatory proceedings of Hindman, Thomas 
had time to withdraw among the mountain-passes, and 




GENERAL BRAXTON PRAGG. 



2i8 '^^^E BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

by about the middle of the month the two other corps, 
under McCook and Crittenden, effected a junction with 
the one which had been so seriously menaced. Simul- 
taneously with the attack upon Thomas, Polk was to 
fall on Crittenden's corps, forming the center of the 
three advancing bodies ; but he was as unsuccessful 
as Hindman and Buckner, and on September i8, the 
whole of the Union army stood on the western bank 
of Chickamauga Creek. Not far to the east were the 
Confederates, and it was obvious to both sides that a 
general action must presently ensue. 

By this time, Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood 
and McLaws, had been despatched by Lee to the sup- 
port of Bragg, and the advanced brigades of the rein- 
forcement had already arrived, Rosecrans felt that his 
line was weak towards the left, and he feared lest he 
should be cut off from Chattanooga. He therefore, on 
the evening of the i8th, moved some of his divisions 
from the right to the opposite extremity, and next morn- 
ing the two armies were fronting one another in a nar- 
row valley formed by two lines of hills called Mission 
Ridge and Pigeon Mount — the former to the west, the 
latter to the east. Between the two uplands flowed 
Chickamauga Creek, which the Confederates had by 
this time crossed, so as to seek their enemy. The 
ground was uneven, and covered with oak-woods ; it 
therefore presented many opportunities for effective 
manoeuvering. The line of battle, roughly speaking, 
ran north and south ; the Union Forces facing towards 
the east, the Confederates towards the west. Bragg 
was desirous of executing the very movement which 
Rosecrans dreaded. He would gladly have interposed 
between his adversary and Chattanooga ; but Rose- 
crans thwarted any attempt of this nature by the change 
which he effected in his front. On the morning of the 
19th, Rosecrans brought on an engagement by moving 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



219 



forward a brigade of Thomas's corps, which attacked 
the Confederate right wing. The fighting soon became 
general ; a sanguinary and hotly-contested action 
strewed the field with dead and wounded ; and for awhile 
the Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them. 
When night put an end to the battle, however, the 
Southerners had been checked. Still, they were in 
advance of the 
morning's posi- 
tions, and had 
gained possession 
of the road to 
Chattanooga, be- 
sides having driv- 
en the Union forces 
about a mile west 
of Chickamauga 
Creek, almost to 
the foot of Mis- 
sion Ridge. 

Longstreet, the 
most eminent and 
capable of Lee's 
lieutenants.arrived 
at Bragg's head- 
quarters near 
midnight on the 
19th, together with 
placed in command 




GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK. 



an additional division, and was 
of the left wing. At the same 
same time, a fresh disposition of the forces was carried 
out by Bragg's directions, and it was ordered that the 
action should recommence at daybreak on the 20th, 
The night was an anxious one. Rosecrans was uneasy 
about his communications with Chattanooga, and, on 
the representations of Thomas, who conmianded in that 
direction, again transferred some of his troops from the 



220 ^-^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

right to the left. While this dangerous movement was 
in course of execution, the Confederates began their at- 
tack. It was now ten o'clock in the day, for owing to 
some error or negligence, the Southern troops had not 
opened fire at the early hour originally contemplated. 
The delay had enabled the Union troops to throw up 
breastworks, and to strengthen them by repeated addi- 
tions. Against these entrenchments the right wing of 
Bragg's army repeatedly hurled itself, but without any 
permanent gain. On the left of the line, however, 
Longstreet met with almost uniform success. His men 
rushed forward with fierce impetuosity, and interposed 
themselves between the two wings of the Union army, 
where the removal of the center, to strengthen the left, 
had created a wide gap. Operating in both directions 
at once, the Confederates, headed by Longstreet in 
person, struck confusion into the Union line. Several 
of the divisions were thrown into extreme disorder, and 
Rosecrans rode off to Chattanooga, to secure his supply- 
train, and his pontoon-bridges over the Tennessee 
River. At this critical moment, Hood, one of the 
bravest of the Southern Generals, fell severely wounded, 
and the Confederate advance was momentarily delayed 
while another commander was being put in his place. 
The Union forces now rallied ; reinforcements were con- 
centrated at the weak points ; and a fresh stand was 
made on the lower slopes of Mission Ridge. The day, 
however, was beyond retrieval. Advancing once more 
with fresh vigor, the right wing of the Confederates, 
under Polk, carried the opposing breastworks ; the left 
wing, after a brief repulse, also moved forward ; and the 
whole army retreated, but for the most part in such 
good order that Bragg thought it prudent to refrain 
from pursuit. Longstreet was desirous of following on 
the track', but his chief countermanded the orders he 
had eiven with that view. That the Union forces liad 



222 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

not been utterly routed, was due to the firmness with 
which Thomas clung to his position on the left, and to 
the promptitude with which Granger, on hearing heavy 
firing in the distance, sent up the reserves fi-om Ross- 
ville. Longstreet was the chief hero on the Confeder- 
ate side. In neither army did the principal commander 
greatly distinguish himself. 

The sacrifices on both sides had been very severe. 
It has been estimated that the Confederates lost I2,000 
men, and the Unions loss was i6,ooo. Bragg confessed 
that two-fifths of his army had been taken from him ; 
and on that side alone three Brigadier-Generals had 
been killed. The Union forces, however, were the great- 
est sufferers. Thirty-six of their guns were captured, 
and large quantities of small-arms were left behind upon 
the field. Rosecrans was considered to have exhibited so 
little generalship that he was shortly afterwards suc- 
ceeded by Thomas, while McCook, Crittenden, Negley, 
and Van Cleve, were suspended from their commands, 
that inquiry might be made into their conduct. Of 
the Confederate superior officers, the only one removed 
from the scene of the recent operations was Polk, who 
was thought to have acted with hesitation in the battle 
of the 20th. Much blame was thrown by the Southern 
public on Bragg himself, for not having completed a 
victory which had been so well begun ; but Davis re- 
fused to recognize these complaints. Even in removing 
Polk, he paid a high compliment to that officer for his 
past services, and promised him a speedy appointment 
to some new command. 

On quitting the banks of the Chickamauga, the 
Union corps retreated to Chattanooga, where they 
speedily entrenched themselves. On September 23, 
Bragg appeared before the Union lines, and, finding 
them too strong to be taken by assault, determined to 
invest the position. Attempts were made to cut off all 



THE UNION FORCES AT CHATTANOOGA. 



223 



the sources on which the Northerners depended for 
their daily needs ; but these endeavors were defeated by 
the activity of the Union cavalry, though the supply of 
food still remained a matter of great difficulty. The 
position of the army at Chattanooga threatened disas- 
trous results, if it could not be relieved ; and Halleck 
and the authorities at Washington saw in Grant the man 
most likely to cope with existing troubles. He was ac- 
cordingly appointed to the command of the West, and 
large bodies of troops were set in motion to provide 
him with the necessary means for acting decisively. 
The nth and 12th corps, under Hooker, were trans- 
ferred from the Army of the Potomac to that of Tennes- 
see. These two corps consisted of 23,000 men, who, 
together with their artillery, baggage, and animals, 
moved from the Rapidan, in Virginia, to Stevenson, in 
Alabama — a distance of 1,192 miles — in seven days, 
during which they crossed the Ohio twice. With the 
advance of autumn, several columns were converging 
on Chattanooga, to the relief of the Union forces; and 
Bragg's forces, though continuing to watch the im- 
prisoned enemy, could do little else. Burnside's opera- 
tions in Eastern Tennessee had prevented his joining 
Rosecrans in time to avert the catastrophe of Chicka- 
mauga ; and he was now withheld from marching to 
the succor of his comrades at Chattanooga by the oper- 
ations of a Confederate detachment. Yet Bragg either 
could not or would not make a direct attack on the 
Union position ; and, while every day brought rescue 
nearer to the Union forces, it rendered still more prob- 
lematical the chances of ultimate success on the part of 
their adversaries. Among those who were hurrying 
towards the invested city was Sherman, who started 
from Vicksburg, and advanced towards Athens, in Ala- 
bama, near the borders of Tennessee. He was now 
appointed to succeed Grant in the Tennessee Depart- 



224 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



merit, and, while at luka, Mississippi, on his route to 
Athens, was directed to march on to Bridgeport, a small 
town situated on the north side of the Tennessee River, 
24 miles to the west of Chattanooga. Thomas was by 
this time in the principal command at the beleaguered 
place ; and he was endeavoring to open a road along the 
southern bank of the Tennessee, so as to establish a con- 
nection between Hooker's force, which at the close of 
October had arrived at Bridgeport, and the main army. 
The base of the Union army was at Bridgeport and 
Stevenson (both in Alabama), and the regiments were 
supplied from depots at Nashville (in Tennessee and 
Kentucky) by a single line of rail. The southern side 
of the Tennessee River was in possession of the enemy, 
with the exception of Chattanooga and the surround- 
ing lines ; and the road on the north side was 
rendered impassable by the Confederate sharp- 
shooters, who fired across the stream. The Union forces 
were consequently obliged to bring all their supplies in 
a circuitous way from a distance of nearly 60 miles ; 
and it was therefore of the highest importance to 
open the river, and secure a .shorter communication 
with the military base. 

Hooker's arrival at Bridgeport relieved the troops at 
Chattanooga from any further anxiety about their sup- 
plies ; and, as we have seen, Sherman was on his way 
to the same point. Thomas now directed his principal 
engineer officer. General W. F. Smith, to seize the 
mouth of Lookout Valley, and the neighboring heights, 
on the southern side of the river (the side on which 
Chattanooga itself is situated), while Hooker crossed 
from Bridgeport, on the opposite bank. On the night 
of October 27 Smith descended the river in boats to 
Brown's Ferry, accompanied by infantry and engineers. 
Landing at the mouth of the valley early next morning, 
with but slight opposition from the enemy, he made 



GRANT AT CHATTANOOGA. 



225 



good his position in the contemplated spot, and im- 
mediately proceeded to construct a pontoon bridge, 
which, though 900 feet in length, was put together 
in five hours. During the day (the 28th) Hooker 
crossed the river at Bridgeport, and marched eastward, 
so as to join the force already in possession of the en- 
trance to Lookout Valley. This movement was known 
to the Confederates. Bragg and Longstreet observed 
its progress from the brow of Lookout Mountain, but 
at the moment refrained from attacking, lest a general 
action should be brought on with inconvenient precip- 
itancy. On the night of the 28th, Longstreet assailed 
a detachment of Hooker's Corps, which was separated 
from the rest on the western side of Lookout Creek ; 
but the attempt was unsuccessful, and the Confederates 
then abandoned the position to their opponents, and re- 
tired across the creek, leaving behind them a large 
number of dead and wounded. 

Bragg now determined to detach Longstreet against 
Burnside, who was occupying Knoxville and Kingston, 
in Eastern Tennessee. This, however, had the effect 
of weakening the Confederates before Chattanooga to 
so serious an extent that their position became ex- 
tremely hazardous. Grant, who had arrived at Chatta- 
nooga on the night of October 20, repeatedly and 
urgently telegraphed to Burnside to hold Knoxville at 
all costs, while he himself operated against Bragg. The 
railway from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry was speedily 
repaired by the Union troops, who being now in pos- 
session of both shores of the river, were in a far better 
position, in every respect, than those of the South, and 
Bragg, whose abilities were not of a shining order, had 
to deal with an adversary of very superior powers. 
Bragg's arrangements were indeed marked by ex- 
traordinary carelessness. His divisions were widely scat- 
tered, while the Union troops were adding to their 
15 



226 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

numbers and concentrating their forces at the most 
available points. Sherman reached Chattanooga on 
November 15, and was speedily instructed by Grant as 
to the part he was to assume in the attack which it was 
resolved to make with as little delay as possible. A 
division of his troops was to be marched to Trenton 
(west of Lookout Mountain), so as to threaten the 
enemy's left flank; and under cover of this movement 
the main body was to cross General W. F. Smith's 
pontoon-bridge at Brown's Ferry, and enter a concealed 
camp on the north side of the Tennessee River. Ulti- 
mately the troops were to be re-conveyed to the 
southern side of that stream, near the mouth of Chicka- 
mauga Creek, and to take up a position on the left of 
Grant's line of battle, while Hooker and Thomas 
operated in other directions against the Confederate 
masses. The arrangements were of a complicated 
character, and were designed to deceive and surprise 
the enemy. Over the frail causeway of the Brown's 
Ferry bridge, which had already been damaged by the 
rising waters of the river, and by rafts which the Con- 
federates had sent floating down the current, the men 
and horses of Sherman's corps advanced on the 23d 
from the southern to the northern shore, under heavy 
torrents of rain. When all but one division had got 
across, the bridge broke up; but, in the main, the first 
part of the operation had been accomplished. On the 
same day. Grant ordered Thomas to push forward a 
reconnoissance from tlie lines of Chattanooga. The 
result of this movement was that with but little fighting 
the Union troops captured some rifle-pits, and occupied a 
small hill between Chattanooga and Mission Ridge. Just 
before this event, Bragg had set in motion additional re- 
inforcements for Longstreet ; but they were recalled, on 
its becoming evident that the Union forces were about 
to undertake operations of a very menacing character. 



228 T^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

The arrival of Sherman's corps had raised Grant's 
army to nearly 90,000 men, while Bragg had only about 
half that number with which to defend his lines. Bragg 
felt the weakness of his position and the insufficiency 
of his resources. Perceiving how seriously his right 
was threatened, he drew off a whole division from his 
left on Lookout Mountain, while still retaining that 
position with a most inadequate force. On the morning 
of the 24th, his army was thinly distributed along an 
irregular line of 12 miles, reaching from the western 
slopes of Lookout Mountain to a point near the outfall 
of Chickamauga Creek into the river with which it 
blends. The fighting on that day was not considerable; 
yet the combined operations of the Union forces were 
such as to make Bragg still more sensible of the peril 
in which he stood. He evacuated Lookout Mountain 
after dark, relinquished theValley of Chattanooga, and re- 
formed his line of battle along Mission Ridge; his front 
directed nearly to the west, his right covering Chicka- 
mauga Station, and his left overlooking the little town of 
Rossville. The morning of tiie 25th was foggy ; but when 
the mists cleared off, the Confederates, from their high 
ground, beheld the dark masses of Sherman's corps 
(which had rccrossed the Tennessee on the previous 
day) advancing towards the extreme right, in the 
vicinity of Chickamauga Station. Against this attack- 
ing force a heavy fire of artillery was opened ; but 
the Union forces swept on, and presently attained 
the base of the ridge. Then the cannonade slack- 
ened, and the sharp rattle of musketry broke forth. 
Sherman's division was endeavoring to scale the steep 
and difficult ground occupied by the Confederate right 
wing, commanded by General Hardee. The attack was 
pressed with the utmost gallantry, and maintained for a 
full hour; hut the breastworks which the Southerners 
had erected were manned by stubborn troops, the in- 



MISSION RIDGE. 22Q 

cessant flash of whose rifles carried death into the Union 
ranks at every discharge. 

Sherman's men at last reeled back to the rear ; but 
Grant ordered the attack renewed. Again did those 
devoted soldiers move up to the assault. The ground 
in many parts was slippery with blood, and, rising sharp- 
ly towards the barricades, presented difiiculties of no 
ordinary kind; yet the breastworks were once more 
reached, in the face of a terrific fire, both of artillery 
and musketry. A 
desperate combat 
took place in front of 
the batteries ; but 
again the heroic 
masses of Sherman's 
corps were hurled 
back into the valley. 
Grant now directed a 
general movement on 
the left centre of the 
Confederates. Here 
also the opposition 
was most determined, 
and resulted in fear- 
ful carnage; but the 
weak point in the 
Confederate line had 

at length been struck. A whole brigade of Hindman's 
division gave way; the Union troops leaped into the 
trenches, and scattered their antagonists right and left ; 
and the routed line fell back towards Ringold, to the south- 
east of the Confederate position. Thousands of prisoners 
were taken, and munitions of war to a large amount fell 
into the conquerors' hands. Hooker started in pursuit, 
and on the 26th the Confederates retired from Ringold, 
after an unsuccessful attempt to hold that place. They 




GENERAL HARDEE. 



230 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNI OX. 



then took up a position on a line of hills called Taylor's 
Ridge, where they presented so menacing a front to 
their opponents that on the 27th Grant determined that 
the pursuit should not be pushed any farther, but that 
Hooker should remain at Ringold, while Sherman, at 
the head of a strong force, marched against Longstreet. 
By this time, Cleveland, lying to the east of Chattanooga, 
had been occupied by a portion of Sherman's com- 
mand, and the railway between that place and Dalton 
had been effectually destroyed, so as to prevent the 
possibility of a flank movement against the column ad- 
vancing upon Knoxville. Bragg had completely lost the 
confidence of the Southern people. Though personally 
supported by Davis, he was removed from his command, 
and the direction of the Georgian forces was for a time 
conferred on Hardee, whose stubborn couracje and «fOod 
generalship on the 25th had won the admiration of all. 
It is now time to consider what was passing at 
Knoxville. That town is situated on the East Tennes- 
see and Georgia Railway, south of Clinch River, and 
north-east of Chattanooga. The point is one of great 
strategical importance, since it commands the whole 
valley of the Upper Tennessee; and on this account 
Grant had ordered Burnside to do his utmost for the 
retention of his post, threatened by the advance of 
Longstreet from the army before Chattanooga. Burn- 
side was in command of two corps ; but they were not 
very strong in numbers, and the several divisions were 
distributed at considerable distances from one another, 
and from the center at Knoxville. A sudden attack on 
these scattered forces seemed not unlikely to be at- 
tended by success. Longstreet left the neighborhood 
of Chattanooga early in November. He took with him 
about 12,000 men, who were to be reinforced by the 
two divisions which he expected to find at Sweetwater, 
near Loudon ; but, on arriving at that place, he dis- 



LONGSTREET BEFORE KNOXVILLE. 



231 



covered that the forces stationed there had been ordered 
to join Bragg on the banks of the Tennessee, and that 
some had ah-eady started. He was therefore obhged to 
rest contented with the regiments he already had in 
hand, strengthened by about 5,000 cavalry under Gen- 
eral Wheeler. It had been part of his engagement 
with Bragg that he was to be furnished with supplies ; 
but no supplies were forthcoming, and he was com- 
pelled to halt for some days at Sweetwater, while he 
sent out foraging parties to collect corn, thresh it, and 
bring it into a proper condition for being made into 
bread. Not only were his men ill-supplied with food ; 
they were also destitute of tents, and poorly furnished 
with clothes. Longstreet, however, had the confidence 
of his troops as much as Lee himself He had been 
associated with many victories, and entire reliance was 
placed on his ability to overcome the most adverse 
circumstances with which he was likely to be en- 
countered. He accordingly marched forward towards 
Knoxville, strong in the devotion of his men ; and, hav- 
ing crossed the Little Tennessee, came into collision 
with two divisions of Burnside's forces on November 16. 
The attack was vigorously conducted, but the Union 
troops held their antagonists in check sufficiently to effect 
their retreat within the fortifications of Knoxville. Those 
fortifications extended from hill to hill round the town ; 
and within the works were collected nearly 15,000 
infantry and artillery, together with a proportion of 
cavalry; Knoxville was invested by Longstreet on the 
17th and 1 8th, and on the second of those days an 
assault was undertaken against one of the principal out- 
works, which was carried after a very obstinate resistance. 
Although one of the outworks was now in possession 
of the Confederates, Longstreet doubted his ability to 
carry the whole of the fortifications by assault. It 
was equally impossible to reduce the place by a regular 



232 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

siege, for which it was not at all likely that time would 
be allowed by the vastly superior forces under Grant. 
There was consequently nothing to be done but to cut 
off the supplies, and thus reduce the town by faiuine. 
This, however, was in itself a work of time, and after 
the total defeat of Bragg it became evident that the 
plan was no longer practicable. A large body of Union 
troops would soon be marching to the relief of Knox- 
ville, and Longstreet feared to be caught between two 
fires. He therefore fell back on his first idea of an as- 
sault. The attack was to be made on the morning of 
the 29th, and Fort Sanders, or College Hill, was the 
point selected for the difiicult and perilous attempt. 
The necessary preparations were completed on the night 
of the 28th ; and early next morning the storming- 
parties were sent forward. The Union batteries having 
been silenced, these brave men moved across the open 
ground, and gained the edge of the ditch ; but it was 
then seen that there were no scaling-ladders, and, while 
the assailants were pausing in hesitation as to what 
they should do, the Union troops poured so deadly a 
fire into their ranks that the column was broken and dis- 
organized. Some of the men clambered up the side of 
the works on to the parapet, but were' immediately shot 
down or captured. The ditch was choked with dead 
and wounded; and when a number of hand-grenades 
were thrown into the staggering mass, its cohesion was 
entirely destroyed, and nothing remained but to retreat. 
Though greatly disappointed by the result of this 
attempt, Longstreet still maintained his positions round 
the town, the garrison and inhabitants of which began 
to suffer from shortness of provisions. Sherman, how- 
ever, was now on his road to Knoxville, and it was 
known to the army, from the reports of prisoners, that 
Bragg had been defeated before Chattanooga, and that 
succor could not be long in arriving. Marching with 



SHERMAN RF.LIFA'ES KNOXVTLLE. 233 

rapidity, and only pausing to repair broken bridges or 
construct new ones across the rivers by which the 
country was intersected, Sherman reached the vicinity 
of Knoxville on December 5. Longstreet, though 
lately reinforced, knew that he was not strong enough 
to resist the united armies of Burnside and Sherman; 
and when the latter arrived upon the spot, he found 
that his adversary had already departed. He had 
quitted his lines on the previous night, and had moved 
in a north-easterly direction to the borders of Virginia. 
Sherman met Burnside outside the fortifications, and 
proposed to him to pursue Longstreet with a force 
sufficient to ensure the withdrawal of the Confederates 
from Eastern Tennessee ; but the offer was refused by 
Burnside, who is said to have exhibited some jealousy 
of his distinguished colleague. He declared that 
Granger's corps, in addition to his own, would be suf- 
ficient to guarantee Knoxville against further attack, 
and that the pursuit could be undertaken by his cavalry. 
Very little, however, was done to harass Longstreet's 
rear. Sherman returned to Chattanooga, and shortly 
afterwards Burnside, whose health was failing him, 
solicited recall, and was superseded by General For- 
ster, from the Department of North Carolina. 

The fame of Sherman was now almost equal to that 
of Grant. He was at the time in his 44th year, and 
during the early period of the Civil War had been re- 
garded as a man of inferior abilities. The test of actual 
service, however, had shown that he was possessed, not 
merely of the very ordinary gift of courage, but of real 
military genius, of tireless energy and quick discern- 
ment. Sherman's troops were proud of their General ; 
their General was equally proud of them. Referring 
to the recent course of events in one of his official 
despatches, he said : — " In reviewing the facts, I must 
do justice to the command for the patience, cheerful- 



234 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



ness and courage which officers and men have dis- 
played throughout — in battle, on the march and in 
camp. For long periods, without regular rations or 
supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud 
and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a mur- 
mur, without a moment's rest. After a march of 400 
miles, without stopping for three successive nights, we 
crossed the Tennessee, and then turned more than 
100 miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise 
the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to 
the whole country." In Sherman and his troops were 
to be found all the elements of success, and a series 
of triumphs attended their operations wherever they 
carried the flag of the Republic. Nearly three years 
of civil war had taught both the North and the 
South to be soldiers in every sense of the word. 
They were no longer the amateurs who had been help- 
lessly driven to the slaughter in the dark and evil days 
of 1 86 1. They had acquired the professional feeling 
and the professional habits of veterans, to whom war 
is not an affair of declamation in the first instance, and 
of panic in the second, but a stern and terrible duty, 
to be faced with courage and borne with resolution. 
In the earlier part of the struggle, the fighting-men 
of the South, from their greater familiarity with arms 
and active exercises, had shown more military virtue 
than their brethren of the North ; but the scale was 
now inclining in favor of the other side. Freedom 
had its heroes, as well as slavery; and not merely its 
heroes, but its men of genius and success. In Grant 
and Sherman alone, the Union found a guarantee that 
in the end its cause would certainly prevail. 

The campaign in Tennessee was over for the present. 
The State had been snatched from the grasp of the Con- 
federacy, and the forces of the Union were in a favorable 
position for acting against Virginia and the Carolinas. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Charleston and Fort Sumter. 

The flag of the Palmetto State audaciously waving 
from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor had long been 
looked upon as a sort of standing rebuke to the im- 
potent power of the North. It appeared impracticable 
to attempt the recovery of the fort; so it was determined 
to destroy the present usefulness of the harbor, and 
thus prevent the egress of privateers to prey on 
Northern merchantmen, and the ingress of the swift- 
sailing British blockade-runners. 

Accordingly, it was proposed to fill the channel 
by blocking it up with huge masses of stone. Charles- 
ton had been the cradle of the rebellion, and some 
degree of punishment for the immense wrong it had 
committed, and the misery it had spread far and wide 
in the prosecution of its wicked ambition, should be 
meted out, and it would have been nothing more than 
just. The plan met with approval, and 45 old whaling 
vessels and mercantile ships were purchased and filled 
with stones. These assembled at Port Royal, and, on 
December 17, under convoy of ships-of-war, sailed for 
the harbor of Charleston. The vessels to be sunk, 
together with their contents, were ships and barks of a 
burden between 200 and 500 tons, too old to be any 
longer employed in long sea-voyages, but very well 
adapted to the project in hand. They were for the 

(235) 



236 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



most part double-deckers, and, having been stripped of 
their copper and other fittings, were loaded with stones 
as deeply as was considered safe. Each vessel was 
manned by about fourteen men, and precise instructions 
were given as to how they should proceed. Measures 
of a similar nature had already been taken on the coast 
of North Carolina, where Ocracoke Inlet, Pamlico 
Sound, had been to some extent blocked by sunken 
vessels, as a means of preventing the entrance of 
blockade-runners. The old boats were so sunk as not 
entirely to block up the outlets to the current, lest the 
stream, running with c^reat force out of the harbor, 
should make for itself a fresh passage, equal to that 
which had been closed. On December 19, the fleet 
assembled off Charleston Bar, when the position where 
each ship was to be sunk was exactly marked. The 
act of sinking the vessels was believed to have been 
thoroughly effected ; but the calculation proved errone- 
ous. The strength of the current soon swept away the 
obstructions in its channel and the harbor was once 
more free. 

The defences of Charleston had been greatly 
strengthened, and early in 1863 General Beauregard 
was placed in command of the department. Charleston 
had been watched by a large fleet of ironclads; but 
these had been scattered one dark night towards the 
end of January, 1863, by a bold attack conducted by 
Captain Ingraham, in command of two rams which had 
been built and equipped on the spot. One of the 
Union ironclads had been compelled to surrender and 
the Confederates claimed that they had raised the 
blockade. Such was the state of affairs when a fresh 
expedition was directed against the city under the com- 
mand of Admiral Dupont. 

In the course of March, the greater part of the fleet 
was transferred from Port Royal to a point about mid- 



EXPEDrriON AGAINST CHARLESTON. 



'■Z7 



way between that locality and Charleston Harbor, and 
about lOO vessels were collected at the mouth of the 
North Edisto River, The fleet sailed for Charleston 
Bar on April 6. The bar was crossed by the ironclads 
in the course of the day; and a position was taken up 
in the main channel along the coast of Morris Island. 
On the 7th, a line of battle was formed, in which the 




SOUTH CAROLINA FLAG. 



ironclads were to take the principal part. The wooden 
vessels remained outside the bar. Attached to the lead- 
ing ironclad, the IVcchmvkcn, was a raft, designed to ex- 
plode torpedoes and remove obstructions. 

The attacking force was allowed to pass the outer 
batteries; but as the Wcchawkcn was about to enter the 
inner harbor, a gun was fired from Fort Moultrie, fol- 



238 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

lowed by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island and Mor- 
ris Island, and by those of Fort Sumter. On reaching 
the entrance of the channel between Sumter and Sulli- 
van's Island, the leading ship got entangled in a hawser 
stretched across the waterway, to which were sus- 
pended nets and various contrivances for preventing the 
action of the screws. The ironclads opened fire on the 
forts; but a good deal of confusion ensued in the move- 
ments of the heavy-armored ships. The WccJiazvken 
endeavored to steer into a more favorable position, and 
the whole squadron got mixed up in a way that was 
utterly destructive of order. 

By four in the afternoon, the ironclads were ranged 
opposite the north-east front of Sumter, at distances 
varying from 550 to 800 yards, where they were ex- 
posed to the concentrated fire of 300 guns, possessing 
extraordinary range and power. Setting aside the Wce- 
hawken, which was incapable of rendering assistance, 
owing to the obstructions with which it was entangled, 
the number of the ironclads was but eight, carr}'ing not 
more than 16 guns in all. It is stated that, at the hot- 
test part of the fire, 1 60 shots were counted in a minute, 
and officers described the projectiles as sometimes 
striking their vessels as rapidly as the ticking of a 
watch. The narrowness of the channel, the dense 
clouds of smoke proceeding from the guns, and the 
necessity of avoiding collisions with one another, with 
the various floating obstructions, and with the sub- 
merged batteries, proved sources of great embarrass- 
ment to the commanders of the attacking fleet. Never- 
theless, the action was maintained with much spirit, and 
Commander Rhind ran his vessel, the Keokuk, within a 
short distance of Fort Sumter, where she was so hotly 
received that at the end of half an hour she was forced 
to retire, lest she should be utterly destroyed. She had 
been struck 90 times in the hull and turrets, and 19 



240 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



shots liad pierced her sides, either at or below the water- 
hne. It was only with much difficulty that she could 
be brought to anchor beyond the range of fire, and 
next morning she sank. The other vessels were injured 
in various degrees, though not so severely as the Keokuk. 
It was evident that the guns in the forts and batteries 
were stronger than those which were brought to bear 
in reply, and that the armor-plated sides of the iron- 
clads were not of sufficient thickness to withstand the 
tremendous weight of metal that was hurled against 
them. Moreover, the land forces were too io-w in num- 
ber to render any assistance. Dupont therefore gave 
orders for the attack to cease. Several men had been 
killed and wounded on board the fleet, while only two 
deaths had occurred in the forts. The east wall of Fort 
Sumter had been somewhat broken by the Union guns ; 
but the damage was slight, and this was all that could 
be set against the enormous amount of injury that had 
been received by the vessels. A large proportion of 
these had been either wholly or one-half disabled in less 
than an hour's engagement, and the admiral felt con- 
vinced that persistence in the attack would have resulted 
in the loss of nearly all his ships. With the exception 
of the Ncio Ironsides, which anchored outside Charles- 
ton Bar, the whole fleet returned to Port Royal on April 
12. Next day Lincoln telegraphed to Dupont that 
he was to hold his position inside Charleston Bar, or, in 
the event of his having left it, was at once to return. 
He was not to allow the enemy to erect new batteries 
or defences on Morris Island, and, if he had begun to 
do so, he was to drive him forth. He replied by ex- 
pressing his willingness to obey all orders with fidelity, 
while at the same time pointing out that the course im- 
posed on him would be attended with great risks. He 
was superseded in July by Admiral Dahlgrcn, and 



EXPEDITION AGAINST CHARLESTON 



241 



arrangements were made for combined operations 
against Charleston by land and sea. 

A third attack was now begun on Charleston, that 
city having already successfully resisted two powerful as- 
saults. It was settled that a military force should seize 
Morris Island, and bombard Fort Sumter. The troops 
were to be aided by a strong fleet under Dahlgren ; and 
it was hoped that the monitors and ironclads would be 
able to enter the harbor, to pass the batteries, and to 
reach the city. An army was collected on Folly 
Island, to the south of Morris Island, and early 
in July batteries were erected among the woods. 
Under cover of these guns, a brigade of 2000 men, 
commanded by General Strong, prepared to assail 
the position which it was first desired to occupy. The 
southern end of Morris Island was defended by 700 
Carolinian infantry, two companies of artillery, and some 
other forces, under the direction of General Ripley, who 
acted under Beauregard. Strong's attack, which took 
place on July 10, was successfully conducted, and the 
Southerners were driven back to Fort Wagner, situated 
near the farther end of the island. The fort was 
strongly constructed, and armed with 20 guns of various 
calibre, nearly all covering the only approach to the 
walls, which was along a barren and shifting beach, ex- 
tremely narrow, and subject to frequent overflow. Being 
in communication with Charleston, the armament and 
garrison of this work could be easily maintained at its 
highest standard, and any attacking force was within 
reach, not merely of the guns in Wagner itself, but of 
those in Fort Sumter, and of the adjacent batteries. 
After forcing the Confederates to take shelter within 
their lines, the Union forces refrained from commencing 
an immediate assault upon the works, owing to the 
exhau'^tion which they had already suffered from the 
heat of the day. During the night, two fresh regiments 
16 



242 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



of Confederates were sent to Fort Wagner, to reinforce 
the garrison; but at daybreak on the nth, an assault 
was made by Strong's troops, who, proceeding along 
the narrow neck of land between the sea on the right 
hand and a marsh on the left, advanced in good order 
to the outer defences. A Connecticut regiment, which 
occupied the front position, crossed the glacis, and 
leaped into the ditch ; but all attempts to climb the 
parapet were defeated by the terrific fire of the Con- 
federates. At length the storming party was compelled 
to retreat, losing many gallant men in struggling back 
to their lines, as well as in the attack itself. Gillmore 
determined to proceed against the fort by the erection 
of opposing batteries, which were aided by the fire of 
the monitors. The garrison suffered greatly from the 
artillery of their foes, and from the suffocating heat en- 
gendered in the bomb-proof galleries by the July sun, 
and the continual discharges of the cannon. The 
troops, however, could be frequently relieved, and occa- 
sional sallies varied the monotony of passive defence. 

A terrible bombardment was opened on July i8. 
The Confederate guns replied feebly, and the garrison 
in Fort Wagner saw that they would shortly have to 
defend the walls against a renewed assault. Their 
anticipations were realized that very evening. In the 
midst of a thunderstorm, the Union columns were 
formed upon the beach. The head of the first brigade 
consisted of a negro regiment, and the whole body, 
consisting of blacks and whites, pushed steadily on, 
under a concentrated fire from Forts Wagner, Gregg, 
and Sumter, and from the batteries on James and Sulli- 
van's Islands. The attempt to mount the walls was 
fiercely resisted by the Southerners, who poured into 
the Union ranks a stinging fire of musketry aided, 
whenever the antagonists came to close quarters, by 
the action of the bayonet and the sword. The dead 



244 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



and dying dropped from the ladders into the mud and 
ooze of the ditch, and the first brigade was repelled by 
the vigor and determination of the defenders. This, 
however, did not deter the second brigade from advanc- 
ing to the assistance of the first. A lodgment was 
effected in one of the angles of the fort, and a fierce 
encounter was kept up in that confined space for about 
an hour ; but the assailants were at length driven out, 
and forced to retire. General Strong had by this time 
been wounded, and nearly all the superior officers had 
fallen. Owing to some error, the third brigade did not 
arrive to the support of the two first ; and when the 
attacking forces had regained their own positions, it 
was found that their numbers had been fearfully reduced. 
The Confederates in the fort had lost 174 in killed, 
wounded, and missing ; but the position was almost as 
strong as ever. General Taliaferro, who commanded 
the garrison, estimated that 9000 shot and shell had 
been hurled against the works; yet the walls were but 
slightly injured. The fort was constructed of compact 
sand, which dulled and turned aside the heaviest pro- 
jectiles, while such damages as were inflicted could be 
easily repaired. 

Parallels were now opened against the fort, and the 
Union forces proceeded with all the regular grada- 
tions of a siege. The ironclads in the surrounding 
waters frequently engaged Fort Wagner and Fort Sum- 
ter ; but the garrison of the former were regularly rein- 
forced and periodically relieved, and the batteries were 
strengthened by fresh guns, which were conveyed 
thither during the concluding part of July, and in the 
early days of August. The breaching batteries of the 
Union forces were opened on August 17. They were 
directed, however, not against Wagner, but against 
Sumter, which was reached by firing over the interven- 
insf fort. The distance from the batteries to Sumter 



EXPEDITION AGAINST CHARLESTON. 



245 



was not far short of three miles ; but tlie ramparts 
crumbled before the awful concentration of power now 
brought to bear on them. Forts Wagner, Gregg, and 
Sumter were bombarded by the Union ironclads, and, 
replying with energy, added to the horrible roar which 
filled the air. The vessels were compelled to withdraw 
at noon, by which time the men were almost exhausted 
by heat and fatigue. They returned in the afternoon, 
but the defenders of Fort Wagner had in the meanwhile 
repaired the injuries which had been inflicted during 
the morning. The bombardment continued during the 
18, 19, and 20th ; and whenever the flag at Fort Sumter 
was shot away, it was immediately replaced, though he 
who bore it aloft stood in inmiinent danger of being 
slain in the act. By the 21st, the southern wall of 
Sumter was a mere pile of rubbish ; on the north, the 
stones were crumbling into a mass of ruins ; several 
guns had been dismounted, and others removed; but 
the garrison themselves had lost scarcely any of their 
number. Forts Wagner and Gregg had suffered very 
slightly, while the inner line of defences, extending 
across James Island in the direction of Sullivan's Island, 
had been greatly strengthened by the Southern forces. 
Encouraged by the effect he had produced on Fort 
Sumter, Gillmore now demanded the surrender of that 
position, and of the works on Morris Island, on pain of 
the city of Charleston itself being bombarded if the 
requisition were refused. The letter was sent to 
Beauregard on the night of August 21 ; but he was 
away at the time on a reconnoissance, and, before an 
answer could be returned, the bombardment opened 
upon the city at one a. m. on the morning of the 22d. 
It necessarily produced consternation among the sleep- 
ing inhabitants, who, rushing confusedly into the streets, 
made for the open country. Beauregard sent a remon- 
strance with respect to this sudden attack upon the 



246 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

city. He remarked that among nations not barbarous 
the usages of war prescribe that, when a city is about 
to be attacked, timely notice shall be given, so that 
non-combatants may have an opportunity of withdraw- 
ing beyond its limits ; that generally the time allowed 
is from one to three days, but that Gillmore had given 
only four hours' notice ; and he characterized this mode 
of warfare as "atrocious, and unworthy of any 
soldier." Gillmore replied that he had been steadily 
advancing for a long time, and that an attack upon the 
city itself was to be expected, and should therefore 
have been guarded against by a timely removal of the 
women, children, and old people. He had reason to 
believe that many of these had in fact left the place 
long before; but, as several nu'ght still be there, he 
would give them until II P. M. on the 23d before he 
renewed the bombardment. 

The bombardment recommenced at the expiration 
of the stated time, but did not long continue, owing to 
the speedy explosion of an immense Parrott gun, called 
by the soldiers " the Marsh Angel," which was em- 
ployed in this particular work. In the meanwhile, the 
parallels were being steadily pushed forward towards 
Fort Wagner ; the Confederate rifle-pits were carried at 
the point of the bayonet on the 26th, and a fifth par- 
allel was then completed within 240 yards of the main 
work. Nevertheless the opposing fire from the Con- 
federate forts and batteries continued as strong as ever, 
and the Dahlgren fleet being unable to pass the bar- 
riers defending the inner harbor, could do nothing to 
outflank the several positions which the army was en- 
deavoring to take in front. The Union losses increased 
from day to day, and the men were discouraged at the 
seemingly endless nature of their task. The sappers 
could only work at night, and even then were often 
brought down by aid of the powerful moonlight. Yet 



248 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

Gillniore held firmly to his purpose, and now determined 
to open on Fort Wagner a bombardment more power- 
ful than any which had gone before. This was to con- 
tinue day and night without any cessation, and during 
the hours of darkness the gunners were to work by cal- 
cium lights, which had already been tried with good 
effect. The new bombardment commenced on Septem- 
ber 5, and prevailed for 42 consecutive hours. The 
land batteries were assisted by one of the ironclads, 
which fired enormous shells from its eight broadside 
guns ; and the garrison, compelled to keep watch 
against any assault that might be intended, lost many 
of their number in exposed positions. The work was, 
in fact, no longer tenable, therefore preparations were 
made for the withdrawal of the troops. It was resolved 
to abandon Fort Wagner, together with Fort Gregg, 
situated at Cumming's Point, which is the northern ex- 
tremity of Morris Island. The evacuation commenced 
at nine on the evening of the 6th, when the guns were 
spiked, and fire was applied to the magazines. No ex- 
plosion followed, as the matches failed to operate ; and 
while the Union sappers were mounting the deserted 
parapet of Fort Wagner, the last of the Confederate 
garrison were quitting the island. Their retreat was 
scarcely interrupted by the enemy, and next morning 
the Union troops were compelled to repair the ramparts, 
to protect themselves against the batteries in Fort 
Moultrie and on James Island, which were immediately 
turned upon the positions just abandoned by the South- 
erners. It was believed by Dahlgren that Sumter must 
be surrendered now that Morris Island was in posses- 
sion of his colleague. The fort was little better than a 
ruin ; its artillery could no longer be worked, and the 
ground was held merely by a detachment of infantr}^, 
commanded by Major Elliott. To this officer Dahl- 
gren sent a demand for the surrender of the fort. 



EXPEDITION AGAINST CHARLESTON. 249 

Elliott replied that the admiral might have Sumter 
when he could take it. An attempt to obtain posses- 
sion of the place was made by the ironclads, assisted 
by a military force, on September 9, but it was not suc- 
cessful. Some of the crews who had landed were re- 
ceived by so hot a fire that the survivors speedily sur- 
rendered, and the vessels thereupon retired. This put 
a termination, for the time being, to the Union successes 
before Charleston. The city and the remaining forts 
were occasionally bombarded ; but it was not until the 
final days of the Civil War that this stronghold of re- 
bellion submitted to the authority of the Union. 

On the 14th of April — the fourth anniversary of 
the surrender of Fort Sumter, and the very day on 
which Lincoln was assassinated — the identical flag 
which had been lowered in 1861 was once more planted 
on the shattered walls of the great fortifications which 
protected the harbor of Charleston ; and was planted there 
by its defender, General (formerly Major) Anderson. 



CHAPTER VII. 

Sherman's March to the Sea, 

Sherman was entrusted with a series of operations, 
for the prosecution of which three large armies were 
committed to his charge. These were the Army of the 
Tennessee, under McPherson ; the Army of the Cum- 
berland, commanded by Thomas ; and the Army of the 
Ohio, at the head of which was Schofield, who had re- 
cently succeeded to Forster. All were men of ability and 
experience, though Schofield was but 33 years old ; and 
the supreme commander, Sherman himself, had given evi- 
dence of marked and brilliant powers as a military leader. 
The Confederate Generals were Hardee, Hood, and 
Polk, acting under the directions of Joseph E. Johnston. 
The three Confederate corps were inferior in numbers to 
to the Union troops ; but their spirit was equal to that 
of the legions which were contending under Lee on the 
blood-stained fields of Virginia. The Northern plan of 
the campaign was sketched out by Grant, who visited 
Sherman at Nashville in the middle of March, when he 
was appointed to the control of the whole military 
power of the Union forces ; and the conduct of the op- 
erations was confided with entire reliance to the known 
judgment and energy of Sherman. 

The preparations for the campaign were necessarily 
very elaborate, and could not be perfected under several 
weeks. Supplies were sent from the depots at Nash- 
(250) 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



251 



ville to Chattanooga ; and these two cities were made 
the primary and secondary bases of the expeditionary 
force. For the economizing of food, it was ordered that 
no more rations should be issued to the people of Ten- 
nessee, who had for some time been partly supported 
by the Union authorities. Directions were also given 
for the entire devotion of the railways to the service of 
the army ; and in the early part of May not far short of 
100,000 men, with 254 guns, had been concentrated in 
and about Chattanooga. It was felt that to obtain 
possession of Georgia, or even of a portion of that State, 
would be a great advantage to the Government ; for the 
mountainous district in the north-west abounds in iron- 
ore, which had been turned to great use by the Con- 
federates. At Rome, and Atlanta, large iron-works had 
been opened, the capture of which by the Union troops, 
together with the cotton and woolen mills which were 
to be found at other places, would be a source of ex- 
treme embarrassment to the Southerners. Atlanta had 
become a chief center of railway communication and 
trade between the Western States and those on the At- 
lantic and the Gulf of Mexico. The machine-shops of 
the principal railways were stationed there, and the 
Confederate Government had set manufactories of arms, 
shot and shell, gun-carriages, cartridges, and military 
clothing. The place was therefore one of importance 
to the Southern Power ; and, on its becoming known 
that Sherman was about to lead a powerful army in that 
direction, strenuous efforts were made for defending the 
approaches. 

Abandoning his first idea of counteracting Sherman 
by invading Tennessee and Kentucky, Johnston now de- 
termined to dispute the road to Atlanta by making a 
stand on every hill and river in the intervening country 
which offered opportunities of temporary defence. He 
desired to avoid a general engagement, and to draw on 



252 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



his adv^ersary until he should be able to take him at a 
disadvantage, far from his supplies and base of opera- 
tions. The plan did not find favor with the Richmond 
Government nor with the Southern people generall}-, to 
whom it appeared a waste of strength to give up so 
many mountain-barriers without a more stubborn at- 
tempt to hold them than Johnston seemed disposed to 
make. These objections, however, had no effect in al- 
tering the views of the Confederate general, whose 
brilliant abilities and success in previous years had put 
him in a position to defy adverse criticism. On May 
6th, his forces were drawn up on a range of hills trav- 
ersed by a pass, known as the Buzzard's Roost, lead- 
ing to Dalton and Resaca. The three Union armies 
were at different places in his font, and one of them — 
Schofield's — was in close proximity at the other end of 
the pass. Johnston's position was strongly fortified, 
and Sherman, fearing that he should not be able to take 
it simply by a direct attack, decided to send McPherson 
round by another pass, i8 miles to the south-west, and 
thus to threaten the left rear of his opponent with one 
portion of his army while with the rest he advanced 
against the centre. Tunnel Hill, directly in front of 
Buzzard's Roost, was occupied by Thomas, with but 
slight opposition, on the 7th of May, and two days 
later one of the lower ridges of the Confederate posi- 
tion was carried by a division of his army. An attempt 
even was made to seize the crest of that terrific natural 
rampart, and the troops advanced with such singular 
gallantry and devotion that for a moment the task 
seemed almost accomplished. But the fire of the Con- 
federates was too fearful to be long endured, and, after 
a great sacrifice of life, the troops withdrew to less ex- 
posed quarters. 

This was on Ma\' 9th. On the 8th, McPherson sur- 
prised a brigade of Confederate cavalry ; and next day 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



253 



he approached Resaca. Tlie place, however, was too 
well fortified to be open to attack ; no convenient road 
existed for further progress of the troops ; and McPher- 
son, dreading a hostile demonstration on his left flank, 




GENERAL JAMES B. MCPHERSON. 



retired and took up a position where he was not likely 
to be assailed. That Johnston's position could be turned 
with a sufficiently strong force, was now evident : Sher- 
man therefore resolved to make the movement at once 
with the greater part of his army, McPherson, pre- 



254 ^^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

ceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, marched towards Resaca 
on the 13th. In an encounter with the enemy, Kilpat- 
rick fell severely wounded ; but the army pushed on, 
and ultimately drove the Confederates within their forti- 
fications. Johnston left Dalton on the night of the 12th, 
and on the following day General Howard entered that 
town, and pressed the Confederates in their rear. With 
prudent foresight, Johnston had constructed a number 
of good roads from Dalton to Resaca, and by these he 
was enabled to transfer his army with despatch from 
the one town to the other. Sherman had overcome the 
first obstacle on his route to Atlanta ; but he was now 
confronted by a strong line of entrenchments in a bend 
of the Oostenaula River, on which stream the town of 
Resaca is situated. 

As soon as his whole army had arrived in front of the 
position, Sherman determined to attempt its reduction. 
Two divisions, one of infantry and one of cavalry, were 
ordered to cross the Oostenaula below Resaca, and to 
cut the railway between that town and Kingston, lying 
farther to the south ; at the same time, the main army 
was to close in round the fortified lines. On the 14th, 
the Union forces threw up counter-works to those of the 
Southerners, and, under cover of these, directed several 
attacks against the Confederate positions on the neigh- 
boring hills. Severe and desperate fighting took place 
during that day and the next ; but the Union forces 
were unable to carry the opposing lines in front. The 
operations against the flanks, however, had been more 
successful. McPherson, on the left, threatened to cut 
off his adversary from the bridges by which the Ooste- 
naula was crossed, and the Union cavalry had penetrated 
to the railways in the rear. Johnston perceived that he 
must again retire, and on the night of the 15th crossed 
the stream at his back, and retreated to the Etowah 
River, forty miles south of Resaca. Sherman lost no 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



255 



time in pursuing. The division of Jefferson C. Davis, 
turning to the south-west, captured and occupied Rome, 
while the rest of the army followed on the track of the 
Confederates, who, crossing to the southern side of the 
Etowah, took up a position in the Allatoona Pass of the 
Etowah Mountains. Sherman had now conducted his 
soldiers a long way into the enemy's country. He was 
nearly a hundred miles from even his secondary base of 
operations, at Chattanooga ; and in his rear he had a 
hostile population, and a mountainous and almost path- 
less region. His position, consequently, was in many 
respects a very perilous one, and Johnston reckoned on 
his antagonist's inability to maintain himself under such 
difficult circumstances. With less capacity in the chief 
commander, the expedition might indeed have entailed 
the most disastrous consequences. Sherman, however, 
maintained a watchful eye over all the arrangements of 
the campaign, and averted danger by anticipating it. 
The army marched in three columns; but the commu- 
nications were well kept up, the flanks were watched by 
cavalry, and the several divisions were rapidly brought 
together whenever there was any reason to apprehend a 
concentration of the opposing forces. In this way an 
attempt on the part of Johnston, before crossing the 
Etowah, to crush the centre column of Sherman's army, 
was completely defeated, though not without a sharp 
engagement. Johnston was unable to beat his enemy 
in detail, and was glad to gain the shelter of another 
stream, where he could once more throw up defences 
against the constantly advancing foe. For some days 
the two armies continued watching one another. Sher- 
man had ordered that his troops were to live on the 
country — a regulation which the evilly-disposed con- 
verted into a license for all kinds of plunder and devas- 
tation ; yet for many of the supplies necessary to active 
operations the army was dependent on the railway, and 



256 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



the trains were frequently attacked b\' guerillas issuing 
from the thick forests that bordered the line. Had 
Johnston been sufficiently strong in numbers to detach 
a powerful force of cavalry for the complete and effec- 
tual destruction of the railroads, the situation of Sher- 
man would have been grave. 

Even as it was, the only safety for the invaders lay 
in a vigorous prosecution of their march. Crossing 
the Etowah at points near Kingston on the 23d, Sher- 
man directed his course towards Dallas, and entered a 
wild and rugged country, where detached bodies of 
the Confederates were frequently encountered. Both 
armies entrenched themselves among the hills, and on 
the 28th Johnston attacked McPherson with sudden 
fury, but was repulsed with heavy loss. Sherman was 
again endeavoring to outflank his adversary, and in this 
he finally succeeded. Allatoona Pass was entered si- 
multaneously from the east and west ends, and June 4, 
Johnston again fell back, leaving Sherman free to ad- 
vance on Ackworth. At that town he received a wel- 
come reinforcement, and by the 9th was once more in 
motion, after establishing in his rear a fortified position 
in the pass of Allatoona. Heavy fighting fol- 
lowed, and General Polk — a Bishop in the Episcopal 
Church of Louisiana, and for the last three years an 
officer of some ability and varied service — was killed 
by a round shot during a heav)- caimonade on the 14th. 
Ultimately, Johnston was compelled to evacuate one 
part of his position, and to concentrate his army within 
shorter lines. A pause then follow-ed for some days ; 
but on the 22d Johnston attacked Hooker and Sclio- 
field, obtaining some temporary advantage, but in the 
end suffering a defeat. Sherman now abandoned his 
former tactics, and resolved to attack the center of his 
line with concentrated force. In this way he hoped to 
reach Marietta, lying to the rear of the Confederate 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



257 



position ; but his motives were not merely strategical. 
He considered it right to prove his ability to make a 
direct attack, and feared that by a constant repetition 
of his first procedure he should lower the fighting ca- 




GENERAI, WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN. 

pabilities of his troops, and induce in his adversary an 
opinion that he shrank from more onerous encounters. 
He therefore assaulted the left center of the Confeder- 
ate army, and a sanguinary combat took place on the 
27th. Sherman, however, had for once miscalculated 
17 



258 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

his powers. He lost 3,000 men in an attempt to take 
the slope on which his enemy was posted, and in the 
end was compelled to withdraw. Nothing remained 
but to return to previous methods, and, by out-flank- 
ing the Confederates, to compel them once more to 
retire. A movement of the Union forces' right towards 
the Chattahoochee River so seriously threatened John- 
ston's communications with Atlanta that on the night 
of July 2 he evacuated Marietta, and assumed a new 
position five miles in its rear. Between the Union 
army and the works in front of Atlanta, there was now 
only this one line of defence; but Johnston made the 
most of it. Menaced, on the 4th, by another flanking 
movement on the part of his indefatigable foe, he 
carried the greater part of his army across the Chatta- 
hoochee, and strongly entrenched himself. Sherman 
did not care to risk a direct attack. He sent out 
parties of cavalry to destroy the flour-mills and cloth- 
factories in that part of Georgia, and then turned his 
attention to the enemy in front. By operating on vari- 
ous points at once, and thus distracting his adversary, 
he contrived, while seeming to proceed in the main 
against the left flank of Johnston, to obtain a command 
over the Chattahoochee in the vicinity of his right 
flank. In the prosecution of this difficult and some- 
what dangerous manoeuvre (which took place between 
the 5th and 9th of July), Sherman was obliged to shift 
large masses of his troops with the utmost rapidity 
from the extreme right to the extreme left of his own 
line. But the movement was attended by complete 
success, and, several pontoon-bridges have been thrown 
across the Chattahoochee, a portion of the Union army 
was speedily transferred from the western to the eastern 
bank of that river. This threatened to place Sherman 
once more in the rear of Johnston; and the latter, hav- 
ing lost the protection of the stream, was forced to re- 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



259 



treat as quickly as he could, and to enter the defences 
in front of Atlanta. 

Sherman now paused in his advance — partly to rest 
his men, partly in order that he might form depots for 
stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and other places, and 
partly that he might defend the railway by which he 
communicated with his base. His army was by this 
time much reduced in numbers, though admirable in 
discipline, and animated by the sense of triumph. The 
slaughter in the several battles had been great, and it 
had been necessary to leave detachments at various 
points, to protect the rear, and to keep open the rail- 
way line with Chattanooga. A reinforcement which 
Sherman had expected from Corinth, Miss., had been 
completely routed by Forrest, so that Sherman was 
compelled to look in other directions for the neces- 
sary augmentation of his corps. He accordingly sent 
a telegram to General Rousseau, commanding 2000 
cavalry at Decatur, Ala., directing him to join the camp 
on the Chattahoochee, after having destroyed the rail- 
way which connected Alabama with Georgia. Before 
the arrival of this force on the 22d, Sherman had con- 
ducted the main body of his army to the farther side 
of the Chattahoochee, whither some of his divisions 
had preceded him a few days earlier. By the 17th the 
whole army had crossed, with the exception of Davis's 
division of the 14th corps, which was left to keep guard 
over the rear. The object was to march at once on 
Atlanta by turning sharply to the right; but the move- 
ment was fraught with peril, as tlie Confederate force 
was by no means small, and was now determined to 
make a desperate stand. Johnston felt that he had car- 
ried his policy of retreating to the very limits of pru- 
dence, and, urged by the clamors of the people, as 
well as by his own perception of what was necessary, 
had formed the resolution of giving battle to his ad- 



260 'J^E. BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

versaries before the fortifications of Atlanta. But this 
design he was not permitted to carry out. Bragg, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Southern forces, had an 
interview with Johnston at Atlanta, and, not being sat- 
isfied with the conduct of that officer, or with his 
promises for the future, had recommended Jefferson 
Davis to place the direction of the Confederate Army 
of Tennessee, as it was called, in other hands. This 
was done, and on July 17, Johnston issued a farewell 
address to his troops. His successor was General 
Hood, an officer who enjoyed a high reputation for 
dashing courage, energy and spirit. Johnston had cer- 
tainly failed in preventing Sherman's advance ; but he 
had made him pay dearly for his success, and it may 
be doubted whether he could have checked the vast 
and highly-organized invasion of that commander, had 
he offered battle at every stage of his progress. The 
previous career of Johnston had shown that he was a 
general of very great ability, skilled in the most elabor- 
ate tactics of armies, and capable of winning victories 
when he met his enemy in an open field, and with any- 
thing like equality of conditions. But in the present 
campaign he was overmatched in numbers, and com- 
mitted to the defence of a country which presented as 
many difficulties to the protector as to the assailant. 
It was not unnatural or surprising that the people of 
the Confederacy should have laeen angered at his frequent 
withdrawals from one position to another; but it is 
likely that a bolder policy would simply have resulted 
in more sanguinary losses, and no greater success. 

The three armies of the Union commander con- 
verged towards Atlanta on July 20. By means of 
trestle-bridges, Thomas's army crossed the lower part 
of Peach-tree Creek, a small tributary of the Chat- 
tahoochee, on the same day ; and a detachment of that 
army, while lying in a somewhat exposed position, was 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



261 



attacked by Hood. The ground was hotly disputed, 
but the Confederates were at length conipelled to retire 
to their entrenchments. The remainder of the Union 
forces crossed Peach-tree Creek on the 21st, and 
Sherman was now immediately in front of the Con- 
federate defences, which were drawn round the city at 
a distance of about three miles. The hnes had been 
long prepared, but 
were not yet com- 
pleted, for, when 
the Union troops 
approached, they 
found their adver- 
saries engaged in 
connecting the re- 
doubts with cur- 
tains, and in the 
construction of 
other work s. 
McPherson had 
by this time ob- 
tained possession 
of a hill to the left 
of the line, from 
which he could 
overlook the city, 
and materially 
help in its reduc- 
tion. Hood was disinclined to let him remain in that 
position, and about noon on the 2 2d directed a sudden 
and vehement attack on his left flank. On hearing the 
sound of firing, McPherson rode towards the scene of 
action, but, coming unexpectedly on some skirmishers, 
was mortally wounded by their rifle-shots. Though 
barely 36 years of age, this officer was one of the ablest 
of Sherman's subordinates, and his loss at so critical a 




GENERAL J. 1!. HOOD. 



262 ^-^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

moment was a serious misfortune. General Logan 
was temporarily appointed to the command, and took 
measures against tiie threatening demonstration of the 
Confederates. The attack was being pushed with great 
spirit. The Union line was assaulted in three different 
places ; several guns were taken, and the Southern 
cavalry, under General Wheeler, dashed into Decatur 
(Georgia), in the rear of the Union line, and nearly 
captured the wagon train. Some of the troops began 
to give ground, and it was for a time doubtful whether 
their line would not be cut in two by the furious 
advance of the Southerners. By special efforts, how- 
ever, and by the concentration of reinforcements at the 
weak points, Sherman contrived, after an anxious 
interval, to restore the fortunes of the day. 

With a view to isolating Atlanta, and cutting it off 
from all sources of supply, Sherman entered on a 
series of operations for the destruction of the neighbor- 
ing lines of rail. To this end it was proposed to 
occupy East Point, a small town about five miles south 
of Atlanta, which forms the meeting-place of the West 
Point and Macon Railways. The movement was one 
involving some risk, for it was necessary to extend the 
right of the Union line round Atlanta, so as to reach 
the junction from which it was desired to operate. Two 
bodies of cavalry were sent out on this service; the 
larger commanded by Stoneman, the smaller by 
McCook. Roth expeditions ended disastrously. 
Marching by different routes, the two columns were 
to meet at Lovejoy's Station, on the Macon Railway; 
but, owing to some mistake, the coalition was not 
effected. Each body was encountered by a superior 
force of Confederates (McCook's on the 29th, Stone- 
man's on the 31st) and entirely defeated. Large 
numbers of prisoners were taken, and the Union army 
was appreciably weakened with respect to its cavalry. 



264 ^'-^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

The Army of the Tennessee, now under command of 
Howard, who had succeeded to McPherson, was 
occupying a high ridge which crossed one of the 
principal roads leading from the Chattahoochee to 
Atlanta, when a large body of Confederates poured 
down on their uncompleted breastworks. The engage- 
ment lasted from noon until four o'clock p. m. ; but, 
after six assaults, the attacking force withdrew. Hood's 
object in ordering this movement was to draw away 
that portion of Sherman's army which was being ex- 
tended towards the right. Herein he failed, and Sher- 
man, having strengthened his position by extensive and 
elaborate entrenchments, was enabled to advance his 
line to within three miles of East Point. Nevertheless, 
he could not touch the railways, which Hood protected 
by a counter-movement. Engagements were constantly 
taking place ; the loss of life on both sides was lamen- 
table ; but at the close of July nothing of importance 
had been done. Atlanta was now being bombarded, 
and the miserable inhabitants shrouded themselves in 
the vaults of churches and the cellars of private houses. 
But as yet there were no signs of yielding, and Hood 
thought he could relieve his own communications by 
threatening those of his enemy. He sent a body of 
4500 cavalry, under Wheeler, to act against the rail- 
way running from Marietta to Chattanooga — the line by 
which Sherman maintained his intercourse with the 
North. Portions of the rail were for a time destroyed; 
cattle and stores were captured ; and Sherman was 
obliged to take special measures to provide against the 
danger. Yet no permanent injury was effected ; the 
garrisons at the several stations maintained their posi- 
tions ; the lines were speedily repaired; and when 
Steedman marched against Wheeler from Chattanooga, 
the Confederate was glad to escape into Eastern Ten- 
nessee, and ultimately into Northern Alabama. His 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 265 

services were thus lost to Hood, who had soon cause to 
regret his mistake. 

Stoneman had been captured in the unfortunate affair 
of July 31 ; but his place was supplied by Kilpatrick, 
who, though still far from cured of his severe wound, 
received before Resaca on the 13th of May, had 
heroically returned to his post, and in the early part of 
August was busily engaged in the task of reorganizing 
the Union cavalry, which had been much reduced by 
the recent operations, and by the surrender of so many 
of its number. On August 18, Kilpatrick was de- 
spatched to operate against the Southern railways, which 
he was not merely to inj-ure,but, if possible, to destroy. 
In executing this commission, he was attacked both by 
cavalry and infantry, and only with difficulty succeeded 
in breaking through the opposing hosts. He then 
returned to Decatur, which he reached on the 22d, 
after having made a complete circuit of the enemy's 
position. Very little had resulted from this incursion, 
and Sherman saw that, if he would produce any decided 
effect on his antagonist's communications, he must 
strike with nearly the whole of his army. Reverting 
to his favorite method of outflanking the adversary, he 
formed a plan by which, while leaving behind him one 
corps for guarding his rear, he hoped to draw Hood 
from out his entrenchments, and compel him to stake 
his fortunes on a decisive battle, unless he should be 
able to retreat. In the prosecution of this scheme, 
Sherman would be obliged to enter the very heart of 
the enemy's country, and to endanger his own com- 
munications with the North ; but he had confidence in 
his ability to carry out the movement, especially as the 
absence of Wheeler's horsemen allowed him to employ 
his cavalry with but little fear of opposition from the 
Southerners. Preparations for this momentous enter- 
prise were rapidly pushed forward. The wagons were 



266 THR. BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

loaded with fifteen days' provisions, and on the night 
of the 25th two corps, occupying the extreme left, 
moved quietly out of their entrenchments, and marched 
in a southwesterly direction. Other corps followed on 
succeeding days, and the West Point Railway was soon 
destroyed. For twelve miles the ties were burned, and 
the rails twisted out of all ordinary shape. Large gaps 
were made in the earth, which were filled up with the 
trunks of trees, with rocks and other foreign matter 
intermingled with torpedoes, so placed as to explode 
should any attempt be made to remove them. With 
the exception of the 20th corps, the Union army was 
now out of sight of Atlanta, -and the people of that 
city, perceiving the abandoned lines, issued forth under 
a false impression that the danger had been entirely 
removed. Hood, having but little cavalry at his dis- 
posal, was unable for several days to ascertain the 
whereabouts of his opponent ; but, on discovering that 
his rear was menaced, he despatched the corps of 
Hardee and S. D. Lee, under the chief command of 
the former, to Jonesborough, a few miles south of 
East Point, on the Macon Railway. He was even then 
ignorant that nearly the whole of the Union army was 
severing his communications, and considered that a 
portion of his force would be sufficient for encounter- 
ing what he regarded as a detachment of the enemy. 
Howard, marching due east from Fairburn, on the 30th 
arrived within half a mile north of Jonesborough on 
the evening of that day, when, finding the two Con- 
federate commanders entrenched outside the town, he 
proceeded to throw up entrenchments of his own at a 
little distance. He was attacked on the 31st, but with- 
out being dislodged from his position. On the con- 
trary, the Confederates were obliged to retire ; and, as 
the Union troops were reinforced by successive divi- 
sions durine the action — Sherman himself being now 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 267 

on his way to Jonesborough — the position of the 
Southerners became extremely critical. 

It was important to divide the corps of Hardee and 
Lee from that which was still left in Atlanta itself. To 
accomplish his design, Sherman ordered Schofield to 
move rapidly along the Macon Railway, which he was 
entirely to destroy ; at the same time, Howard, with one 
corps of Thomas's army, was to engage Hardee in front, 
while the cavalry vexed his flank and rear. The plan 
failed in some of its particulars, but was so far success- 
ful that a lodgment was effected within Hardee's lines 
before nightfall on September i. Darkness coming on 
Hardee was enabled to fall back seven miles south to 
Lovejoy's Station on the Macon Railway, where he 
fortified himself in a strong position. The feeling of 
consternation in Atlanta itself was now extreme. It 
had become known during the day that the main body 
of the Union army lay between the city and Hardee ; 
and Hood perceived that he would no longer be able to 
hold the position. His left flank had been completely 
turned ; his communications with the south had been 
intercepted ; and he feared that Hardee and Lee would 
be overwhelmed, and that the large body of prisoners 
at Andersonville, amounting to no fewer than 44,000, 
might be released by the Union cavalry, and form an 
army for the devastation of Georgia. It was imperative, 
therefore, to abandon Atlanta with all speed. A large 
proportion of the army, stores was rapidly packed in mili- 
tary wagons; the rest was burned, or distributed to the 
people; and by the light of vast conflagrations, which 
reddened the sky for many miles, Hood's soldiers, ac- 
companied by several of the citizens, marched out of 
the city, and made their way towards Lovejoy's Station. 
The explosion of ordnance trains was distinctly heard 
by the Union forces at a great distance; and it was 
evident from this circumstance, and from the wide- 



268 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

spread glare of the flames, that Atlanta had been re- 
linquished in despair. General Slocuni, from his posi- 
tion on the Chattahoochee, sent out a heavy reconnoiter- 
ing column at daybreak on the 2d. Meeting with no 
opposition, the Northern troops entered the city at nine 
o'clock A. M. The mayor shortly afterwards made a 
formal surrender of the place, and the stars and stripes 
were raised over the Court House to the throb of mar- 
tial music. On abandoning Atlanta, Hood directed his 
course west, and succeeded in forming a junction with 
Hardee and Lee at Lovejoy's Station. On September 2 
Sherman, marching from the north, appeared before 
the entrenchments of Hardee, but, hearing of the capit- 
ulation of Atlanta, did not consider it worth while to 
risk an attack on the now reunited Confederate forces. 
He accordingly led his army by easy marches towards 
the captured city; and on the 8th the Army of the 
Cumberland encamped round Atlanta, that of the Ten- 
nessee above East Point, and that of the Ohio at 
Decatur. 

The capture of Atlanta placed in Sherman's grasp a 
city not very remarkable in itself, but valuable as form- 
ing the connecting point of several lines of rail linking 
together many wide and productive districts. It was a 
centre from which the power of the Union could radiate 
in various directions, and which it was therefore impor- 
tant that the Union forces should gain, and grievous 
that the Confederates should lose. The great fact was 
known at Washington on the very day when it oc- 
curred, and Lincoln despatched an expression of the 
national thanks to Sherman, his officers and soldiers, 
for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance 
which had been displayed throughout the campaign. 
September 1 1 was appointed a day of solemn thanks- 
giving for the successes of Sherman in Georgia, and of 
Farragut at Mobile. On arriving at Atlanta, Sherman 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 260 

determined that the place should for the present be ap- 
propriated exclusively to military purposes, and orders 
were issued for the departure of all civilians, except 
those employed by Government. A truce of ten days 
was proposed in a letter from Sherman to Hood, and 
accepted by the latter, though not without a strong 
protest against the contemplated measure of his victori- 
ous adversary, which he denounced as transcending in 
studied and ingenious cruelty all acts ever before 
brought to his attention in the dark history of war. 
The Mayor of Atlanta likewise sent a petition to Sher- 
man, imploring him to reconsider his decision, and 
painting in vivid hues the misery which it would cause 
to large numbers of women, children and infirm people. 
Sherman replied to both these representations ; ve- 
hemently attacking the whole policy of the South in 
his answer to Hood, and with greater moderation ar- 
guing with the mayor to the effect that war is inevi- 
tably cruel, tliat the necessity of re-establishing the 
Union was paramount, and that his military plans were 
such as to make Atlanta a place totally unfit for non- 
combatants. 

An extension of the truce was obtained, as a conces- 
sion to the unfortunate people who were compelled to 
remove. In the result, 440 families, counting 705 
adults, 860 children, and 470 servants, were moved 
south, together with the furniture and household goods 
of each family. 

Hood exhibited great ability in withdrawing his corps 
from Atlanta, and effecting a junction with the rest of 
the army on the Macon and Augusta lines. In this 
way he was still able to cover the main roads to the 
South, and, as his numbers were far from contemptible, 
was in a position, even after his great defeat, to present 
a formidable front to the enemy. Sherman considered 
it prudent to fortify Atlanta against any possible attack. 



270 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



He also strengthened the entrenched posts on the h'ne 
connecting his army with Chattanooga, and, having 
provided that place and Rome with efficient garrisons, 
despatched Schofield to watch over the conquests that 
had just been made in Eastern Tennessee. In the 
interval between his late exploits and those which were 
to follow, it was a sad but necessary duty to count up 
the cost of what he had already won. His loss was 
estimated at 30,400 men ; but it was probably more. 
The Confederate loss was set down at 42,000; but it 
may have been less. The campaign had been skilfully 
and valorously conducted by both combatants ; but it 
had proved the immense superiority of the Union over 
the Confederation — a superiority which every month 
was making more overwhelmingly apparent. Sherman, 
it is true, was in a position of some danger ; but his 
forces were being constantly augmented by conscripts 
from the North, while the Southern army could hardly 
be maintained at its original strength. Thus did mat- 
ters stand in those desolated regions during the autumn 
days of 1864; and the feeling of exultation at the North 
found its natural counterpart in an extreme depression 
at the South, which even the steady self-reliance and 
unflinching purpose of Jefferson Davis could scarcely 
counteract. 

Alarmed by the defeat of Hood and the fall of At- 
lanta, Davis determined to investigate for himself, by 
personal examination and inquiry, the real state of 
affairs at the South. Although his presence was needed 
at Richmond, and the distance from that city to Hood's 
headquarters on the Macon Railway was very con- 
siderable, he made his way to the neighborhood of 
Jonesborough. There he found much to inspire him 
with grave anxiety ; but Hood was full of confidence in 
his ability to retrieve the misfortunes of the Southern 
army. He proposed to Davis to assume the offensive 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



271 



by attacking Sherman's lines of coiiiniunication. It 
was a bold and hazardous plan ; but nothing else of 
an equally practical character remained open to the 
harassed Confederates, and Davis gave his sanction to 
the scheme. With astonishing want of prudence, how- 
ever, he made a speech at Macon, in which the main 
features of the contemplated operations were revealed. 
The address was reported in the Southern journals, and 
soon got into those of the North ; so that in a very 
little while Sherman was well informed as to the blow 
that was being prepared against him, and took his meas- 
ures accordingly. 

Davis' imprudence was not confined to his intimation 
of what it was intended to do in the future. In his 
querulous outbursts of disappointment, he divulged the 
fact that Hood's army was very much weakened by de- 
sertions, and made the success of the proposed opera- 
tions dependent on the return of the absentees. The 
grievance was in truth very serious. Governor Brown, 
of Georgia, had just withdrawn from Hood's command 
the whole body of the State militia, on the ground that 
the men had been called out for the defence of Atlanta, 
and that the fall of that city released them from any 
further obligations. Such was the true Southern idea 
of patriotism — an idea purely local, circumscribed with- 
in the narrowest limits, and entirely disdainful of 
nationality. This was a matter in respect to which 
Davis was constantly at issue with Governor Brown. 
He perceived the necessity of establishing some species 
of strong central government in place of that which he 
had helped to overthrow ; and the safety of the Con- 
federation was with him a more important matter than 
the convenience of particular citizens, or the exagger- 
ated independence of certain States. But to many of 
the Southerners, and to the Georgians especially, such 
ideas were the expression of pure tyranny. The year 



2/2 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



1864 abounded in complaints against the Richmond 
Government for transcending its powers, and aiming at 
despotic predominance. Yet if ever a poHtical body- 
had reason to remember the fable of the bundle of 
fagots, that body was the Slave Confederacy of America 
in the dwindling days of its existence. 

Having determined on their plan, the Southerners 
were prompt in their endeavors to carry it into execu- 
tion. Even before Davis' ridiculous speech at Macon, 
Forrest had made a movement against the communica- 
tions. He crossed the Tennessee on September 20, 
and captured Athens, in Alabama; then, turning north- 
wards, he attempted to cut the railway which passes 
from Nashville to Chattanooga. But the incursion was 
speedily repelled by the skilful combinations of the 
Union troops and Forrest escaped with difficulty to the 
neighborhood from which he had started. The forward 
movement of Hood and his colleagues commenced 
on October i, when they crossed the Chattahoochee, 
and marched on Lost Mountain, lying to the west of 
Marietta. Detachments were sent out in various direc- 
tions to destroy the rail, and to threaten the Union 
troops in many places at once ; but Sherman knew that 
his adversary had passed the river very shortly after the 
event occurred, and he had already made arrangements 
for resisting an attack to which he might be exposed. 
Desirous of learning a little more as to the enemy's 
plans before he made any important move, he remained 
in the neighborhood of Atlanta until the 4th ; but on 
that day, having ascertained beyond a doubt that a large 
force was in his rear, he marched with five corps to 
Kenesaw Mountain, in the immediate vicinity of the 
elevation on which Hood had drawn up the main body 
of his army. 

By this time, Colonel Tourtelette, with the men under 
his command, was threatened at Allatoona Pass, one of 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



273 



the military stations by which Sherman guarded his rear. 
The troops at that post stood in great danger of being 
overwhelmed by French's division of Stuart's corps ; 
and Sherman, dreading the consequences, sent word to 
General Corse, at Rome, to go with the whole of his 
division to the assistance of Tourtelette. A portion of 
this force was at once moved up ; but the rest was de- 
layed by an accident on the railway, owing to the dam- 
aged condition of the line. Even with the reinforce- 
ment, not more than 2000 troops could be brought to- 
gether ; and to these a whole division was opposed. 
The Union forces were drawn up on both sides of a 
deep railway cutting, and were protected by forts from 
sudden assault. A vigorous attack, however, was made 
on the morning of October 5. Advancing along the 
railway track, and at the same time operating against 
the heights, the Confederates struck with vigor and 
effect, and the feeble ranks of their opponents were 
driven from fort to fort until they reached the last of 
the defences. Supplies to a large amount were stored 
up at Allatoona ; and for this reason alone it was most 
important that the position should be retained, to say 
nothing of its value as one of the links in the chain 
which bound the invaders to their military bases. 
During that anxious day, Sherman was standing on the 
crest of Kenesaw Mountain, where, though he was 18 
miles off, he could see the smoke from the guns at 
Allatoona, and hear some faint reverberation of the dis- 
charges. The electric wires along the railway had been 
cut ; but a less rapid mode of communication still ex- 
isted in the form of signal-posts, by means of which 
Sherman was able to send orders to the commander at 
the pass. It was a great relief to him when he learned 
by the same method that General Corse, with a portion 
of his command, was at the scene of action. He knew 
that that officer was one on whom the fullest reliance 
18 



274 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



could be placed ; that he would hold out to the last, 
even against superior numbers. Such proved to be the 
fact. In the progress of the struggle, Corse was 
wounded, and for a time insensible ; but on recovering 
consciousness he urged his men to renewed efforts, and 
about four in the afternoon the Confederates, being once 
more repulsed, and having lost a large proportion of 
their number in killed, wounded and captured, thought 
it prudent to retire. Their retreat was hastened by a 
report that a large body of Union troops was marching 
against them ; in truth Sherman had sent to the relief 
of his beleaguered detachment the corps under General 
Stanley which had been stationed at Pine Mountain. 

Disappointed with the result of French's attack on 
Allatoona, Hood pushed rapidly northwards, crossed 
the Etowah and the Oostenaula, and made for Resaca, 
at the foot of the Rocky Hill Ridge. Sherman followed 
on his track, and, proceeding through Allatoona Pass 
on October 8, reached Kingston three days later. On 
the 1 2th, the Confederates summoned the garrison of 
Resaca to surrender, but, being met by a refusal, moved 
on towards Dalton,the hills round which were occupied 
by Hood on the 14th. A demand for the capitulation 
of the fort was at first rejected, but not for long. The 
position was held by a colored regiment, under Colonel 
Johnston, who, finding himself surrounded by the whole 
bulk of Hood's army, considered that defence would 
be impracticable. All this while, the Southern forces 
were tearing up the rails behind them ; but the work 
was so ill performed that Sherman, as he pursued his 
way, was able roughly to restore the line without much 
difficulty. After the fall of Dalton, Hood passed 
through Tunnel Hill, and for a few hours took up a 
position near Villanow. Sherman was close at his 
heels; but some dispositions which he made, in the 
hope of bringing his adversary to bay, and cutting off 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



275 



his retreat, were foiled by the rapid movements of the 
Southerners. Fighting with his rear-guard, Hood es- 
caped on the 15th into the valley of the Chattanooga, and, 
turning southwest, entered Alabama, where he took up 
a position at Gadsden, between the spurs of Lookout 
Mountain and the river Coosa. The northern advance 
had been a failure, and Sherman was relieved of anxiety 
with respect to his communications. He followed his 
enemy as far as Gaylesville, where he halted, and sent 
out strong working parties to effect a complete repair 
of the railways. The work was done with remarkable 
rapidity, and in a very few days trains were running as 
usual between the several towns which had been 
threatened by Hood's adventurous campaign. 

Hood was now to some extent superseded by Beau- 
regard, who on October 17 assumed command of the 
Military Division of the West, and issued an address to 
the troops, in which he said : — " The army of Sherman 
still defiantly holds Atlanta. He can and must be 
driven from it. It is only for the good people of 
Georgia and the surrounding States to speak the word, 
and the work is done." Notwithstanding the appoint- 
ment of this officer. Hood retained his special command, 
subject to the supervision and direction of Beauregard. 
After remaining some time at Gadsden, Hood moved, 
about November i, towards Warrington, and thence to 
Decatur, on the southern bank of the Tennessee, where 
he was enabled to menace the Chattanooga and Atlanta 
Railway. He was somewhat puzzled at the inactivity 
of Sherman, and did not know what schemes were being 
revolved in that commander's mind. It was obvious to 
Sherman that Hood, though possessing an army capable 
of endangering his communications, was unable to meet 
him in open fight. He considered that to follow him 
would be simply to waste his strength in vain attempts 
to overtake an active and constantly retreating enemy, 



2/6 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



and would necessitate the abandonment of Georgia, with 
all the great results which the retention of that State 
would render probable. A further prosecution of the 
advance seemed therefore the most advisable course to 
pursue. Sherman had previously suggested to Grant 
a plan which amounted substantially to the destruction 
of Atlanta and of the railway track to Chattanooga, 
followed by a march through the heart of Georgia, with 
a view to capturing one or more of the great seaports. 
" Until we can repopulate Georgia," he wrote to Grant, 
"it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of 
its roads, houses, and people, would cripple their military 
resources." He felt confident of his ability to reach 
Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoo- 
chee, and dwelt on the advantage of compelling Hood 
to guess at what he meant, instead of being obliged 
himself to guess at what his adversary designed. While 
staying at Gaylesville, Sherman renewed these proposals, 
with certain modifications, but at the same time insisted 
on being left free to adopt one of the three alternative 
routes, in which case he could follow so eccentric a 
course that no one could guess at his objective. Grant 
authorized the proposed movement, but indicated his 
preference for Savannah as the objective, and fixed 
Dalton as the northern limit for the destruction of the 
railway. 

Towards the end of October, Sherman detached Stan- 
ley's and Schofield's corps to Chattanooga, where they 
were placed under the orders of Thomas for the protec- 
tion of Tennessee. Preparations for the great march 
were now being actively hurried forward. By moving 
like a devastating storm across Georgia, from Atlanta 
to the sea, Sherman hoped to cut the Confederacy in 
two, and thus to hasten its death. He had ardently 
desired that Hood, in retreating after his ineffectual at- 
tempt to sever his communications, would retire west- 






A 




^>5 1 1' ^i *' 
-7 %? .'^'' 



2/8 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



ward into Alabama, instead of southward to the vicinity 
of Jonesborough. When the event proved that the 
Confederates had done the very thing wanted, Sherman 
saw that his opportunity had arrived. He threw out 
strong reconnoissances in the direction of the enemy, so 
as to induce in him the idea that future operations 
would be towards the west; but at the-same time every- 
thing was being arranged for an eastward march. For 
the present, however, the design was kept a profound 
secret from all but the corps-commanders, and the head 
of the cavalry. General Kilpatrick. Nearly 70,000 men 
were brought together, and these were divided into two 
columns; the right under Howard, the left under Slocum. 
The garrisons were withdrawn from Kingston, Rome, 
Resaca, and Dalton ; all troops north of Kingston were 
concentrated in and around Chattanooga ; the railways 
south-east of the Oostenaula were completely destroyed ; 
and the country about the Chattahoochee was reduced 
to the condition of a desert. Sherman had determined 
to relinquish his former bases of supply at Chattanooga 
and Nashville, and to live entirely on the fertile regions 
through which he was about to make his way. On the 
evening of November 15, Atlanta was fired, and contin- 
ued burning all that night. The glare of the conflagra- 
tion filled the heavens, and the roar of exploding shells 
and magazines was heard at intervals, as the rear-guard 
of Sherman's army marched in a south-easterly direction, 
to join the more advanced divisions which were already 
on their road. When Sherman ordered the removal of 
non-combatants from that unfortunate city, and told the 
mayor that his military plans rendered such a step 
necessary, he was doubtless contemplating this event, 
and the great march to which it was a preliminary. 

Beauregard and Hood were at Tuscumbia, south of the 
Tennessee River, with a view to the invasion of the State. 
The former had for some time been moving in an opposite 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



279 



direction to that which Sherman was now pursuing. 
He had never for a moment suspected the great de- 
sign of his opponent, and both he and Beauregard were 
much surprised when they heard that Sherman had 
burned Atlanta and struck into the heart of Georgia. 
It was too late to overtake him, for he had by this 
time got the start for more than 250 miles. The Con- 
federate leaders therefore determined to conduct a 
series of operations against Tennessee and Kentucky, 
in the hope that Sherman would m that way be drawn 
back to the defence of the imperilled States. At the 
same time, arrangements were made for harassing the 
rear of the invading force, and for bringing into the 
field as many troops as possible for opposing the 
onward march. Alabama and Mississippi were re- 
quired to aid Georgia to the utmost of their power ; 
but the resources of the South were now nearly ex- 
hausted, and only a very small army, as compared with 
that of the Northern commander, could be collected at 
the bidding of Beauregard. This poverty in the 
material of war was well known to Sherman, and was 
one of the elements in the general situation on which 
he had based his calculations. Had the forces under 
Hood been in front of Sherman, a better show of re- 
sistance might have been made ; but they had been 
cleverly manoeuvered out of the way, and Georgia lay 
at the mercy of the Union advance. 

Sherman's army moved in four columns, forming 
two principal wings. The direction followed was be- 
tween Macon and Augusta, so as to compel the Con- 
federate general to divide their forces for the protec- 
tion of both those towns. The habitual order of 
march, whenever practicable, was by four roads, as 
nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points 
which were indicated from time to time. No general 
train of supplies had been provided ; but each corps 



28o THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

was accompanied by its ammunition and provision 
train, and the army had permission to " forage Hberally " 
on the country. To the corps-commanders was en- 
trusted power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, 
&c. ; but no such destruction was to take place in dis- 
tricts where the army was unmolested. " In all forag- 
ing, of whatever kind," said Sherman's order laying 
down the details of the march, " the parties engaged 
will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and 
may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give 
written certificates of the facts, but no receipts ; and 
they will endeavor to leave with each family a reason- 
able proportion for their maintenance." The high mili- 
tary genius of Sherman will not be questioned by any, 
nor can the honesty of his intentions be for a moment 
impeached; but his greatest admirers must admit that 
in the accomplishment of his designs he was remorse- 
less. The ends attained, he had probably not a 
thought of revenge ; but no considerations of mercy 
ever softened the rigor of his will, or the iron temper 
of his disposition. 

The movement from Atlanta commenced on Novem- 
ber 14; but Sherman did not leave until the i6th, when 
he started with the left wing. Howard was at the head 
of the right wing, which was ordered to proceed due 
south, and to destroy the Macon Railway at various 
points. The left was under the immediate command of 
Slocum, who was to menace Augusta, and tear up the 
Georgia Central Railway. The Confederate forces op- 
posed to this immense invading host consisted prin- 
cipally of militia, under the command of Howell Cobb, 
who had been Buchanan's Secretary of the Treasury and 
had traitorously used his authority when in that office 
towards the furtherance of secession. At the utmost, 
he had not more than 10,000 infantry under his orders ; 
and Wheeler's horsemen, by whom he was supported, 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 28 1 

were few in comparison with the well-appointed cavalry 
of his antagonist. Very little resistance, therefore, 
could be opposed to the torrent of invasion now pour- 
ing through the land. Passionate appeals to the citizens 
were, indeed, not wanting. On the i8th, Beauregard, 
from his headquarters at Corinth, Alabama, put forth 
an address to the people of Georgia, which promised 
success as the speedy result of vigorous efforts. 
" Obstruct and destroy all the roads in Sherman's front, 
flank, and rear," he said, " and his army will soon starve 
in your midst. Be confident ; be resolute." The 
Georgian Senators in the Confederate Congress, writing 
on the same day from Richmond, told their fellow- 
citizens: — "You have now the best opportunity ever 

yet presented to destroy the enemy Every 

citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade 
and axe, can do the work of a soldier. You can 
destroy the enemy by retarding his march." Governor 
Brown ordered a levy eii masse of the whole of the 
free white population of the State between the ages of 
sixteen and forty-five, and offered pardon to such con- 
victs as would volunteer. Very little, however, came 
of all these efforts. A few skirmishes occurred now 
and then, but they were without effect in checking the 
advance of Sherman's legions. Bridges were burned, 
but speedily repaired; and roads which were broken up 
by the retreating troops were soon put once more into a 
practicable state by those who followed. Milledgeville, 
the capital of Georgia, was occupied on the 21st and 
22d. When the expedition started from Atlanta, the 
Legislature was in session at Milledgeville. On hear- 
ing that the Union forces were approaching, Brown, the 
State representative, and several officials, fled in panic 
to Augusta ; two days after, the Union scouts dashed 
into the town, which was at once surrendered by the 
mayor. It was plundered and partially destroyed; 



282 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

large numbers of slaves were set free ; and the army 
swept on. 

At the beginning of the campaign, the cavalry under 
Kilpatrick had been sent towards Macon, in order to 
distract the enemy's attention ; and 8oo horsemen, with 
four cannon, made a feigned attack on East Macon, 
two miles from the chief city, but, after an animated 
combat, retired in the direction of Griswoldville, destroy- 
ing several miles of rail. The demonstration against 
Macon was resumed on the 22d, when very severe 
fighting took place between a large body of Union 
troops and a Confederate army of 5000 troops. The 
Southerners, who made six desperate assaults upon the 
breastworks which their opponents had constructed, 
were ultimately compelled to retire, and Macon itself 
might have been taken, had it formed any part of the 
Union scheme to do so. Kilpatrick's cavalry afterward 
joined the right wing at Milledgeville, in accordance 
with previous arrangements. The plan of the campaign 
was carried out with the utmost regularity and success, 
and the Confederates, not knowing where the blow was 
principally to fall, were distracted with anxiety and 
apprehension. Augusta was now hastily garrisoned, 
and Hardee obstructed the roads towards Savannah by 
as many defences as he could improvise. Sherman's 
advance, however, continued with inexorable steadiness. 
On November 24, the right wing of the Union army, 
marching from Milledgeville and Gordon, arrived at the 
Oconee River, which they immediately prepared to 
cross. Being edged with swamps, through which many 
creeks ran in winding courses towards the main stream, 
the Oconee seemed easy of defence, and difficult for an 
invading army to pass. The Georgian militia, under 
General Wayne, endeavored to hold the line ; but the 
troops got across with little trouble, and the Con- 
federates retreated without any serious attempt at fight- 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



283 



ing. Kilpatrick entered Waynesborough on the 27th, 
and, after tearing up the railway which connected that 
town with Augusta, escaped towards the left v/ing of the 
advancing army ; though not without a sharp action, in 
which his regiments were very nearly surrounded and 
taken prisoners. The left had by this time crossed tlie 
Ogeechee, and, on the 28th, Louisville was entered by 
that division of the invading force, 

Sherman's troops were now approaching the sea, and 
the arid soil and wiry pine-trees of Eastern Georgia had 
succeeded to the richer forest lands and cultivated fields 
of the interior portions of the State. Sherman, with the 
center corps of his army, was at Millen on December 
3, from which spot he made demonstrations against 
Augusta and Savannah, that the Confederates might be 
kept in doubt as to what point would be attacked. He 
then moved down the peninsula formed by the Ogee- 
chee and Savannah Rivers, and thus approached the 
object of his march through the swamps and rice-fields 
by which it is encompassed. Deluging rain had come 
on ; the marshy soil presented great difficulties to the 
masses of heavily-armed troops, with their artillery and 
baggage-wagons ; and it was necessary in many places 
to construct the roads over which the army was to pass. 
Felled trees, field-works, and other defences were now 
encountered by the invaders ; but by the loth, the 
Southern troops had been driven within their lines, 
and Sherman's entire army was massed in front of Sa- 
vannah, after a march of more than 300 miles, which 
had been accomplished in about 25 days. The Union 
losses during this great military operation had been 
very few, and all the divisions were in excellent condi- 
tion when Savannah rose before them over the flat and 
watery landscape. The men would gladly have as- 
saulted the town at once; but the walls were mounted 
with heavy guns, and Sherman had brought with him 



284 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



nothing stronger than field-artillery. He therefore re- 
frained from a general attack, and trusted to the effect 
of time in starving out the city and its garrison. The 
fleet under Dahlgren was lying not far off; but it was 
no easy matter to conmiunicate with the naval force, 
owing to the guns of Fort McAllister, which com- 
manded the mouth of the Ogeechee. It was necessary 
in the first instance to capture that work, and this was 
effected, after a hot and gallant contest on the 13th, by 
General Hazen's division of the 15th corps, which 
carried the position by assault. 

The fleet was thus enabled to operate with the army. 
Arrangements were made for a supply of ammunition 
and heavy guns from Hilton Head, and Sherman sent 
instructions to General Foster, commanding the Union 
troops in that department, to occupy the railway be- 
tween Savannah and Charleston, so as to complete the 
environment of the former city on the side where alone 
any gap existed in the investing force — viz., the side 
towards the north. The surrender of Savannah was de- 
manded on the 17th, but refused by Hardee, who ap- 
parently relied on his ability to defend the position. 
Preparations were made for a bombardment and assault, 
while on the other hand, the Confederate batteries, as 
well as the gunboats on the river, kept up a constant 
fire, which seemed to promise a desperate resistance on 
the part of the besieged. But Hardee had in fact made 
up his mind to abandon the city to its fate. It was con- 
sidered that the army would be of much greater use in 
other quarters than in a town where it was shut up 
within walls, and exposed to the certainty of capture, if 
once the defences were overcome. The Confederates 
still had command of the Savannah River, and across 
that stream they escaped during the night of the 20th. 
Having reached the farther shore, they threaded a little- 
known road through the swamp, and made their way to 



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 



285 



South Carolina. Sherman entered the city on the fol- 
lowing day, and despatched a telegram to President 
Lincoln, in which he said : — " I beg to present you, as 
a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy 
guns, and plenty of ammunition ; also about 25,000 
bales of cotton." A good deal of Union feeling seemed 
to be latent among the citizens. They behaved with 
civility towards the soldiers, and made no attempt to 
destroy cotton or any other kind of property. On the 
28th, a meeting was held at the requisition of the mayor, 
at which certain resolutions were unanimously adopted 
with a view to a complete submission to the Union, and 
the laying aside of all differences ; and under the consid- 
erate rule of General Geary, the commandant appointed 
by Sherman, the city enjoyed a period of repose and of 
comparative prosperity. 

Reckoning up the results of the campaign, in the 
ofificial report which he afterwards sent the War De- 
partment, Sherman wrote : — " I estimate the damage 
done to the State of Georgia and its military resources 
at ^100,000,000, at least ;$20,ooo,ooo of which have been 
used to our advantage, and the remainder is simple 
waste and destruction. This may seem a hard species 
of warfare ; but it brings the sad realities of war home 
to those who have been directly or indirectly instru- 
mental in involving us in its attendant calamities." 
Sherman's wonderful success had been accomplished at 
a cost of not more than 567 men in killed, wounded and 
missing. The almost total collapse of the South had 
been made manifest by the facility with which he had 
conducted his legions from Atlanta to the sea ; and the 
transport of enthusiasm at the North was all the greater 
in consequence of the previous feeling of anxiety. The 
news of Sherman's triumph came like a burst of sun- 
shine to brighten the departing year, and those who had 
been most doubtful now acknowledged that one of the 



286 '^^^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

greatest achievements of the war had been acconipHshed, 
and that the subjugation of the Confederacy at no dis- 
tant date was thenceforth assured. 

During the progress of these events in the South, 
Hood was conducting that series of operations in Ten- 
nessee which ultimately proved his ruin. His army 
was of respectable dimensions, consisting of nearly 
30,000 infantry and artillery, with about 12,000 cavalry; 
and the forces of Thomas, to whom the defence of Ten- 
nessee had been confided by Sherman, were, speaking 
roughly, about equal to those by which he was con- 
fronted. The Union base of operations was at Nash- 
ville, where, while awaiting the arrival of some addi- 
tional regiments, Thomas formed his plans of resistance 
to the threatened attack. Hood began his forward 
march on November 21, shaping his course along the 
road between Florence and Nashville ; and the outlying 
Union divisions were either concentrated at Chatta- 
nooga and Murfreesboro', or withdrawn across the 
Duck River in the direction of Nashville. Forrest, in 
command of the Confederate cavalry, crossed the river 
a few miles above Columbia on the night of the 28th, 
and Schofield, who had command of the Northern 
armies in the open country, was nearly cut off from his 
line of retreat. The Southerners were actually on the 
flank of one of Schofield's divisions ; Confederate re- 
inforcements were advancing from other directions ; and 
had an attack been made at once, it seems almost cer- 
tain that a great success would have been achieved. 
But the Confederate officer, General Cheatham, let his 
opportunity slip by. He awaited the arrival of Stewart, 
and, after that officer had reached the spot, still hesitated 
to engage the enemy. The two armies were so close 
that even after nightfall the march of the Union regi- 
ments could be distinctly seen by their adversaries ; yet 
Cheatham forbore to attack. Thomas now ordered 



THE WAR IN TENNESSEE. 



287 




V - 



Schofield to entrench himself in such a position as 
would enable him to defend the approaches to Nash- 
ville from Columbia. This he immediately did ; but, 
before his works could be completed, he was furiously 
assailed by 
Hood. 

Schofield 
had thrown 
up his en- 
trenchments 
in front of the 
small town of 
Franklin, sit- 
uated on the 
Big Harpeth 
River, 18 
miles south 
of Nashville ; 
but he was 
somewhat en- 
cumbered by s 
a long train 
of wagons, 
which had 
not yet got Kj 
over the river ^'■ 
extending in 
his rear. If, 
therefore, he 
could be de- 
feated in this position, he would probably be over- 
whelmed, and one great obstacle to Hood's plans would 
be removed. The Confederate force was divided into 
two columns, one of which was to attack Franklin in 
front, while the other was to move down the stream, 
to cross it some distance east of Franklin, and thus 




GENERAL SCHOFIELD. 



288 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

unexpectedly to approach the Union rear. At four in 
the afternoon of November 30, Hood's main column 
advanced to the attack. The contest was prolonged 
and sanguinary ; entrenchments were taken and re- 
taken ; but Schofield, at the head of 15,000 men, held 
his positions until nearly midnight, when, ascertaining 
that he was in danger of being outflanked by the col- 
umn that had crossed the river, he ordered a retreat. 
This was continued during the night, and on Decem- 
ber I Schofield had reached a point seven miles south 
of Nashville, where General A. J. Smith's corps was 
posted. Hood had suffered very severely in the action, 
and confessed to a loss of 4500 men, including a large 
number of general officers ; but, as the Union troops 
also had suffered grievously, and were dispirited by the 
necessity of retreating, the Confederate leader did not 
hesitate as to the expediency of pursuit. He followed 
closely on his adversary's track, and Smith, finding 
himself hard-pressed, fell back to the outer line of the 
Nashville entrenchments, which were situated three 
miles from the town. 

The consternation in Nashville was extreme when it 
became known that the outlying armies had been de- 
feated, and that the enemy was near at hand. Large 
numbers of civilians were hurriedly armed ; Thomas's 
forces were drawn up in line of battle outside the town, 
and additional troops were brought up by rail from 
Chattanooga. Hood arrived in front of Nashville on 
the 2d, and, throwing up strong works and counter-bat- 
teries, made preparations for a siege. Forrest, in com- 
mand of a body of cavalry and infantry, was despatched 
towards Murfreesboro', to summon the garrison to 
surrender; but a portion of this detachment behaved ill, 
and the army before Nashville was weakened by the 
absence of so large a contingent. Thomas, on the 
other hand, was being continually reinforced, and by the 



THE WAR IN TENNESSEE. 



289 



middle of the the month felt himself strong enough to 
deliver a powerful assault on the beleaguering hosts. 
In the early morning of the 15th, a feint was made on 
Hood's right, and a real attack on his left, which ended 
in the capture of several redoubts and guns, and in the 
complete discomfiture of Hood, who was forced from 
his chief position on Montgomery Hill, and compelled 
to retreat a 
distance of 
some miles. 
Next day his 
troops were 
again attack- 
ed, and, after 
an action of 
varying for- 
tunes, driven 
in c o n f u - 
sioii towards 
Franklin. 
The division 
which misbe- 
haved itself 
at Murfrees- 
b o r o ' had 
once more 
given e V i- 
dence of de- 
ficiency i n 

fighting qualities. Its dismay was communicated to 
other divisions, and only one corps preserved its organ- 
ization and self-respect. The retreat of the main body 
necessitated the withdrawal of Forrest from before 
Murfreesboro' ; but, owing to the swollen condition 
of the rivers, his detachment had great difficulty in 
joining the regiments that had fled from Nashville. 
19 




GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS. 



2QO THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

The pursuit was vigorously pressed by Thomas, and 
Hood's defeated legions, pouring over the Duck River, 
and in time obtaining the support of Forrest, who re- 
joined the army at Columbia, made for the Tennessee, 
which was crossed on the 27th. The Confederate Army 
of the West was completely shattered. In the two 
days' battles before Nashville, 54 guns and 4460 
prisoners had been captured by the Union forces, and 
the entire loss of the Confederates during the whole 
campaign was stated at 13,189 in prisoners alone, in- 
cluding several general officers, and looo others of 
lower grades. During the same period, more than 
2000 deserters came into the Northern lines, and 72 
pieces of artillery passed from the defeated to the 
victorious army. The Union loss was about 10,000 in 
killed, wounded, and missing; but the authority of the 
Union in Tennessee was saved by a series of actions in 
which Hood had done little more than demonstrate the 
weakness of his resources, and his own want of com- 
manding ability as a general. Shortly after his with- 
drawal into the northern part of Alabama, he was re- 
lieved of the command, at his own request, and was 
succeeded by General Taylor, who was transferred from 
the Trans-Mississippi Department. 

Sherman rested at Savannah only long enough to 
prepare for that further advance of his armies which he 
frcMTi the first judged to be necessary. To penetrate 
northwards through South Carolina, to enter North 
Carolina, and in due time to combine his forces with 
those besieging Petersburg and Richmond, seemed to 
him the most likely way of terminating the war. Grant 
desired that the whole of Sherman's army should at 
once be transported by sea from Georgia to the banks 
of the James River; but the hero of Savannah con- 
sidered that it would be far better to march through the 
intervening country, reducing it to submission by an 



SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS. 



291 



overwhelming display of force. The land, it is true, 
presented in many parts great difficulties to the progress 
of a hostile body ; but the Confederate Army was now 
so reduced in numbers, and so broken in spirits, that 
little active opposition was to be feared. In January, 
1865, Beauregard was at Augusta, on the Georgian side 
of the Savannah River, endeavoring to scrape together 
from various localities a force to resist the further meas- 
ures of Sherman. But his attempts of this nature were 
not very successful, and he found himself at length in 
command of only a few thousand men with which to 
confront the serried legions of his adversary. He 
wished to augment his scanty divisions by abandoning 
Charleston and Wilmington ; but these measures were 
not then sanctioned by the Confederate Government. 

Beauregard had the assistance of General D. H. Hill, 
and also of Wade Hampton, who commanded the cav- 
alry. The want, indeed, was not in generals, but in 
men, so that little could be done to protect the roads by 
which Sherman would move towards the more northern 
States. On the completion of his preparations at Savan- 
nah, that commander found himself at the head of 
60,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and artillery in propor- 
tion. A detachment of his force he left at Savannah, 
and with the rest set out for Goldsborough, in North 
Carolina. To deceive the enemy, demonstrations were 
to be made against Charleston to the right, and Augusta 
to the left ; and, while these were in progress, the main 
body was to push forward along the causeways by 
which the marshes of the coast are traversed. The 
advance did not fairly commence until February ist, 
when the several divisions set out on their northward 
march, and entered on a dreary tract of flooded lands, 
where the Confederate cavalry had done their utmost 
to impair the roads and destroy the bridges, and where 
therefore it was necessary to conduct many engineering 



292 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



operations before the troops could pursue their course. 
In South CaroHna, as in Georgia, houses, barns, agri- 
cultural produce, and even large woods, were set on fire, 
and the invaders, as they passed over the country, left 
behind them a blackened desert, stripped of everything 
which could support the life of man or beast. 

The Confederates held the line of the Salkahatchie, 
but, on their positions being forced, fell back behind the 
Edisto at Branchville, where they burned two bridges. 
Sherman's forces, however, crossed the stream, and ad- 
vanced towards Orangeburg, which was occupied on 
February 12th. Wade Hampton was now compelled 
to fall back on Columbia, the State capital, situated 
north of the Congaree River. The bridge in front of 
the town was burned by the retreating Southerners ; but 
the Union troops, on reaching the banks of the Conga- 
ree, early in tiie morning of February 16, passed the 
river by means of extemporary bridges, and received 
the surrender of Columbia. The place was consumed 
by fire on the night of the 17th; but Sherman charged 
this fact on Wade Hampton himself, who, it is alleged, 
applied the torch to a large quantity of cotton and lint 
stored up in the town, blazing fragments of which were 
carried by an unusually high wind in many directions. 
Hampton denied the accusation, and vehemently asserted 
that the city was fired by Sherman's men. The left 
wing, under Slocum, reached Winnsborough on the 21st, 
and was followed by the cavalry of Kilpatrick. The 
latter then moved upon Lancaster, so as to foster the 
impression that Sherman intended a general march on 
Charlotte, North Carolina, to which city Beauregard 
and all the Confederate cavalry had by this date retreated 
from Columbia. 

At the same time, Hardee evacuated Charleston, it 
being considered that to retain 11,000 troops within the 
defences oi that city, when they were so much needed 



SHERMAN IN THE CAR O UNAS. 



293 



to oppose the advance of Slierman, would be a grave 
mistake. Thus, the original proposal of Beauregard 
was now adopted ; but the time had passed when it 
was capable — if it was ever capable — of producing the 
desired effect. The abandonment of Charleston was 
attended, on the night of February 17, by the burning 
of the city, which was fired by the Confederates them- 
selves, in order that the Northerners should have little 
but a mass of ruins as the reward of their long endeavors 
to take this stronghold of rebellion. The Government 
stores, the railway depots, and the ironclads in the har- 
bor, were burned or blown up ; the guns on the ram- 
parts were burst; and the rear-guard of Hardee's army 
left by rail for the north-west, in the midst of an infernal 
glare and clamor of destruction, which the Union troops 
were for the moment powerless to prevent. Gillmore's 
troops entered the flaming city on the morning of the 
1 8th, and, hoisting the national colors once more over 
the remnants of the forts, proceeded to subdue the con- 
flagration. But only a small portion of the city could 
be saved. Charleston, the cradle of the rebellion, had 
perished in fires of her own kindling — a fit type of that 
rapacious and cruel oligarchy which would wreck where 
it could not rule, and which knew no medium between 
the insolence of domination and the despair of baffled 
crime. 

Wilmington, in North Carolina, was also abandoned. 
The reduction of Fort Fisher, on January 15, had 
greatly diminished the value of the position ; and in this 
instance, as well as in the case of Charleston, it was 
thought better to add the garrison to the scanty forces 
then in the field under the direction of Johnston, who 
had been restored to command as one of the most capa- 
ble of the Southern leaders, notwithstanding the series 
of defeats which he had suffered at the hands of Sher- 
man in Georgia. During the depth of winter, the 23d 



294 '^'^^^ BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

corps, under Schofield, had been transported from Clif- 
ton, on the Tennessee River, to the vicinity of Wihning- 
ton, that it might aid in the capture of that city, and, 
when the main object had been effected, might assist 
the designs of Sherman by marching on Goldsborough. 
The siege operations against Wilmington were so vigor- 
ously prosecuted that both the outer and the inner line 
of defences were outflanked in the course of February, 
and on the 22d of that month the Confederates under 
Hoke destroyed the steamers, cotton, and Government 
stores, and, retreating on Goldsborough, where Johnston 
was concentrating his forces, abandoned Wilmington. 
Schofield then determined, as soon as his arrangements 
should be complete, to advance in two columns from 
Wilmington and Newbern to Goldsborough. But 
means of transportation could not at once be obtained, 
and the first week of March had nearly closed ere his 
movement began. 

After quitting Winnsborough, Sherman turned east- 
wards, and directed his columns on Cheraw, a small 
town situated on the Great Pedee River, at the termina- 
tion of the line of rail running from Charleston. His 
supplies were getting short; the solitary lands where 
he now found himself yielded but little for the support 
of his regiments ; and it became imperative to open 
communications with the sea. Progress was fatiguing 
and difificult. Heavy rain was frequently falling, and 
the roads were so rotten with mud and ooze that it was 
often necessary to make long causeways of felled trees 
across some desolate stretch of watery soil. The labors 
of the men were prodigious ; yet their advance was not 
seriously delayed. 

Sherman pushed on to Fayetteville, and while there 
learned that the fragments of an army that had left 
Columbia under Beauregard had been reinforced by 
Cheatham's corps from the West, and by the garrison 



THE BATTLE AT BENTONVILLE. 295 

of Augusta ; that Hardee had succeeded in getting 
across Cape Fear River ; and that the whole of the 
Confederate forces, under Johnston, made up an army 
superior to his own in cavalry, and not contemptible 
either in infantry or artillery. Sherman was quick to 
see that the real difficulties of his enterprise were about 
to begin, and that his further operations must be char- 
acterized by extreme caution. 

On the 15th, he resumed his forward march, and on 
the i6th discovered Hardee strongly entrenched at a 
point where the road branches off towards Goldsbor- 
ough, by way of Bentonville. He was immediately 
attacked and defeated by the Union left wing, and dur- 
ing the ensuing night the whole body withdrew in the 
direction of Smithfield, where Hardee effected his 
junction with Johnston. Another battle was fought 
on the 19th near Bentonville, where Slocum's column 
sustained a temporary check. Johnston had moved 
from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without the 
encumbrance of many heavy guns, hoping to over- 
whelm his opponent's left flank before it could be re- 
lieved by the co-operating columns; but Sherman had 
expected such a movement, and was prepared for it. 
The action continued the whole day, and Slocum's 
forces repulsed no fewer than six attacks, delivered by 
the Confederates with their accustomed energy and en- 
thusiasm. The Union troops had hastily entrenched 
themselves, and, being reinforced during the night, were 
in a position of comparative security on the morning 
of the 20th. The two armies then confronted one an- 
other from behind their respective breastworks. The 
battle was resumed on the 21st, when, after many hours 
of heavy fighting, the Southerners were driven towards 
Smithfield, and, Sherman, who had by this time been 
joined by Schofield, remained master of the situation. 
Schofield's advance had been delayed by the vigorous 



296 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



opposition of Hoke's forces, with whom some severe 
actions had been fought. On the 21st the Union 
columns entered Goldsborough, where Sherman left 
his army under Schofield, while he proceeded alone to 
Grant's headquarters, which he reached on the 27th, 
and then for the first time learned the general state of 
affairs, of which he had been ignorant since the end 
of January, The main Union armies were now in such 
a position with reference to one another that they could 
readily combine for the prosecution of any campaign 
which might be considered advisable in the spring. 
The great object of the march had been obtained, and 
the two Carolinas, as well as Georgia, were all but lost 
to the Confederacy. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The Closing Battles in Virginia. 

When, in March, 1864, General Grant was invested 
with the command of all the armies, he found himself 
at the head of 770,000 troops, provided in the most 
ample measure with the resources of modern warfare. 
To this immense army the Confederates could only 
oppose much scantier legions (Lee's veterans who 
fell in the awful charge of Gettysburg could never be 
replaced). The North could now depend on the ser- 
vices of tried and able officers ; and in Grant was found 
a directing mind which would not fail in energy or in- 
telligence. His idea was that active and continuous 
operations by all the troops that could be brought into 
the field, regardless of season and weather, were neces- 
sary to complete and speedy success. The armies of 
the East and of the West, he perceived, acted inde- 
pendently of each other, and without concert ; while 
the enemy, taking advantage of his interior lines of 
communication for transporting troops from one point 
to another, was enabled to reinforce any army that 
might be particularly pressed, and also, during seasons 
of Union inactivity, to furlough large numbers of men, 
who were then at liberty to return to their homes and 
assist for a few months in reproductive labors. Grant 
determined to use all the troops practicable against the 
armed hosts of the Confederacy, thus preventing his 

(297) 



298 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



opponents from using the same force at different 
seasons against first one and then another of the North- 
ern armies, and allowing them no possibility of repose 
for refitting, or for the production of fresh supplies. 
He resolved to strike continuously against the forces 
of the enemy, until " by mere attrition, if in no other 
way," nothing should be left them but submission. 

To crush out the rebellion by simultaneous opera- 
tions on a vast scale was Grant's scheme. He proposed 
to march against Richmond with the armies of the 
Potomac and of the James River, while Sherman, in 
command of the three armies of the Cumberland, Ten- 
nessee and Ohio, was to move towards Atlanta, in 
Georgia. For the protection of Richmond, Lee had 
less than 58,000 men of all arms. In other parts of 
the Confederacy, the armies of the South were for- 
midable rather by the fighting qualities of the soldiers, 
and the ability of the generals, than by positive num- 
bers ; but altogether the assemblage of armed men, 
when we consider both sides, was probably greater 
than any one nation has ever set in hostile array. Tf 
to the forces of the North already referred to we add 
222,000 for those of the South — and this appears to be 
a probable estimate — we reach a total of nearly a mil- 
lion men. The much larger population of the Northern, 
as compared with the Southern States, enabled the 
Government to put such gigantic armies in the field, 
and, after repeated losses of the most appalling charac- 
ter, to be ready with fresh legions for yet grander enter- 
prises. Even more remarkable, however, was the abil- 
ity of the South to bring forward a force of more than 
200,000 men, after their separation from the Western 
and the border States. 

Wilderness (May 5,6, 1864). — The new movements 
of the Union armies were to begin as early in May as 
po'^sible. The Potomac army now consisted of three 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 



299 



instead of five corps. These were wielded by Hancock, 
Sedgwick and Warren, while Meade continued as prin- 
cipal commander, under the general directions of Grant. 
On May 4, 1864, the Army of the Potomac crossed 
the Rapidan, driving in the Confederate pickets, and 
advancing through the dense shades of the Wilderness 
in a south-easterly direction. Burnside, with the 9th 
corps, remained for a while at Warrenton, north of the 
Rap[)ahannock, to protect the line of communication 
with Washington. 

Lee's forces were also divided into three corps, com- 
manded by Longstreet, Hill and Ewell, and occupied a 
position round Orange Court House, south-west of 
Fredericksburg. Lee ordered the larger part of his 
army to march towards the advancing foe, while with 
the rest he watched the fords of the Upper Rapidan, 
that he might guard against a flank attack on his left. 
Early on May 5, the vanguard of Ewell's corps came 
into collision with the Union troops. After a fiercely- 
contested action, in which success seemed to incline first 
to the one side and then to the other, the Confederates 
remained in the most favorable position, although their 
brilliant courage and lavish expenditure of life had 
enabled them to do little more than check the Union ad- 
vance. The battle lasted all day and was distinguished 
by the utmost valor and resolution on both sides. 
Grant sought to outflank his enemy on the right, so as 
to get between him and Richmond ; but in this he 
failed. 

The struggle began again next morning. The Union 
Army was drawn up across the Orange and Fredericks- 
burg road — the right, under Sedgwick, covering Ger- 
mania Ford ; the center, under Warren, posted at Wil- 
derness Tavern, and the left, under Hancock, drawn up 
to the south-east of Chancellorsville. The reserve, 
under Burnside, which had crossed the Rapidan during 



30O 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UXION. 



the previous night, was stationed in the rear, with orders 
to support Sedgwick, if he needed it; or in the event 
of the worst happening to cover the retreat of the army 
towards its base. The Union line extended over five 
miles, and was involved in tangled woods. The trees 
were so thick the cavalry could not be employed, nor 
could the artillery make use of any complicated 
manoeuvres. Hard hand-to-hand fighting was what 
lay before the combatants, and during the day they had 
plenty of it. Grant (who in the rear of the center was 
acting with Meade) ordered an advance of his whole 
line, and for some hours the battle swayed to and 
fro with changeful fortune. The Union left attacked 
with such irresistible force that the Confederates under 
Wilcox and Heath were scattered in utter rout, and 
Lee, for once, lost his equanimity as he saw the ruin 
that had overtaken some of his trusted divisions. Had 
it not been for the timely appearance of Longstreet 
with McLaw's division, the disaster would have been 
more extreme. Longstreet's arrival saved the right 
from a crushing reverse. The attacking force was driven 
back with the loss of many prisoners, and Grant then 
ordered the greater part of Burnside's corps to 
strengthen the line between the left and the center. Lee 
now directed a vehement attack on the Union positions. 
This was headed by Longstreet, who fell seriously 
wounded — struck accidentally, like Jackson at Chan- 
ccllorsville — by a volley from his own men who, seeing 
some officers through the trees, mistook them for 
Unionists. Another Confederate general (Jenkins) was 
killed by the same discharge; and this started a feeling 
of confusion and dismay into the attacking force. Ulti- 
mately, after a great deal of hot fighting in all parts of 
the line, the Confederates were repulsed, and the Union 
troops in the main retained the ground. 

Spottsylvania (May 8-12, 1864). — It was thought 



BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA. 



301 



that the Union forces would retire back to the 
Rapidan. Grant, on the contrary, gathered up his 
army, and pushed towards Spottsylvania Court House. 
Longstreet's corps were sent thither, and were in posses- 
sion when, on the 7th, a large body of Union infantry 
arrived. Lee sent up additional troops, and the fighting 
on the 8th resulted in the Confederates retaining their 
possession. Some unimportant fighting occurred on 
the 9th, when General Sedgwick was killed. Towards 
night Grant ordered another advance. The right wing 
crossed over the south bank of the Upper Po ; but after 
an encounter with the opposing troops the Union forces 
withdrew to the northern side of the river. On the 
lOth, severe fighting again took place, and the Union 
losses throughout the day were estimated to exceed 
10,000. The slaughter was great and without any com- 
mensurate gain. The Confederates were driven to their 
breastworks, but were not compelled to abandon their 
chief positions. The Confederates lost a large number 
in dead, wounded and captured on the morning of the 
Ilth. Grant was satisfied with the progress he had 
made during the six days' struggle, and wrote to the 
Secretary of War, " I propose to fight it out on this 
line if it takes all summer." The iith was a day 
of comparative rest. It rained heavily, and both sides 
were glad of any excuse for repose. Some fighting 
was done by Hancock on the 12th. Lee fell back a 
short distance on the 13th, but his hold on Spottsyl- 
vania Court House was not relinquished. Six days of 
comparative inactivity, varied by occasional engage- 
ments of a minor character, followed this tremendous 
series of battles. Torrents of rain had converted all the 
ways into so many muddy channels, and manoeuvering 
was impossible until the weather should change, and the 
roads become more dry. 

Up to this time, it cannot be said that Grant's plans 



302 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



had been attended by any great measure of success. 
He vowed he would not turn back; but advance toward 
Richmond. He held his positions in front of Lee's 
army, and created a feeling of anxiety and watchfulness 
at the Confederate capitol. The Southern forces had 
been so well handled, so ably directed, and so expedi- 
tiously moved from one point to another, that they 
seemed more numerous than they really were. 

Cold Harbor, (June 3, 1S64). — Grant concluded that 
he could not force his way through the Southern army, 
and he therefore proposed to outflank it, and compel 
its retreat towards Lynchburg, lying on the James 
River, to the south-west of the threatened city. He 
moved his immense army, and after a deal of manoeuver- 
ing and some severe fighting, Lee slipped into the en- 
trenchments of Cold Harbor. Heavy rains prevented 
an attack on June 2, but on the 3d the advance was 
begun. Hancock attacked with his usual vigor, and 
Breckenridge was driven back; but the success was 
short-lived. Hancock's men were repulsed with great 
slaughter to their former lines, and in other directions 
the Confederates held their ground against the utmost 
endeavors of the Union forces. Lossing asserts that, 
"in 20 minutes, 10,000 Union soldiers were killed or 
wounded." Lee's army, sheltered behind its works, 
suffered but little. 

Grant telegraphed, "We have driven the enemy 
within his entrenchments at all points, but without 
gaining any decisive advantage. Our troops now 
occupy a position close to the enemy." Grant's new 
movement had been as unsuccessful as his first ; but it 
must be borne in mind that Lee had done nothing more 
than hold his own, and had been totally unable to drive 
off his adversary. On the evening of the 3d, the Con- 
federates suddenly attacked Smith's brigade and Gib- 
bon's division, but, after a furious combat of half an 



BATTLE OF COLD LI ARBOR. 



303 



hour's duration, were completely repulsed. On the fol- 
lowing morning, Lee's left wing, in front of Burnside, 
was found to have been drawn in during the night ; 
yet for the most part the opposing lines continued close 
to each other. 

Grant had arranged for three co-operative movements 
to divide the strength of the Confederate army. Sigel, 
with 10,000 men, was to advance up the Shenandoah 
Valley and threaten the railroad communications with 
Richmond. He was totally routed at New Market 
(May 15). Hunter, who superseded him, defeated the 
Confederates at Piedmont (June 5), but pushing on to 
Lynchburg with about 20,000 men, he found it too 
strong, and prudently retired into West Virginia. 
Sheridan likewise had been defeated by the cavalry of 
Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. 

In the second week in June, Butler, with 30,000 men, 
ascended the James River, under the protection of 
gunboats, and landed at Bermuda Hundred. After 
some trifling successes, he was surprised in a dense fog 
by Beauregard, and driven back into his defences with 
considerable loss. Beauregard could get no reinforce- 
ments from Richmond, so the entrenchments in front of 
Butler were secretly evacuated, and the men added to 
the scanty forces still holding desperately to Petersburg. 

The operations against that city were now being 
pushed with great energy. Grant marched his army 
over the James River, and fell upon Petersburg; but 
here again he was confronted by his indomitable an- 
tagonist, and the works could not be forced. Grant, 
therefore, threw up entrenchments. The campaign now 
resolved itself into a siege of Richmond, with Peters- 
burg as its advanced post. The campaign had cost the 
Union army 40,000 men and the Confederates 30,000. 

It was proposed to run a mine under one of the 
approaches to the Confederate entrenchments before 



304 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UA'IO.V. 



Petersburg, and having created a gap by its explosion, 
to surprise the town by capture in the crisis of con- 
fusion and alarm created by the catastrophe. The 
plan was adopted, though reluctantly. More than 
three weeks were consumed in the construction of the 
mine. Eight thousand pounds of powder were placed 
in the chambers. The explosion occurred in the early 
morning of July 30. It resulted in the formation of 
a cavity 200 feet in length, 60 feet wide, and 20 feet 
deep. The defenders of the parapet were struck with 
consternation, and began to retire into the town; but 
Lee and Beauregard were soon on the spot, and restor- 
ing the self-reliance of their men, ordered their bat- 
teries to reply to those of the Union works, which 
opened fire immediately after the explosion. Owing, 
perhaps, to this unexpected opposition, the assault was 
made with but little spirit, and the attacking force, 
instead of dashing over the aperture, simply occupied 
it. The men sought cover, and fired over the edge of 
the crater, without attempting to advance any farther. 
The Confederates, now calm and collected, sent their 
shells in great numbers into the crater, inflicting terrible 
slaughter on the unfortunate men huddled together in 
that ghastly hole. No commander of high rank was 
present to give directions such as might retrieve the 
failure of the first assault; and long before night closed 
on that disastrous day the Union loss in killed, wounded, 
and captured was more than 4000 men. A long series 
of misfortunes had received another dismal addition, and 
Grant had to consider once more how he should con- 
quer that success which was so long in coming. 

Invasion of Maryland. — The exposed condition of 
the Shenandoah Valley consequent on Hunter's retreat, 
and on the large concentration of troops before Peters- 
burg and its vicinity, invited attack during the summer, 
and the Confederates took advantage of their opportunity. 



INVASION OF MARYLAND. 



305 



General Early resolved to advance from the Valley, and 
enter the Northern States, and in this way draw off a 
portion of Grant's army which was giving so much 
trouble to the forces of Lee, Bragg, and Beauregard. 

On July 2, Early forced Sigel to evacuate Martins- 
burg, with the loss of some of his stores. Early con- 
tinuing to advance, Sigel fell back across the Potomac, 
and took up a position on Maryland Heights. This 
movement of the Confederates was a dangerous one, for 
a successful blow might be struck before Union rein- 
forcements could be sent to repel the invasion. 
Scattered bodies were seen in various places, and Penn- 
sylvania was entered, as well as Maryland. Whole 
neighborhoods were laid waste, in revenge for what had 
been done by Hunter in the Valley ; and the rich people 
were compelled to ransom their dwellings and property 
by the payment of large sums of money. To meet this 
invasion Lincoln called for 12,000 militia from New 
York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. On the even- 
ing of July 8, General Wallace, in command of a 
hastily raised force, was attacked. His ill-disciplined 
troops soon gave way before the vehement assault to 
which they were exposed, and fled towards Baltimore, 
pursued by cavalry. This disaster produced consterna- 
tion in Washington. Reinforcements were hurried up 
and a corps of Grant's army was despatched from be- 
fore Petersburg. Early next attacked Rockville, Mary- 
land, a little town about 14 miles west of Washington. 
Some of his troops got within five miles of the Capital, 
where they siezed prisoners, horses and cattle, and in- 
flicted a large amount of damage. Intoxicated by his 
success, Early appeared before Washington on July ii, 
and engaged the batteries of Fort Stevens, one of the 
outworks of the metropolis. Reinforcements had by 
this time reached the city, and in the evening a body of 
men under General Auger sallied forth to drive away so 



3o6 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

troublesome and humiliating an enemy. A sharp 
skirmish ensued, and the Confederates were speedily 
compelled to retreat, leaving loo dead and wounded on 
the field. The invaders retired up the Potomac to the 
western side of the Shenandoah. Early established 
his headquarters at Winchester, and successfully re- 
sisted an attack by General Averill, who was obliged to 
seek shelter behind the works at Harper's Ferry. 

On July 29, Early once more crossed the Potomac 
into Maryland and advanced on Chambersburg, 
Pennsylvania. Gilmor's cavalry demanded ^200,000 
in gold, which the people declined to furnish. The city 
was accordingly given to the flames, and Averill, on ar- 
riving for its relief, found it fiercely burning. The Con- 
federates retreated, and contrived to elude the Union 
troops sent to intercept them, and again to reach in 
safety the southern shores of the Potomac. Grant, 
before Petersburg, determined to unite in one the three 
departments of Western Virginia, Washington, and the 
Susquehanna ; and placed the direction of this large 
area under control of General Sheridan, who found him- 
self at the head of more than 40,000 men. Early had 
only about 13,000 troops with whom to maintain his 
position round Winchester ; yet Grant refused to sanc- 
tion any offensive movement on Sheridan's part, fearing 
the disastrous consequences of a defeat. At length, he 
gave his consent, but only on the understanding that 
the Valley of the Shenandoah should be completely de- 
vastated, so that ftothing might be left to invite auy fur- 
ther invasioji. 

On September 19, Sheridan attacked Early with com- 
plete success. 2500 prisoners and five pieces of artillery 
were captured. Gordon and Rhodes of the Confeder- 
ate army were killed. The Union forces were them- 
selves great losers, for the Confederates fought well. 

Sheridan made another attack on the 21st, when 



SHERIDAN ' 5 CAMPAIGN. 



307 



Early was again defeated and forced to withdraw farther 
into the Valley. A division of Longstreet's corps rein- 
forced Early, but Sheridan's divisions were too strong 
to be seriously menaced. 




GENERAL I'HII.IP H. SHERIDAN. 



Sheridan carried out only too well the instructions 
he received from Grant ; and a scene of desolation was 
produced in one of the most fertile and beautiful valleys 
in the land. These frightful excesses were much con- 
demned. 



308 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



On his return down the Cedar Creek Valley in the di- 
rection of the Potomac, Sheridan was closely followed 
by a large force of Confederates. A collision took 
place on October 5, ending in the repulse of the 
Southerners ; and ten days later a more important 
action was fought on the banks of Cedar Creek. The 
Union troops were entrenched on the north bank of 
that stream (which runs into the Shenandoah), when, in 
the early morning of the 19th, they were unexpectedly 
attacked by the Confederates. Sheridan had gone to 
Washington, leaving General Wright in temporary com- 
mand; while his adversary was preparing for a power- 
ful and well-directed blow. The assault, when it came, 
was delivered simultaneously against the front and the 
rear. Most of the pickets were captured ; the rest of 
the troops, suddenly aroused from sleep, were thrown 
into confusion, and driven back tumultuously on the 
road to Middletown. Eighteen of the Union guns were 
seized by Early, and turned on their late possessors ; 
and for a time it seemed as if the Union troops would 
be utterly overwhelmed. Wright succeeded in restor- 
ing order to the ranks, and in checking the advance; 
the Southerners, scattering themselves through the 
abandoned camps, began drinking and plundering ; and 
when Sheridan arrived from Winchester — " thirty miles 
away" — and ordered a vigorous attack, the opposing 
troops gave way in unreasonable panic, abandoning the 
guns they had captured in the morning. 

Sheridan's reputation was greatly advanced by this 
affiiir, and the President, on November 14, promoted 
him to the rank of major-general, as a reward for his 
" personal gallantry, military skill and just confidence in 
the courage and patriotism of his troops." He had in 
truth saved the Union cause from a crushing reverse, 
and had inflicted on Early a blow which made his forces 
stagger. On the morninci of that memorable October 



3IO 



TIJE BATTLES FOR IIJE UNION. 



19, the Union troops had fallen back in dismay; in the 
evening, it was their adversaries who were in flight, and 
who, smitten with dread, blocked the roads with the 
scattered remnants of an army which only a few hours 
before had almost attained the sunmiit of victory. A 
charge by the Union cavalry, as dusk was setting in, 
completed the ruin that had already been commenced ; 
and from that hour nothing but terror and despair pre- 
vailed throughout the Confederate ranks. Early biv- 
ouacked at Fisher's Hill durin<7 the nisfht. and next 
day retreated beyond Woodstock, followed by the 
cavalry. He did not consider himself safe until he had 
taken up a position on Mount Jackson, near the south- 
ern extremity of the Great North Mountains, where, 
counting up his losses, he found that 22 of his guns 
had passed over to the enemy, together with most of 
his stores and camp-equipages. The Southerners were 
extremely disappointed at the result of his movement. 
They had not only lost a large number in killed, 
wounded and captured, but their operations in the Val- 
ley had been injured be\'ond the hope of redemption. 
The superiority of the Union troops in that locality was 
now so clearly established that Grant felt he could 
safely recall to the army before Petersburg those de- 
tachments which he had sent a few months earlier to 
guard Washington. It had been hoped at Richmond 
that the alarm at Washington would be so great as to 
induce Grant to transport the major portion of his army 
northward for the protection of the Government ; but 
Grant, refusing to be influenced by the fears of the 
timid, only despatched a comparatively small contingent 
and retained the bulk of his forces for the prosecution 
of the task he had in hand. Lee, therefore, had been 
but slightly helped by Early's bold incursion. Great 
courage and ability had been shown by the Southern- 
ers, who had at one time carried the utmost dismay into 



SHE R IDA N'S CA MP A IGN. 



311 



VVasliington ; but their divisions were not strong 
enough to meet the superior forces of the North, and 
the Shenandoah Valley, after being desolated in turn by 
the hostile operations of both armies, remained as the 
prize of the Union troops, and throughout the further 
course of the war was not again threatened by the 
Southern armies. 

While these events were proceeding on the banks of 
the Shenandoah, Grant continued to watch his adver- 
saries at Petersburg and Richmond, in the hope that he 
should be able to discover some weak point through 
which he could strike effectually at one or both of 
those cities. His lines, strongly fortified, covered a 
length of nearly 30 miles, starting from near the Weldon 
Railway on his left, and, after crossing the James River, 
terminating in the vicinity of Newmarket on his right. 
During the autumn and early winter, he made many 
attempts to turn the Confederate flanks ; but Lee ac- 
commodated his own movements to those of his oppo- 
nents with so much skill and address that nothing could 
be effected. The army under Lee consisted of veterans, 
who had had experience of almost every kind of war, 
and whose steadiness was certain not to desert them 
under any circumstances, however adverse ; but their 
numbers were few in comparison with those of Grant, 
and, what was worse, the population of the Confederate 
States seemed to have lost all heart in the struggle, and 
to be increasingly disinclined to furnish the recruits 
who were now so sorely needed. " The rebels," Grant 
wrote, " have now in their ranks their last men. The 
little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guard- 
ing railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their 
garrisons for entrenched positions. A man lost by them 
cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and 
the grave equally to get their present force. Besides 
what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they 



312 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



are now losing from desertions and other causes at least 
one regiment per day. With this drain upon them, the 
end is not far distant, if we will only be true to our- 
selves." These statements were substantially correct. 
The desperate game of the Southern Confederacy was 
almost played out, and it was merely the determination 
of a few able and adventurous men that prevented the 
immediate submission of the people to a power which 
they might dislike, but which it was obvious they could 
not withstand. The consciousness of this fact strength- 
ened Grant in that tenacity of purpose which was one of 
his most distinctive characteristics. Another might 
have given up the attempt on Petersburg and Richmond 
after so many failures ; Grant, on the contrary, held to 
his position, and did not suffer himself to be discouraged 
by incidental reverses. 

The weakening of Lee's force by the despatch of divi- 
sions to the assistance of Early, appeared to offer an oppor- 
tunity for an offensive movement. The approaches to 
Richmond from the north-eastern side of the James River 
were believed to be guarded by not more than 8000 
men ; and Grant accordingly sent a strong detachment, 
under the general orders of Hancock, up that stream to 
Deep Bottom. The troops, however, disembarked with 
so much slowness that Lee had time to concentrate his 
regiments on the menanced point, and, after a good deal 
of fighting, the Union forces were obliged to retire. 
This was a movement against the left flank of Lee, to 
repel which it had been necessary to draw away the 
greater number of the defending army from the oppo- 
site extremity of the line. Grant, being aware of the 
fact, struck in that direction also. The commander of 
the expedition against the Confederate right was War- 
ren, who took with him the 5th corps, and succeeded in 
obtaining a position beyond the Weldon Railway. Al- 
though Lee had only a few troops in that quarter, he 



314 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



assailed his antagonist with great spirit, and achieved a 
temporary success ; but the Union forces, on being rein- 
forced, recovered the ground they had abandoned, and 
proceeded to fortify themselves against further molesta- 
tion. An attack by the Southerners, on August 21, met 
with no success, and on the same day Hancock reached 
the Weldon Railway at a point four miles south of 
Warren's entrenchments. On the 25th, an action took 
place between Hancock and Hill, which resulted in the 
Confederates obtaining possession of Reams' Station, 
and in the retreat of the Union forces. Nevertheless, 
the latter still held the Weldon Railway, and succeeded 
in connecting it with the center of the army in front of 
Petersburg. All this while, that city was shelled by the 
Union troops, and the Confederate batteries on the 
James River were revenging themselves by firing on the 
Union gunboats. 

Grant now ordered Meade to conduct a feigned 
attack against Lee's right, while he sent two corps 
under Butler, to make an attempt against the Confeder- 
ate works north of Chaffin's Bluff, opposite Drury's 
Bluff, on the James River. It was believed that onl)' a 
small force of Southerners occupied the works on the 
north side of the river, and it seemed therefore not im- 
probable that a sudden movement and rapid advance in 
that direction might ensure the capture of Richmond. 
The inhabitants of the city were apprehensive for their 
safety, and, being threatened at so many points, feared 
that at some one the circle would be broken through, and 
all would be lost. Even should the movement fail, it 
was anticipated that the withdrawal of a large part of the 
Confederate force from the southern to the northern side 
of the river would materially aid the Union forces in their 
operations against Petersburg; and it was therefore con- 
sidered by Grant that the venture would be worth the 
cost in life it would demand. The movement was com- 



THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND. 



315 



menced on the night of September 28, when General 
Ord, with the i8th corps, was directed to cross the James 
at Aikin's Landing, eight miles above Deep Bottom, 
and at daylight to advance quickly against the enemy's 
works in his front. At the same time, General Birney, 
with the loth corps, was to move on Bermuda Hundred, 
and cross the river during the night. These two de- 
tachments were to obtain possession of the Newmarket 
road, and to form a connection in front of Richmond. 
The design was carried out without any accident, and 
the outer line of Confederate defences was soon 
in the hands of the two Union commanders. The 
inner defences at Chaffin's Bluff were now before 
the assailants, and preparations were made for carry- 
ing them. Before these preparations could be com- 
pleted, reinforcements had reached the garrison, and 
the assault, when at length it came, proved unsuccess- 
ful. The troops employed on this service were negroes, 
of whom only a small proportion succeeded in reaching 
one of the forts. These behaved with much gallantry, 
but were unable to take so formidable a position. All 
who were not killed were captured, and it was found 
necessary to abandon the attack. On the 30th, further 
portions of the enemy's lines were seized by the Union 
troops, and an attempt to recapture the works, on the 
same day, was wholly without result. On October 7, 
the Confederates made a partially successful endeavor 
to turn the right flank of their opponents, but were re- 
pulsed. Other encounters took place on subsequent 
days, without materially altering the position of the be- 
ligerants towards one another ; and Grant, considering 
it important to keep what he had gained, extended his 
lines from opposite Dutch Gap to tlie Newmarket road. 
Meade's simultaneous movement against the right of 
the Confederate line ended,after an engagement of three 
days' duration, and a heavy loss in men, in the Union 



3i6 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

forces acquiring a position across the Squirrel road 
parallel with the Weldon Railway; whereupon the Con- 
federates retired within their main entienchments. 

Another attempt to capture Petersburg followed 
these operations. Meade was ordered to occupy the 
Boydton road and the Southside Railway, both lying 
to the south-west of the town ; and this movement was 
accomplished by Hancock on the 27th. The march 
was performed with great secrecy, and without being 
discovered by the enemy. The 2d corps passed round 
the Confederate flank, and was proceeding to execute 
other portions of the concerted scheme, when Hancock 
received orders to halt. The 9th corps, under Warren 
and Parke, had been directed to engage the adversary 
in front ; but Parke had been unsuccessful in capturing 
the works against which he was sent, and Warren was 
accordingly instructed to form a junction between Han- 
cock's right and Parke's left. This, however, could not 
be effected, owing to the density of the forest, the mazy 
character of the roads which intersected it, and the 
want of proper maps. Hill, who commanded the Con- 
federates in that direction, conceived that the proper 
time had arrived for making an attack, as the Union 
corps were now separated and confused. Hancock and 
Warren were simultaneously assailed, and night closed 
in over an undecided combat. Next day, the Union 
troops, perceiving that their design had been a failure, 
withdrew across Hatcher's Run, a stream crossing the 
Boydton road, and with some difficulty got back to 
their own lines. At the same time, Butler attempted a 
similar manceuvre on the north side of the James 
River; but his operations entirely failed, and it was 
with a loss of nearly 1500 men that the Union troops 
returned to the point whence they had started. This 
terminated the active operations of the year in front of 
Petersburg and Richmond. Both sides were getting 



THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND. 



3^7 



sick of the struggle. From both armies there were 
many desertions; but the Union army could suffer this 
depletion of their ranks much better than the Con- 
federates. Grant's numbers might have been called 
overwhelming, but that they did not overwhelm ; the 
Confederates, on the contrary, presented a daily dimin- 
ishing host to their adversaries, and could ill afford any 
further reduction of their meagre legions. Yet, 
although his forces were so numerous, Grant was deeply 
impressed with the necessity of filling those gaps which 
the progress of the war had inevitably made. He com- 
municated his views to the Government, and the call for 
500,000 men, issued by the President on July 18, was 
ordered to be carried into effect on September 19, and 
succeeding days. Grant, writing to the Secretary of 
War, gave it as his opinion that " prompt action in 
filling our armies, will have more effect upon the enemy 
than a victory over them. They profess to believe, and 
make their men believe, there is such a party North in 
favor of recognizing Southern independence that the 
draft cannot be enforced. Let them be undeceived." 
To the same effect, and on the same day, wrote Sher- 
man from Atlanta ; and as by this time there was 
evidence of the Confederacy giving way on all sides, 
the probability of an enthusiastic response to the draft 
was considerable. 

The last two months of 1864 were not characterized 
by any events of importance on the Potomac or the 
James River. Grant had failed in all his active opera- 
tions, but he had obtained a position in close proximity 
to his antagonist, from which that antagonist was unable 
to expel him. The Union lines were fortified so 
strongly as to defy successful attack, and Butler was 
engaged in cutting a canal through Dutch Gap (a 
peninsula formed by a great bend of the James River), 
in the hope of facilitating the passage of the troops, and 



318 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



of turning the Confederate batteries at that part of the 
channel. The Southern armies in Richmond and 
Petersburg were getting short of food and clothing ; 
yet the soldiers manning the works still fought with 
resolution, and repelled with spirit whatever attacks 
were directed against their lines during the early- 
winter; and it is impossible not to admire the courage 
and self-reliance exhibited by these men at a time when 
everything was tending to their defeat. Fort Fisher 
covered the harbor of Wilmington (North Carolina), 
one of the great resorts of the blockade-runners ; and, 
until it could be reduced, Wilmington was secure from 
attack, together with the vessels which preyed on our 
commerce. In the early winter, a detachment of 6500 
men, under Butler, was sent to act in concert with 
Admiral Porter. The fort was defended by rather less 
than 1000 men. The assailants were in every respect 
much stronger than the assailed ; but it was not pro- 
posed to take the fort by storm. A plan was formed 
for destroying the work, by blowing up a powder vessel 
beneath its walls, and 215 pounds of the explosive were 
placed on board the steamer Louisiana, which, under 
pretence of being a blockade-runner, was anchored 
within three-quarters of a mile of the fort. The 
attempt turned out a failure ; for, although the powder 
exploded, it did not take fire simultaneously, and the 
effect was thus dissipated. The boat was fired on the 
morning of December 24, but the detonation was pro- 
ductive of but trifling results. It was followed on the 
same day by a tremendous bombardment of the fort. 
The fleet was extremely powerful ; but, although the 
roar of the guns was terrific, and the garrison, expecting 
immediate death, crowded into the bomb-proof galleries, 
very little damage was effected. The attack was 
renewed on the following day, when a detachment of 
more than 2000 men, commanded by General Weitzel, 



FORT FISHER. 



319 



landed beneath the walls, and took up a position for 
ulterior operations. The bombardment from the fleet 
still continued ; yet Weitzel found he could do nothmg. 
He reported to Butler that it would be butchery to 
order an assault, and under these circumstances it was 
determined to abandon the attempt. The troops were 
re-embarked, and conveyed to Fortress Monroe. Fort 
Fisher was scarcely injured, and its garrison was now 
strengthened by the arrival of troops from Richmond. 
Butler was removed from command, and the proceed- 
ings at Fort Fisher were made the subject of an in- 
quiry, which resulted in Butler being acquitted of blame. 
A second expedition against the fort was sent out 
almost immediately after the failure of the first. On 
the departure of the army, Porter withdrew his fleet to 
Beaufort, in the confident expectation that the troops 
would soon be ordered back again. He had not long 
to wait, for on January 2, 1865, General Terry, com- 
manding a division of the Army of the James, was 
ordered to proceed to Fort Fisher with the soldiers 
who had been employed in the former attempt, and an 
additional brigade of 1500 men. Having arranged a 
plan of operations with Porter, Terry made his way to 
New Inlet, by which Cape Fear River is approached 
from the Atlantic. While the ironclads and monitors 
shelled the fort, the disembarkation of the troops was 
effected on January 13. The works were presently 
bombarded by all the vessels of the fleet, and the gar- 
rison were able to make scarcely any reply, owing to 
the inferiority of their guns. Bragg, who was at Wil- 
mington, sent on some reinforcements; but little could 
be done against so terrible and concentrated a fire. 
The small gunboats got in very close on the 14th, and, 
firing with great accuracy, dismounted some of the 
guns on the land-face. Preparations were made for an 
assault on the following day. The walls were begin- 



320 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

ning to show signs of serious injury. The rampart 
was overthrown, the palisades were torn away, and 
communication with the mines was cut off. Early in 
the afternoon, three brigades, under General Ames, 
were sent against the north-eastern rampart, while a 
party of sailors and marines, who had landed on the 
beach, made a feint against the sea-face. The Confed- 
erates fought with much resolution, and the two prin- 
cipal commanding officers were severely wounded ; but 
the determination of the Union troops was equal to 
that of their enemies. From one position to another 
the defenders of the fort were driven back ; the whole 
work was at length abandoned ; and the garrison, fly- 
ing to the extremity of the neck of land on which the 
fort was built, threw down their arms in despair. The 
feint against the sea-face had been badly managed, 
and resulted in a somewhat precipitate retreat of the 
sailors ; but the main attack had been successful in the 
highest degree, and, now that Fort Fisher had fallen, 
Wilmington lay at the mercy of the conquerors. For 
the present, however, it was not attacked. The other 
works at the entrance to Cape Fear River were aban- 
doned by the Confederates, and the stream was entered 
when the torpedoes had been removed. A few days 
afterwards, the ironclad squadron which had recently 
been built at Richmond, and launched on the James, 
made an attempt to destroy the pontoon bridges and 
transports by which the Union troops were supporting 
their operations in that quarter. On the night of Janu- 
ary 24, the Confederate vessels tried to force their way 
through the obstructions. One of the ironclads passed 
a boom which had been drawn across the channel ; but 
three larger vessels grounded, and in the early morning, 
when the shore batteries opened fire, the flotilla was 
compelled to withdraw. 

Peace negotiations of a formal character were opened 



irfl^'^'i'llVvi' '«U 




^L!,'^ 



U'lLi' 



m \, 



I 



'ii-''ii'i''nii!i.:iiii;ttW;fei^ 



322 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



in January. Three commissioners — one of whom was 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confed- 
eracy — were charged with power to arrange with Union 
agents the terms on which peace might be conchidcd. 
These discussions ended in nothing but a more com- 
plete manifestation of the inability of the two sides to 
find any common ground of agreement. Lincoln went 
in person to Fortress Monroe and met the commis- 
sioners. Nothing was effected. Lincoln would not re- 
cede from his inflexible demand of absolute submission 
on the part of the South ; the commissioners were not 
empowered to make any such terms. ^The conference 
was held on February 3, and it was the last attempt 
on the part of the Confederacy to obtain peace to- 
gether with independence. The game was very nearly 
played out, and the South was shortly compelled to 
accept peace on any terms it could get. 

" The man," Davis remarked, " who should go be- 
fore the Southern people with any proposition which 
implied that the North was to have a voice in deter- 
mining the domestic relations of the South, could not 
live here a day. He would be hanged to the first 
tree, without judge or jury." 

We now approach the final series of operations which 
proved the ruin of the Confederacy. The state of af- 
fairs at Richmond was now very critical, the troops had 
been on short rations throughout the winter, and, as 
the Northern forces tightened their grip on the devoted 
city, it was evident that the prevalent distress would 
become still greater. If anything more was to be 
done, it must be done at once. Lee accordingly deter- 
mined to strike a heavy blow at Grant, such as might 
possibly compel his withdrawal from Petersburg and 
Richmond, and enable the Confederate forces of that 
locality to unite with those under Johnston for ulterior 
operations against Sherman and Schofield. The point 



ATTACK ON FORT STEADMAN. 



323 



of attack was Fort Steadiiian, the second work from the 
extreme right of the Union defences in the neighbor- 
hood of Appomattox. The position was most formid- 
able. Works of a very elaborate character, strongly- 
built and heavily armed, stretched for a distance of 30 
miles from the north side of the James to Hatcher's 
Run, on the south side. These lines had the Appomat- 
tox in front during the greater part of their course, 
and between them and the river were the opposing 
works of the Confederates. The attack on Fort Stead- 
man was made at dawn on March 25. The assailants 
were led by General Gordon, and the garrison was so 
completely surprised that the place was captured with 
but little difficulty. Gordon then proceeded towards 
Fort Hascall, forming a portion of the second line of 
defence ; but the attempt to carry this position was an 
utter failure. Baffled and discouraged, Gordon retired 
to Fort Steadman, where he was furiously attacked by 
the 9th Union corps, and, after a sanguinary fight, was 
compelled to yield what he had acquired with such de- 
lusive facility. Losing a large proportion of their 
number by death and capture, the Confederates re- 
treated to their own works, followed by the victorious 
Union troops who established themselves in a position 
beyond that which they had occupied when the day's 
operations began. It was two days after this event 
that Sherman arrived at City Point, on the James River, 
to consult with Grant on the future conduct of the cam- 
paign. The two commanders, together with Meade, 
Ord and President Lincoln, subsequently met in con- 
ference in front of Petersburg, and debated on the 
measures necessary for the final subjection of the Con- 
federacy. The great object was to keep the forces of 
Lee and Johnston from effecting a junction, and thus 
prolonging the struggle over an indefinite period. To 
frustrate this design, Grant proposed to take the initia- 



324 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



tive and to make so overvvhelniing an attack on Lee 
as to prevent the union of the two armies. March 29 
was fixed upon for the renewal of active operations. 
The plan embraced a simultaneous attack on many scat- 
tered points of the Confederate position about Peters- 
burg. For resisting this combined assault, Lee had 
only a comparatively small body of troops ; but those 
troops were seasoned veterans, and Lee himself was a 
commander of the highest ability. The approaching 
contest, therefore, seemed likely to be the death- 
grapple, and each side summoned up all its energies for 
the prosecution of the task which lay before it. 

The movement began on the 29th, when the 2d 
corps, under Humphreys, and the 5th, under Warren, 
arrived before the Confederate breastworks in the vi- 
cinity of Hatcher's Run. That night Grant communi- 
cated with Sheridan, and directed him to act in con- 
junction with the main army, instead of simpl}^ operating 
against the enemy's lines of communication, as had 
been originally intended. Violent rain on the 30th 
prevented any active measures; but the Confederates in 
the meanwhile concentrated several of their brigades 
opposite the corps of Humphreys and Warren. On the 
31st, Lee considered himself strong enough to antici- 
pate his enemy's blow by striking a blow of his own. 
A portion of Warren's force was driven back with great 
slaughter ; but the success was only temporary, and was 
followed by a recoil when other troops were encountered. 
Lee then turned on Sheridan, who had taken up a 
position in front of Dinwiddie Court House, at the Five 
Forks — a meeting of cross-roads, three of which run 
towards the Southside Railway. The attack was made 
with so much impetuosity and vigor that Sheridan's 
men were for a time driven back, and seemed likely to 
be entirely defeated. The troopers, however, retired 
behind a breastwork of logs and earth which had pre- 



326 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



viously been erected, and after a while the combat was 
renewed by two brigades of Union cavalry, who at- 
tacked the Southerners in flank, and checked their 
farther advance. Towards night, the Confederates were 
forced to yield the ground they had won at an earlier 
period of the day, and this was at once occupied by 
their antagonists, who in some directions pushed their 
line beyond the points which they had held at the be- 
ginning of the action. A detachment from Warren's 
corps was sent on the night of the 31st to the support 
of Sheridan ; and when these troops arrived at daybreak 
on April I, they beheld the rear of the opposing cavalry 
in rapid retreat. Sheridan now felt in a position to 
assume the offensive, and a murderous conflict again 
ensued, ending in the total discomfiture of the Con- 
federates, who retreated in disorder towards Petersburg. 
On April i, Grant opened a furious bombardment 
along his whole line, and directed the corps of Wright, 
Parke, and Ord, which had not as yet been employed 
in this series of operations, to attack Petersburg next 
morning. The assault commenced at daybreak. The 
three corps appointed to the work dashed across the 
narrow belt of land separating their own from the Con- 
federate lines, and, attacking with irresistible spirit and 
enormous concentration of power, swept like an im- 
mense wave over the entrenchments which had so long 
resisted the Union advance. At the same time, Hum- 
phreys, whose corps was on the left, beyond Hatcher's 
Run, assailed the works in his front, and drove back the 
defenders into the inner fortifications. Magnificent 
efforts were made by the Confederate generals to re- 
trieve this dire misfortune ; but the troops were fast los- 
ing their organization, and there was too much reason 
to apprehend that panic would presently succeed to 
confusion. The less determined were seeking the rear; 
the more self-reliant were desperately striving to retain 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 327 

such positions as still remained within their grasp ; but 
the case was hopeless, and at the utmost nothing more 
could be done than to delay the Union progress, and 
cover the retreat of the army, so as possibly to avoid 
the humiliation of a complete surrender. Fort Gregg 
was held for some hours by a small body of devoted 
men, who in the midst of general consternation retained 
their coolness and their courage. The garrison of Fort 
Alexander also stood firmly to their guns. Repeated 
onsets were made by Gibbons's division ; but it was 
not until half-past two in the afternoon that Fort Gregg 
surrendered, with the small handful of men, 30 in num- 
ber, who alone remained out of the 250 forming the 
garrison that morning. 

The day was Sunday; and while Davis was at wor- 
ship, a message from Lee was handed to him which 
must have cast an additional shadow upon that worn 
and weary face. Lee announced that his outer lines had 
been forced, that he could resist only a few hours 
longer, and that Richmond must be immediately evacu- 
ated. In the course of the morning, however, Lee was 
enabled to rally his troops behind the inner defences, 
and so far to restore their confidence as to undertake the 
offensive on his own part. Hill, one of the most dis- 
tinguished of the Confederate commanders, was directed 
to attack the enemy's 9th corps, and executed the move- 
ment with so much skill and daring that they were for 
a time staggered. But in this heroic effort Hill was 
slain, and his troops were ultimately obliged to recede. 
Field's division of Longstreet's corps, however, was at 
the same time so vigorously handled as to keep the 
Union troops in check ; and during the night of that 
disastrous day the Southerners evacuated Petersburg, 
without further molestation from their opponents. 

They retired on Amelia Court House, to the north- 
west of Petersburg ; and on this point were concentrated 



328 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

the forces that had previously been north of the James. 
Great fires were kindled in Richmond, where the Con- 
federates applied the torch to the Government offices, 
the great storehouses on the banks of the river, and 
other buildings. Davis, the members of his Cabinet, 
and all the citizens of importance, departed for Char- 
lotte, North Carolina. 

The evacuation of Richmond became known to Gen- 
eral Weitzel — who occupied the Union works north of 
the James — at three o'clock on the morning of April 3. 
At daylight he moved his men forward, and, meeting 
with no opposition, entered the city. He found much 
suffering and poverty among the population. The rich 
as well as the poor were destitute of food ; and, what- 
ever their political sympathies, it must in some respects 
have been a relief that the long and arduous strufrcle 
was over. The great news was at once telegraphed to 
Washington, and on the following day President Lin- 
coln arrived at Richmond, and occupied the house be- 
longing to Davis, which was now used as the head- 
quarters of the Union garrison. Martial law was for the 
present proclaimed in the city, and the people were re- 
quested to remain quietly in their houses, and to avoid 
all public assemblages, or meetings in the streets. At 
the same time, strict orders were given for restraining 
the victorious soldiery from acts of j)] under and outrage, 
and from the use of insulting words or gestures towards 
the citizens. To have obtained possession of the Con- 
federate capital was a great triumph for the Northern 
cause; yet the Confederation itself, though pierced and 
mortally wounded in many places, had still some life 
remaining, and was capable of resistance in the field. 
Lee had effected his escape at the head of an army not 
contemptible in numbers, and eminent for valor : and to 
the crushing of that force, wherever it might be found, 
Grant immediately directed his attention. 



CAPTURE OF RICHMOND. 



329 



Breaking down the bridges over which he passed, 
Lee pursued his way in a westerly direction, and was 
presently 16 miles ahead of his adversaries. The fear 
was lest he should unite with Johnston, in which case 
he might still have offered a formidable resistance in the 
open country. To prevent such a result, every nerve 
was strained ; and as early as the evening of the 2d the 
cavalry under Sheridan, and a number of infantry, were 
marching in the direction of the Southside and Lynch- 
burg Railway. Lee was then retreating along the 
southern bank of the Appomattox ; and at Amelia 
Court House the forces from Richmond joined those 
from Petersburg on the morning of the 4th. Lee hoped 
to have an opportunity of taking some of the Union 
columns in detail, and beating them one by one ; but 
the commissariat stores which he had ordered to be col- 
lected at that spot had by some error failed to reach the 
de[)6t. It has been said that they were sent by mistake 
to Richmond, and that they perished there in the con- 
flagration. The disaster, however arising, was one of 
an overwhelming character. The Confederate troops 
carried with them rations for not more than one day ; 
the country was in such a state that it could not supply 
them with food ; and it was no longer possible to per- 
form the long and difficult march by which alone Lee 
could combine with Johnston. On the afternoon of the 
4th, Sheridan cut the rail to Danville between Amelia 
Court House and Burkesville, and, entrenching himself 
strongly, awaited the arrival of the main army. The 
Confederates were now exhausted, depressed, and out 
of heart; desertions were numerous, and many per- 
mitted themselves to be captured. An attempt to escape 
towards Lynchburg, on the night of the 5th, was de- 
feated by the able combinations of the Union troops, 
and next morning the advance-guard of Ord's army 
was planted across the roads by which Lee was march- 



330 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



ing. The obstruction was for the moment swept aside 
after a sliarp encounter ; but the Confederates were by 
this time reduced to such terrible extremities that they 
were compelled to feed on the young- shoots of trees. 
The horses and mules were in an equally bad state with 
their masters, and the soldiers were utterly broken down 
by want of sustenance, and the fatigue of constant 
marching. It was so evident that all was over, that large 
numbers of guns and wagons were destroyed, to pre- 
vent their falling into the hands of the enemy, and the 
records and papers belonging to the army were burned. 
Most of the baggage shared the same fate, and it was 
now only a question of how soon the inevitable collapse 
would take place. Meanwhile, the pursuit was kept up 
with remorseless rigor. Lee's rear was attacked by 
Sheridan, and by the infantry of the 2d corps, on the 
6th. In the first instance, the men fought with the fury 
of despair ; but, on finding every avenue of retreat cut 
off by the converging columns of the foe, they threw 
down their arms, and surrendered. Lee pushed on, at 
the head of 10,000 men, conceiving that he might even 
yet reach Lynchburg, where supplies had been collected. 
General Pendleton expressed to him the opinion of him- 
self and his fellow-officers that surrender was now una- 
voidable ; but, clinging to his desperate hope, he refused 
to admit it. A few scattered actions still took place, 
and the attempts of the Union troops to bar the road 
of retreat were repulsed with amazing valor; but the 
end was by this time a foregone conclusion. Submis- 
sion might be delayed for a day or two ; but in the very 
near future it stood before those vanquished and starv- 
ing men, a fact inevitable as death, inexorable as fate. 

On April 7, Grant addressed a letter to Lee in which 
he said: — "The result of last week must convince you 
of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of 
the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel 



CAPTURE OF RICHMOND. 



331 



that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from my- 
self the responsibihty of any further effusion of blood 
by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the 
Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern 
Virginia." Lee replied on the same day, and, while 
remarking that he was not entirely of the opinion ex- 
pressed by Grant as to the hopelessness of further resist- 
ance, reciprocated the desire of that commander to avoid 
useless bloodshed, and therefore, before considering his 
proposition, asked the terms he would offer on condi- 
tion of the army surrendering. Grant wrote on the 8th, 
demanding that the men surrendered should be disquali- 
fied from taking up arms against the Government until 
properly exchanged, and adding that he would meet 
Lee, or would designate officers to meet any officers 
named by him, at any point that might be considered 
desirable, for the purpose of arranging the terms upon 
which the surrender would be received. But Lee was 
still disinclined to entertain the proposition. He desired 
a peisonal interview with Grant, that the restoration of 
peace might be talked over; and proposed a meeting 
between the picket lines. If by this species of equivo- 
cation Lee hoped to effect any arrangement by which 
the war could be terminated, and the Confederacy at the 
same time recognized, with whatever limitations or under 
whatever conditions, he deceived himself Grant told 
him, in a letter written on the 9th, that peace might be 
had at once on the South laying down its arms ; and by 
that time he must have fully understood, as regarded 
his own army at least, that no other course was possible. 
His forces had sustained another severe defeat early on 
the morning of the 9th. Sheridan had cut off the line 
of retreat. Four trains laden with provisions, which 
were approaching along the line from Lynchburg, were 
captured. A last despairing attempt to cut through 
the opposing ranks was baffled ; and as Sheridan was 



232 THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 

preparing to charge the staggering masses of the Con- 
federates, a flag of truce was seen approaching, with the 
information that hostihties had been suspended, in order 
to arrange terms of surrender. Lee had at length 
requested an interview with Grant in accordance with 
the offer contained in the letter of the previous day ; and 
the preliminaries were on the point of being arranged. 

The two great rivals met during April 9, in a small 
dwelling near Appomattox Court House. The terms 
of surrender were, that the officers were to give their 
individual paroles not to take up arms against the 
United States until properly exchanged ; that each com- 
pany or regimental commander should sign a similar 
parole on behalf of the men ; and that the arms, artil- 
lery, and public property, should be made over to officers 
appointed by Grant to receive them. This last condi- 
tion was not to embrace the side-arms of tlie officers, 
nor their private horses or baggage. On these stipula- 
tions being complied with, the officers and men would 
be allowed to return to their homes, and would not be 
disturbed by the autliority of the United States, so long 
as they observed their paroles, and the laws existing 
where they might reside. The surrender was to include 
all the forces operating with the Army of Virginia on 
April 8, and these auxiliary troops speedily laid down 
their arms. 

The conduct of Grant and of his officers was in the 
highest degree considerate and kind, and the Union 
soldiers shared rations with their famished antagonists, 
now their antagonists no longer. Next day General 
Lee issued a farewell address to his army. " After 
four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed 
courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia 
has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers 
and resources. I need not tell the survivors of so many 
hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the 



LEE 'S SURRENDER. 



333 



last, that I have consented to this result from no dis- 
trust of them ; but, holding that valor and devotion 
could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the 
loss that would attend the continuation of the contest, 
I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those 




THE HOUSE WHERE GENERAL I.EE SURRENDERED. 



whose past valor has endeared them to their country- 
men. By the terms of agreement, officers and men can 
return to their homes, and remain there until exchanged. 
You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds 
from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed ; 



334 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend 
you His blessing and protection." On that same day 
— April 10 — Lee went with an escort of Union cavalry 
to Richmond, where he visited the quarters of Long- 
street, and afterwards took leave of his staff, previous 
to departing for his own home. 

The number of officers and men who surrendered on 
this occasion is not exactly known ; but it has been 
estimated that Lee's army on evacuating Richmond, 
consisted of nearly 30,000 men. Probably it was not 
so large as this, but it was large enough to make the 
loss to the Confederacy one of the most crushing 
disasters that the Southern League could undergo in 
its then exhausted condition. Even before the sur- 
render, many of the rebel soldiers had abandoned the 
army, and returned home, seeing the utter hopelessness 
of a struggle where the resources on one side were 
practically illimitable, and those on the other incapable 
of renewal or repair. The number of muskets given 
up by Lee scarcely exceeded lo,000, and the pieces of 
artillery were thirty. The total captures of artillery 
during this series of battles, and the pursuit that fol- 
lowed, amounted to 170 guns, while of wagons about 
350 were yielded to the conquerors. On receiving 
news of the surrender, the War Department at Wash- 
ington issued an order to the effect that a salute of 200 
guns should be fired at the headquarters of every army 
and department, at every post and arsenal in the 
United States, and at the Military Academy at West 
Point. The Northern people were transported with 
delight at the great intelligence which reached them 
from Virginia. It was true that the army under 
Johnston, and the armies of the West, still kept pos- 
session of the field ; but there could now be not the 
slightest question as to the final issue of the war. The 
slaveowners' rebellion was virtually .at an end ; the 



336 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



authority of the Union was on the eve of being 
restored throughout the length and breadth of the 
Repubhc. A tremendous price had been paid for this 
supremacy of the Federation over its turbulent mem- 
bers ; but the result was nearly achieved. It was no 
longer possible for unfriendly critics, in England or 
elsewhere, to say that the American Government was 
one which naturally tended to disunion, that the model 
Republic was a bubble, that the commonwealth estab- 
lished by Washington, by Adams, by Jefferson, by 
Franklin, and by many worthy peers, had a natural 
tendency to fly into discordant fragments, to relapse 
into chaos, and to end in ruin. 

With the surrender of Lee, the last hope of Southern 
independence vanished. As he rode back from his 
interview with Grant the troops crowded around him in 
transports of grief and enthusiasm. He said, " Men, 
we have fought through the war together. I have done 
the best that I could for you." There can be no ques- 
tion that he had. 

On April 15, 1865, President Lincoln was shot while 
attending a theatre; and Andrew Johnson, the Vic^- 
President, was inaugurated President three hours after 
Lincoln's death. 

The surrender of Lee was the last great event under 
the Presidency of Abraham Lincoln. The first great 
event under the Presidency of Andrew Johnson was the 
surrender of the Confederate leader opposed to Sher- 
man, Sherman had conducted his forces in safety to 
Goldsborough, in North Carolina, and Johnston, after 
vain attempts to bar his progress, had retreated to 
Smithfield, a few miles distant on the same line of rail- 
way. For some time, no active operations took place 
between the principal opponents ; but, in the final days 
of March and early days of April, a detachment of 
cavalry marched to and fro in various directions, de- 



JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER. ^^y 

stroying railways and bridges, burning depots of stores, 
and so interfering with the hnes of retreat of all the 
Confederate forces in that part of the country as to 
make their position even more desperate than before. 
At the same time, General Wilson, with another body 
of cavalry, rode through Alabama and a part of Geor- 
gia, defeating Forrest, capturing Selma (a place con- 
taining an arsenal, an armory and large depots) on 
April 3, and threatening other points. Mobile was 
surrendered to General Canby on April I2, after a short 
siege, and when Davis arrived at Johnston's camp it 
was apparent that the Confederacy was doomed. 

On April lo, Sherman advanced in force against 
Johnston. Marching in two columns in a westerly di- 
rection along the northern bank of the Neuse River, 
and overcoming with but little difficulty the slight op- 
position of the Confederate rear-guard, he entered 
Smithfield on the nth. Here he found that his adver- 
sary had crossed to the southern bank of the stream 
and escaped him, but he also learned that Lee had 
surrendered, and he saw that if Johnston could be 
brought to the same pass, the war would be virtually 
at an end. That he might move with greater quick- 
ness, he abandoned his trains, baggage and other im- 
pediments and pushed rapidly forward to Raleigh. 
Finding the enemy still in advance, he bent towards 
the South, crossed the Cape Fear Rivfer, and made for 
Greensboro', whither the Confederates were now re- 
treating. But Johnston was not disposed to abide the 
shock of battle any further. He saw how fearfully he 
was overmatched ; he knew that succor was impossible ; 
he perceived that his troops would soon be destitute of 
the very means of life ; and as Lee had done under 
similar circumstances, he negotiated for a surrender. 

On April 26, it was agreed that the Confederate 
Army of the Tennessee should be surrendered on the 



33^ 



THE BATTLES FOR THE UNION. 



same terms as those which had been granted to the 
Army of Virginia. The men laid down their arms and 
returned to their homes. A few of the cavahy escaped 
to Mississippi, and some other members of the same 
force accompanied Davis in his renewed flight towards 
the south, whence he hoped to escape by some port on 
the seacoast. With these exceptions, the Confederate 
soldiers under the command of Johnston ceased to be 
an army, and returned to their original capacity as 
civilians. 

Jefferson Davis was captured on May lo, at Irwins- 
ville, Georgia. He was taken to Fortress Monroe as a 
prisoner, and remained there till May 13, 1867, when 
he was released on bail, and departed for Canada ; and 
after further postponements of his trial and enlarge- 
ments of his bail the prosecution was dropped on Feb- 
ruary 6, 1 869. The leniency of the Government towards 
their traitorous citizens was most remarkable, and con- 
ferred on the nation the highest honor it could receive. 

General Grant became the eighteenth President on 
March 4, 1869, and was re-elected for a further term of 
four years on the expiration of his first term of office. 

The Civil War was one of the most destructive 
on record. During the four years of its continuance, 
on the Union side, 2,656,533 men were called into ser- 
vice; 1,400,000 were in actual service; 6o,000 men 
were killed in the field, 30,000 mortally wounded, 
and 184,000 died in hospital or camp. The Confeder- 
ates, it is supposed, lost an equal number, while on both 
sides a large number were more or less disabled for 
life. Nor was the expenditure of money less lavish. 
In August, 1865, three months after the close of the 
war, the debt of the Union was ;^ 3, 000,000,000, and if 
we include the whole nation, the actual cost of the 
war must have been over ^6,000,000,000. 









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